America is Not JUST an Idea

America is Not JUST an Idea

Anti-racist is a code word for anti-white.

Asia for the Asians, Africa for the Africans, White countries for Everybody

It is said that there is this RACE problem. They say this RACE problem will be solved when the third world pours into EVERY white country and ONLY into white countries.

The Netherlands and Belgium are as crowded as Japan or Taiwan, but nobody says Japan or Taiwan will solve this RACE problem by bringing in millions of third worlders and quote assimilating unquote with them.

Everybody says the final solution to this RACE problem is for EVERY white country and ONLY white countries to “assimilate,” i.e., intermarry, with all those non-whites.

What if I said there was this RACE problem and this RACE problem would be solved only if hundreds of millions of non-blacks were brought into EVERY black country and ONLY into black countries?

How long would it take anyone to realize I’m not talking about a RACE problem. I am talking about the final solution to the BLACK problem?

And how long would it take any sane black man to notice this and what kind of psycho black man wouldn’t object to this?

But if I tell that obvious truth about the ongoing program of genocide against my race, the white race, Liberals and respectable conservatives agree that I am a naziwhowantstokillsixmillionjews.

They say they are anti-racist. What they are is anti-white.

Anti-racist is a code word for anti-white.

Thank you Media matters, see you soon on the battlefield.

The Secret of America

By Carol Negro

America is not a plot of land. It is not a culture. It is not a nationality. It is not a set of traditions or customs. It is not a government. It is not a people. It is not a book of laws. And it certainly isn’t a race.

America is an idea.

That’s why anyone can become an American. Embrace the idea (and fill out a few forms) and you’re an American.

You’re one of us.

Most other nations are nationalities. Their heritage depends on blood and territory. America is portable. We carry it around in our hearts and minds.

If you bomb our cities, you can’t destroy America. If you ruin our economy, you can’t destroy America. If most of the continent falls into the ocean, you can’t destroy America. Even if you kill most of us, you can’t destroy America.

Because wherever two or more of us are gathered in her name…America is there.

Here is the secret: We don’t live in America. America lives in us.

America is an idea.

The greatest, purest, sweetest, most sublime idea in the history of the world. It lifts man up, it blesses him, it encourage him, it enlightens him, it civilizes him, it opens his heart, it makes him kind and generous and honest and brave and free. It makes him smart and successful and industrious. It makes him innovative and cheerful. It makes him happy, honorable, and honest.

America is an idea.

And it is that idea that is under constant assault in the halls of power, the press room, the classroom, and the screening room.

Who seeks to murder the idea seeks the destruction of America.

What specifically is this idea? It is that man is created with certain inalienable rights, including Life, Liberty, and Property. It is that man has the right to self-government, the right to be left alone, the right to the fruit of his labors, the right to dispose of his property as he sees fit. It is that all men are created equal under God and the law, and that no man can take away these rights, and that the sole duty of government is to protect them. It is that government must be accountable to The People, not the people to the government. It is that ours is to be a nation of laws, not of men, and that no one is above the law. It is that justice is blind. It is that man must be virtuous if he is to be free. It is that human rights come from the creator and cannot be abrogated by men.

The entire goal of the Left is to murder the idea of the goodness and righteousness of freedom, of self-reliance, of independence, of merit, of virtue, of hard work, of honor, of courage, of sacrifice, of loyalty, of morality, of faith, of the inalienable rights to life, liberty, and property.

The Left, in politics, media, education and entertainment, despise the idea that is America. And they are doing everything in their power to promote a replacement “idea” — one that distorts the language of freedom to promote the serfdom of dependence, twists the meaning of truth to tell lies, seeks to limit freedom, mocks faith, virtue and morality, undermines self-reliance and the independent spirit; one that disdains (or punishes) hard work, laughs at frugality, and sneers at sacrifice; one that approves of murdering new life, regulating liberty, confiscating property, and seizing the fruit of our labors. One that denies the Creator and those annoying and inconvenient inalienable rights.

They seek to replace a divinity with a corpse.

Since America is the idea, plotting the overthrow of the idea is plotting the overthrow of America.

They may love their jobs, their plot of land, their privileges, their personal wealth, their property, their family, their friends, their clubs, and their cars. They may love California wine and Maine lobster and Southern Fried Chicken, Texas barbeque, and Boston baked beans. They may love museums, and lighthouses, and beaches and palm trees and big salty lakes, and waterfalls and huge canyons, and redwoods and geysers and cowboys and Indians. They may love football, and Santa Claus, and Martin Luther King Day. They may love fireworks, and Hollywood, and Harvard. But they don’t love America.

They have already killed her in their own hearts. And they are trying to kill her in ours and our children’s with their unconstitutional laws, their biased reporting, their false history, their immoral and undermining “art.”

They seek nothing less than the death of the American idea, which is far worse than the conquest of territory. They mercilessly and tirelessly work toward the destruction of the American soul.
Ms. Negro is Founder & Director of MyLiberty, the Tea Party Patriots of San Mateo County, California.
Locust: This is why America is Done, nothing left but be ready for the collapse and ethnic cleansing to follow.

One Nation, Indivisible: Is It History?

Todd Bigelow/FTWP
In Los Angeles, demographers see “white flight” beyond the suburbs and into rural areas.
(By Todd Bigelow for The Washington Post)

First in a series of occasional articles

By William Booth
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, February 22, 1998; Page A1

At the beginning of this century, as steamers poured into American ports, their steerages filled with European immigrants, a Jew from England named Israel Zangwill penned a play whose story line has long been forgotten, but whose central theme has not. His production was entitled “The Melting Pot” and its message still holds a tremendous power on the national imagination – the promise that all immigrants can be transformed into Americans, a new alloy forged in a crucible of democracy, freedom and civic responsibility.

In 1908, when the play opened in Washington, the United States was in the middle of absorbing the largest influx of immigrants in its history – Irish and Germans, followed by Italians and East Europeans, Catholics and Jews – some 18 million new citizens between 1890 and 1920.

Today, the United States is experiencing its second great wave of immigration, a movement of people that has profound implications for a society that by tradition pays homage to its immigrant roots at the same time it confronts complex and deeply ingrained ethnic and racial divisions.

The immigrants of today come not from Europe but overwhelmingly from the still developing world of Asia and Latin America. The are driving a demographic shift so rapid that within the lifetimes of today’s teenagers, no one ethnic group – including whites of European descent – will comprise a majority of the nation’s population.


This shift, according to social historians, demographers and others studying the trends, will severely test the premise of the fabled melting pot, the idea, so central to national identity, that this country can transform people of every color and background into “one America.”

Just as possible, they say, is that the nation will continue to fracture into many separate, disconnected communities with no shared sense of commonality or purpose. Or perhaps it will evolve into something in between, a pluralistic society that will hold on to some core ideas about citizenship and capitalism, but with little meaningful interaction among groups.

The demographic changes raise other questions about political and economic power. Will that power, now held disproportionately by whites, be shared in the new America? What will happen when Hispanics overtake blacks as the nation’s single largest minority?

“I do not think that most Americans really understand the historic changes happening before their very eyes,” said Peter Salins, an immigration scholar who is provost of the State Universities of New York. “What are we going to become? Who are we? How do the newcomers fit in – and how do the natives handle it – this is the great unknown.”

This is the first of a series of articles examining the effects of the new demographics on American life. Over the next few months, other reports will focus on the impact on politics, jobs, and social institutions.

Fear of strangers, of course, is nothing new in American history. The last great immigration wave produced a bitter backlash, epitomized by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and the return, in the 1920s, of the Ku Klux Klan, which not only targeted blacks, but Catholics, Jews and immigrants as well.

But despite this strife, many historians argue that there was a greater consensus in the past on what it meant to be an American, a yearning for a common language and culture, and a desire – encouraged, if not coerced by members of the dominant white Protestant culture – to assimilate. Today, they say, there is more emphasis on preserving one’s ethnic identity, of finding ways to highlight and defend one’s cultural roots.

Difficult to Measure

More often than not, the neighborhoods where Americans live, the politicians and propositions they vote for, the cultures they immerse themselves in, the friends and spouses they have, the churches and schools they attend, and the way they view themselves are defined by ethnicity. The question is whether, in the midst of such change, there is also enough glue to hold Americans together.

Todd Bigelow/FTWP
Black community activist Nathaniel J. Wilcox in Miami says, “Hispanics don’t want some of the power, they want all the power.”
(By Todd Bigelow for The Washington Post)

“As we become more and more diverse, there is all this potential to make that reality work for us,” said Angela Oh, a Korean American activist who emerged as a powerful voice for Asian immigrants after the Los Angeles riots in 1992. “But yet, you witness this persistance of segregation, the fragmentation, all these fights over resources, this finger-pointing. You would have to be blind not to see it.”

It is a phenomenon sometimes difficult to measure, but not observe. Houses of worship remain, as the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. described it three decades ago, among the most segregated institutions in America, not just by race but also ethnicity. At high school cafeterias, the second and third generation children of immigrants clump together in cliques defined by where their parents or grandparents were born. There are television sitcoms, talk shows and movies that are considered black or white, Latino or Asian. At a place like the law school of the University of California at Los Angeles, which has about 1,000 students, there are separate student associations for blacks, Latinos and Asians with their own law review journals.

It almost goes without saying that today’s new arrivals are a source of vitality and energy, especially in the big cities to which many are attracted. Diversity, almost everyone agrees, is good; choice is good; exposure to different cultures and ideas is good.

But many scholars worry about the loss of community and shared sense of reality among Americans, what Todd Gitlin, a professor of culture and communications at New York University, calls “the twilight of common dreams.” The concern is echoed by many on both the left and right, and of all ethnicities, but no one seems to know exactly what to do about it.

Academics who examine the census data and probe for meaning in the numbers already speak of a new “demographic balkanization,” not only of residential segregation, forced or chosen but also a powerful preference to see ourselves through a racial prism, wary of others, and, in many instances, hostile.

At a recent school board meeting in East Palo Alto, Calif., police had to break up a fight between Latinos and blacks, who were arguing over the merits and expense of bilingual education in a school district that has shifted over the last few years from majority African American to majority Hispanic. One parent told reporters that if the Hispanics wanted to learn Spanish they should stay in Mexico.

The demographic shifts are smudging the old lines demarcating two historical, often distinct societies, one black and one white. Reshaped by three decades of rapidly rising immigration, the national story is now far more complicated.

Whites currently account for 74 percent of the population, blacks 12 percent, Hispanics 10 percent and Asians 3 percent. Yet according to data and predictions generated by the U.S. Census Bureau and social scientists poring over the numbers, Hispanics will likely surpass blacks early in the next century. And by the year 2050, demographers predict, Hispanics will account for 25 percent of the population, blacks 14 percent, Asians 8 percent, with whites hovering somewhere around 53 percent.

As early as next year, whites no longer will be the majority in California; in Hawaii and New Mexico this is already the case. Soon after, Nevada, Texas, Maryland and New Jersey are also predicted to become “majority minority” states, entities where no one ethnic group remains the majority.

Todd Bigelow/FTWP
Korean American activist Angela Oh says, “This persistence of segregation … you would have to be blind not to see it.”
(By Todd Bigelow
for The Washington Post)

Effects of 1965 Law

The overwhelming majority of immigrants come from Asia and Latin America – Mexico, the Central American countries, the Philippines, Korea, and Southeast Asia.

What triggered this great transformation was a change to immigration law in 1965, when Congress made family reunification the primary criteria for admittance. That new policy, a response to charges that the law favored white Europeans, allowed immigrants already in the United States to bring over their relatives, who in turn could bring over more relatives. As a result, America has been absorbing as many as 1 million newcomers a year, to the point that now almost 1 in every 10 residents is foreign born.

These numbers, relative to the overall population, were slightly higher at the beginning of this century, but the current immigration wave is in many ways very different, and its context inexorably altered, from the last great wave.

This time around tensions are sharpened by the changing profile of those who are entering America’s borders. Not only are their racial and ethnic backgrounds more varied than in decades past, their place in a modern postindustrial economy has also been recast.

The newly arrived today can be roughly divided into two camps: those with college degrees and highly specialized skills, and those with almost no education or job training. Some 12 percent of immigrants have graduate degrees, compared to 8 percent of native Americans. But more than one-third of the immigrants have no high school diploma, double the rate for those born in the United States.

Before 1970, immigrants were actually doing better than natives overall, as measured by education, rate of homeownership and average incomes. But those arriving after 1970, are younger, more likely to be underemployed and live below the poverty level. As a group, they are doing worse than natives.

About 6 percent of new arrivals receive some form of welfare, double the rate for U.S.-born citizens. Among some newcomers – Cambodians and Salvadorans, for example – the numbers are even higher.

With large numbers of immigrants arriving from Latin America, and segregating in barrios, there is also evidence of lingering language problems. Consider that in Miami, three-quarters of residents speak a language other than English at home and 67 percent of those say they are not fluent in English. In New York City, 4 of every 10 residents speak a language other than English at home, and of these, half said they do not speak English well.

It is clear that not all of America is experiencing the impact of immigration equally. Although even small midwestern cities have seen sharp changes in their racial and ethnic mix in the past two decades, most immigrants continue to cluster into a handful of large, mostly coastal metropolitan areas: Los Angeles, New York, San Francisco, Chicago, Miami, Washington, D.C., and Houston. They are home to more than a quarter of the total U.S. population and more than 60 percent of all foreign-born residents.

But as the immigrants arrive, many American-born citizens pour out of these cities in search of new homes in more homogeneous locales. New York and Los Angeles each lost more than 1 million native-born residents between 1990 and 1995, even as their populations increased by roughly the same numbers with immigrants. To oversimplify, said University of Michigan demographer William Frey, “For every Mexican who comes to Los Angeles, a white native-born leaves.”

Most of the people leaving the big cities are white and they tend to working class. This is an entirely new kind of “white flight,” whereby whites are not just fleeing the city centers for the suburbs but also are leaving the region, and often the state.

“The Ozzies and Harriets of the 1990s are skipping the suburbs of the big cities and moving to more homogeneous, mostly white smaller towns and smaller cities and rural areas,” Frey said.

They’re headed to Atlanta, Las Vegas, Phoenix, Portland, Denver, Austin and Orlando, as well as smaller cities in Nevada, Idaho, Colorado and Washington. Frey and other demographers believe the domestic migrants – black and white – are being “pushed” out, at least in part, by competition with immigrants for jobs and neighborhoods, political clout and lifestyle.

Frey sees in this pattern “the emergence of separate Americas, one white and middle-aged, less urban and another intensely urban, young, multicultural and multiethnic. One America will care deeply about English as the official language and about preserving Social Security. The other will care about things like retaining affirmative action and bilingual education.”

Todd Bigelow/FTWP
This century’s huge wave of immigrants is attracted to large metropolitan areas like Los Angeles, above.
(By Todd Bigelow for The Washington Post)

Ethnic Segregation

Even within gateway cities that give the outward appearance of being multicultural, there are sharp lines of ethnic segregation. When describing the ethnic diversity of a bellwether megacity such as Los Angeles, many residents speak soaringly of the great mosaic of many peoples. But the social scientists who look at the hard census data see something more complex.

James P. Allen, a cultural geographer at California State University-Northridge, suggests that while Los Angeles, as seen from an airplane, is a tremendously mixed society, on the ground, racial homogeneity and segregation are common.

This is not a new phenomenon; there have always been immigrant neighborhoods. Ben Franklin, an early proponent of making English the “official language,” worried about close-knit German communities. Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y) described the lingering clannishness of Irish and other immigrant populations in New York in “Beyond the Melting Pot,” a benchmark work from the 1960s that he wrote with Nathan Glazer.

But the persistance of ethnic enclaves and identification does not appear to be going away, and may not in a country that is now home to not a few distinct ethnic groups, but to dozens. Hispanics in Los Angeles, to take the dominant group in the nation’s second largest city, are more segregated residentially in 1990 than they were 10 or 20 years ago, the census tracts show. Moreover, it is possible that what mixing of groups that does occur is only a temporary phenomenon as one ethnic group supplants another in the neighborhood.

If there is deep-seated ethnic segregation, it clearly extends to the American workplace. In many cities, researchers find sustained “ethnic niches” in the labor market. Because jobs are often a matter of whom one knows, the niches were enduring and remarkably resistant to outsiders.

In California, for example, Mexican immigrants are employed overwhelmingly as gardeners and domestics, in apparel and furniture manufacturing, and as cooks and food preparers. Koreans open small businesses. Filipinos become nurses and medical technicians. African Americans work in government jobs, an important niche that is increasingly being challenged by Hispanics who want in.

UCLA’s Roger Waldinger and others have pointed to the creation, in cities of high immigration, of “dual economies.”

For the affluent, which includes a disproportionate number of whites, the large labor pool provides them with a ready supply of gardeners, maids and nannies. For businesses in need of cheap manpower, the same is true. Yet there are fewer “transitional” jobs – the blue-collar work that helped Italian and Irish immigrants move up the economic ladder – to help newcomers or their children on their way to the jobs requiring advanced technical or professional skills that now dominate the upper tier of the economy.

A Rung at a Time

Traditionally, immigration scholars have seen the phenomenon of assimilation as a relentless economic progression. The hard-working new arrivals struggle along with a new language and at low-paying jobs in order for their sons and daughters to climb the economic ladder, each generation advancing a rung. There are many cases where this is true.

More recently, there is evidence to suggest that economic movement is erratic and that some groups – particularly in high immigration cities – can get “stuck.”

Among African Americans, for instance, there emerges two distinct patterns. The black middle class is doing demonstrably better – in income, home ownership rates, education – than it was when the demographic transformation (and the civil rights movement) began three decades ago.

But for African Americans at the bottom, research indicates that immigration, particularly of Latinos with limited education, has increased joblessness, and frustration.

In Miami, where Cuban immigrants dominate the political landscape, tensions are high between Hispanics and blacks, said Nathaniel J. Wilcox, a community activist there. “The perception in the black community, the reality, is that Hispanics don’t want some of the power, they want all the power,” Wilcox said. “At least when we were going through this with the whites during the Jim Crow era, at least they’d hire us. But Hispanics won’t allow African Americans to even compete. They have this feeling that their community is the only community that counts.”

Yet many Hispanics too find themselves in an economic “mobility trap.” While the new immigrants are willing to work in low-end jobs, their sons and daughters, growing up in the barrios but exposed to the relentless consumerism of popular culture, have greater expectations, but are disadvantaged because of their impoverished settings, particularly the overwhelmed inner-city schools most immigrant children attend.

“One doubts that a truck-driving future will satisfy today’s servants and assemblers. And this scenario gets a good deal more pessimistic if the region’s economy fails to deliver or simply throws up more bad jobs,” writes Waldinger, a professor of sociology and director of center for regional policy studies at the University of California-Los Angeles.

Though there are calls to revive efforts to encourage “Americanization” of the newcomers, many researchers now express doubt that the old assimilation model works. For one thing, there is less of a dominant mainstream to enter. Instead, there are a dozen streams, despite the best efforts by the dominant white society to lump groups together by ethnicity.

It is a particularly American phenomenon, many say, to label citizens by their ethnicity. When a person lived in El Salvador, for example, he or she saw themselves as a nationality. When they arrive in the United States, they become Hispanic or Latino. So too with Asians. Koreans and Cambodians find little in common, but when they arrive here they become “Asian,” and are counted and courted, encouraged or discriminated against as such.

“My family has had trouble understanding that we are now Asians, and not Koreans, or people from Korea or Korean Americans, or just plain Americans,” said Arthur Lee, who owns a dry cleaning store in Los Angeles. “Sometimes, we laugh about it. Oh, the Asian students are so smart! The Asians have no interest in politics! Whatever. But we don’t know what people are talking about. Who are the Asians?”

Many immigrant parents say that while they want their children to advance economically in their new country, they do not want them to become “too American.” A common concern among Haitians in South Florida is that their children will adopt the attitudes of the inner city’s underclass. Vietnamese parents in New Orleans often try to keep their children immersed in their ethnic enclave and try not to let them assimilate too fast.

Hyphenated Americans

One study of the children of immigrants, conducted six years ago among young Haitians, Cubans, West Indians, Mexican and Vietnamese in South Florida and Southern California, suggests the parents are not alone in their concerns.

Asked by researchers Alejandro Portes and Ruben Rumbauthow how they identified themselves, most chose categories of hyphenated Americans. Few choose “American” as their identity.

Then there was this – asked if they believe the United States in the best country in the world, most of the youngsters answered: no.

A White Migration North From Miami

Gated entrance/TWP Gated entrances and patrol cars provide Weston, Fla., residents with security. By Andrew Itkoff for The Washington Post)

Fifth in a series of occasional articles
By William Booth
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, November 11, 1998; Page A1

WESTON, Fla. – Everything here is nice and neat, just the way Joanne Smith likes it. The developers call their new city on the edge of the Everglades “Our Home Town,” and Smith agrees. “It’s more like America,” she says.

Like thousands of others, Smith moved to this planned community 40 miles north of Miami just a few years ago, searching for a safe and secure neighborhood like this one, where both modest homes and rambling mansions sit against the manicured landscape of palm and hibiscus, and gated streets called Wagon Way and Windmill Ranch gently curve around the shallow lagoons and golf links.

Weston is a boomtown filling with refugees. But the migrants pouring into this part of Broward County are rarely those from the Caribbean, Central and South America – the immigrants to the south who have transformed Miami and surrounding Dade County into a metropolis proudly called by its business and political leaders “The Gateway to Latin America.”

Instead, the refugees here are mostly native-born and white, young and old, and they have been streaming up from Miami for years now, creating a new version of the traditional “white flight” in reaction not to black inner cities, but to immigration.

While Miami is unique in many respects, because of both geography and politics, the out-migration of whites is occurring in other high-immigration cities. New York and Los Angeles, for example, each lost a million U.S.-born residents in the last decade, as they gained a million immigrants.

According to an analysis of the most recent census data, for almost every immigrant who came to Miami-Dade County in recent years, a white non-Hispanic left.

“I loved Miami, but it’s a mad scene down there now,” said Smith, who is semi-retired and asked that her occupation not be given. Before her move to Weston, Smith lived in Miami for two decades, “in a nice neighborhood gone bad. People say things, ‘Oh that’s change and that’s progress,’ but I like it clean and green – and everybody speaking English,” Smith says.

In discussions about the historic demographic transformations occurring in the United States, which is absorbing almost 1 million immigrants a year, most of the attention focuses quite naturally on the newcomers: Who are they and where are they from and how do they make their way in America?

But immigration is a two-way street – and the welcome the immigrants receive from the native-born is crucial for the continued idea of America as a fabled “melting pot.” Of course, there are many whites – and blacks, too – who have remained in Miami-Dade County, to either continue their lives as before or accept, even embrace the Latin tempo of Miami, who have learned how to pronounce masas de puerco at lunchtime and to fake a respectable merengue dance step, who enjoy the culture, the business opportunities and caffeinated hustle of a metropolis dominated by immigrants. No one could call Miami dull.

But it is almost as if there are two kinds of native whites – those who can deal with multiculturalism that has transformed Miami over the past several decades and those who choose not to. Either way, if the country is to successfully transform itself into a completely multicultural industrialized nation, what these internal migrants say – and there are millions of them around the country – needs to be heard and understood.

Those transplants interviewed by The Washington Post, including those who asked that their names not be used, take pains to explain that, for the most part, the people like them who are moving out of Miami-Dade to Broward are not anti-immigrant xenophobes.

In several dozen interviews with a cross-section of these “domestic migrants,” a picture emerges of a segment of the non-Hispanic white population in Miami-Dade County that feels marginalized, exasperated and sometimes bitter, and who move from Dade to Broward with a mix of emotions.

Migrants to Broward give many reasons for the move north: Their money buys a bigger, newer house in Broward; they are tired of the traffic and congestion; they worry about crime; they complain about the overcrowded schools; those with young families often say they are looking for a place where their children can play ball in the front yard and ride their bikes down the block.

But all these things, the good and bad, can also be found in booming Broward County. Sooner or later, many of the refugees moving north mention immigration and the sense that they are no longer, as many transplants describe it, “comfortable.”

Phil Phillips was born and raised near what is today downtown Miami, where his father worked for the Immigration and Naturalization Service during the postwar years, at a time when the immigrants to Florida were mostly from Europe. Phillips served in the Navy, taught vocational classes at Miami High School, and made a living running a small air conditioning and refrigeration business.

Until the rise of Fidel Castro in Cuba, Phillips described the Miami of yesteryear as a more sleepy, more southern town. It had its glitz in the fanciful playground of Jackie Gleason’s city of Miami Beach, but the county was still filled with open land and farms.

“Miami was a very happy place,” Phillips remembers with nostalgia. “We had our demarcations, don’t get me wrong. But we didn’t have the animosity.” When pressed, Phillips does remember that the beaches, restaurants and nightclubs were often segregated, not only for African Americans. Jews had their own country clubs.

The Miami of black-and-white all began to change with the arrival of the Cubans in the early 1960s. “The vast majority of the Cubans came here and worked two and three jobs,” said Phillips, who is retired and living in Weston. A man who worked with his hands all his life, Phillips respects that. “I saw them do it. And in time, they took over, and some people resent that. But that’s the way it is.”

“There’s this myth out there that a Cuban will screw an American in a deal,” Phillips says. “I don’t think that is so, but that’s the feeling the whites have, and it’s because the two sides don’t communicate, sometimes they can’t communicate, and so they don’t understand the other guy.”

Phillips has seen decades of change, as the demographics of his home town kept skewing toward Hispanics, in fits and starts. After the first big influx of Cubans in the 1960s, there was Cuba’s Mariel boatlift in 1980. Then all through the proxy wars and upheavals in Central America and the Caribbean through the 1980s and 1990s, refugees from Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Haiti kept coming to Miami.

“We’re great in America at blaming somebody else for our problems,” Phillips said. “But I will tell that for a lot of the people who leave Miami, they might not tell you, but they’re leaving because of the ethnics.”

Tim Robbie/TWP Tim Robbie, proprietor of The Sporting Brews restaurant in Weston, Fla. (By Andrew Itkoff for The Washington Post)

Phillips offered his opinions as he sat sipping soup at the counter of a new restaurant here in Weston opened by Tim Robbie, whose family owned the Miami Dolphins for years, before they sold out to Wayne Huizenga, who is “The Man” in Broward County, as much as Jorge Mas Canosa, the power behind the Cuban American National Foundation, was “The Man” in Miami before his death last year.

Robbie was raised in Miami. His family, lead by his father Joe, was a civic institution. But Robbie himself recently moved to Weston, too.

“I know a lot of our friends down in Miami were disappointed with us,” Robbie said. “They asked: How can you do this to us?”

Robbie agreed that something akin to “the tipping point” phenomenon might be at work, whereby one or two families in a social or business network can leave a community and nothing much changes. But at some point, if enough people leave, the balance suddenly tips, and large groups start selling their homes, and over a period of several years, they create mass demographic shifts.

Robbie himself said he was comfortable down south in Miami, but concedes that many are not. “Anglos are accustomed to being in the majority, and down in Dade, they’re not. And that puts some people outside of their comfort zone. People tend to like to stick together.”

Robbie’s business partner is Bob Green, who also moved from Miami to Broward. A longtime denizen of funky and fun Coconut Grove, Green describes himself as one of those who never would have thought about moving north to Broward.

But then he saw the new business opportunities, and also found himself liking a place like Weston. “It has this midwestern feeling,” Green said. “More downhome and friendly.”

This mass internal migration is the latest version of a classic “push-pull” model of residential segregation, whereby many whites in Miami feel lured north by the offerings of a development like Weston, but also feel pushed out of Miami – not only by their fatigue with crime or congestion, but the cultural and demographic upheavals caused by three decades of immigration.

Peter Schott is a tourism official who is changing jobs and, reluctantly, moving with his wife, who works for a cruise ship line, to Broward. The couple, both in their thirties and expecting their first child, are looking for a bigger home. Schott says he will miss the exotic, foreign feel of Miami. Miami, Schott says, is a media noche, the name for a Cuban sandwich, while Broward he fears is “white bread and baloney.” While he will miss Miami, Schott knows that many of those moving north to Broward may not.

“Some people are real frank,” he said. “They say they want to be with more people more like us. If they’re white Americans, they want white Americans around them.”

For non-Hispanic, non-Spanish-speaking whites to survive in Miami, there is no choice but to move, or to adapt. “It is our city now,” many Cuban Americans say, and the numbers tell part of the story.

In the 1990s, some 95,000 white non-Hispanics left Miami-Dade County, decreasing that group’s presence by 16 percent, to around 492,000, or about one-fifth of the county population.

They either moved away or, in the case of elderly residents, particularly in the Jewish community, died. (The Jewish population in Miami-Dade County has decreased from about 250,000 to 100,000 in the last two decades. The new destination for Jewish retirees and younger migrants is Broward and Palm Beach counties).

As whites left Miami, they poured into Broward. Between 1990 and 1997, the white non-Hispanic population here increased by about 82,000, or 8 percent, to more than a million residents.

These dramatic numbers follow an equally large out-migration of whites during the 1980s. So many non-Hispanic whites left Miami-Dade in the previous decade that Marvin Dunn, a sociologist at Florida International University, who has followed the trend, said in 1991, “You get down to the point below which those who are going to leave have left and the others are committed to stay. I think we’re close to that with whites.”

But Dunn was wrong. The whites keep leaving.

“White migration to Miami-Dade has essentially stopped,” said William Frey, a demographer at the University of Michigan, who coined the phrase “demographic balkanization” to describe the ongoing trend of ethnic and racial groups to self-segregate – not only within a city, but from city to city, and from state to state.

“The two appear almost like mirror images of each other,” Frey said of Broward and Miami-Dade counties. “There is definitely something going on here and we can only guess what it is. But this ‘One America’ that Clinton talks about is clearly not in the numbers. Segregation and non-assimilation continue.”

Many times, native whites on the move explain that Miami now feels to them like “a foreign country,” that they feel “overwhelmed” by the presence not just of some Spanish-speakers, but so many.

“You order a Coke without ice,” said an executive and mother of three who moved to Broward from Miami in 1996 and asked that her name not be used. “And you get ice. You say no starch and you get starch. You call government offices, and they can’t take a decent message in English. You spell your name letter by letter and they get it wrong. They keep saying ‘Que? Que? Que?’ (Spanish for “What?’) You go to the mall, and you watch as the clerks wait on the Spanish speakers before you. It’s like reverse racism. You realize, my God, this is what it is like to be the minority.”

“The white population feels increasingly beleaguered,” said George Wilson, a sociologist at the University of Miami who is studying the phenomenon.

“Their whole domain is changing at the micro-level,” Wilson continued. “At the malls, in the schools. A lot of the whites I talk to say they feel challenged by the rapid ethnic and cultural change. A whole population of whites has gone from a clear majority to a clear minority in a very short time . . . and a lot of them simply say, ‘To hell with this,’ and move up the road.”

This feeling of being the beleaguered minority is creating among some a new consciousness of “white ethnicity,” and for those who see America’s future as a relatively harmonious multicultural state based on shared ideas of capitalism and freedom, this may not bode well.

For if whites do not want to share power and place, or if they feel increasingly shoved aside or overwhelmed in the cities and states with high immigration, they will continue to vote with their feet, by moving away, creating not a rainbow of citizens, but a more balkanized nation, with jobs, university enrollments, public spending, schools all seen through ethnic or racial prisms, including among whites.

Several of those interviewed complain that the politics of Miami-Dade are dominated by the issues of the newcomers, particularly the Cuban Americans, who wait for the fall of Fidel Castro; they see in the city hall, where a number of officials were recently indicted and convicted of taking kickbacks after it was discovered that the city was broke, a “banana republic” of ethnic cronyism; they dislike being referred to in Spanish media as “the Americans” by Miami’s Hispanic residents and politicians, as if they were the foreigners.

And many balk at the dominance of Spanish – on television, in official news conferences, on the radio, in schools and meetings and in their day-to-day lives. The movement of so many whites from Miami-Dade to Broward is viewed by many Hispanics as understandable, even natural, though hardly something to be encouraged.

“We had a tremendous exodus of Anglos, especially Anglos who did not feel comfortable with the new demographics of Miami, who were intimidated by the Spanish language and the influx of different people,” said Eduardo Padron, a Cuban American and president of the Miami Dade Community College. “It is a natural trend for them to move out. Many of them kept working in Miami, but they found refuge in Broward.”

Padron believes the rapidity of demographic changes, and the creation of a Hispanic majority, was “intimidating” for many whites, particularly those who did not speak any Spanish.

Some whites interviewed say they know they may seem like “whiners,” as one woman put it, but they feel they are not being met halfway by the newcomers, and this is an especially acute feeling in Miami, where Cuban Americans and other immigrants from Latin America now dominate the political landscape, serving as city and county mayors and council members. Both of Miami’s representatives to Congress are Cuban Americans.

Recent elections reveal that voters in Miami-Dade select candidates along stark racial and ethnic lines in classic bloc voting. The 1995 county mayor’s race, pitting Cuban American Alex Penelas against African American Arthur Teele, Jr., turned almost entirely on demographic lines, with exit polls showing that the overwhelming majority of Cuban Americans voted for Penelas, as most blacks voted for Teele. What did whites do? A lot of them did not vote at all.

Over the years, there has been sporadic, organized resistance by whites in Miami to hold back the changes. One group, calling itself Citizens of Dade United, was successful in passing a referendum in 1980 that declared English the “official language” of county government. But it was overturned in 1993. Enos Schera, who is a co-founder of the group and who is now 71, is still filled with vinegar, and says he refuses to move from Miami – though he says he and his group have received death threats.

“I’m staying to fight this crazy thing,” Schera said. “I’m not a bad guy, but I don’t want to be overrun. They come here and get all the advantages of being in America and then they insult you right on top of it.” He is writing a book about the changes. “That will tell all,” he promises.

But it seems as if Schera is fighting in retreat. He, and his group, have largely been relegated to the role of stubborn whites whose time is over.

Many of the others, like Weston resident Joanne Smith, have already left. “There’s no room for us in the discussion,” said Smith. “It’s like we were the oppressors.”

Smith says she likes to eat at Cuban restaurants, has Hispanic neighbors in Weston and admires the strength and striving of the newcomers. She herself is the granddaughter of immigrants, from Europe. But Smith feels the immigrants should try harder to understand the feelings of native Americans. “If they can survive coming here on a raft,” she says. “They can learn to speak English.”

Here at Weston, almost all of the communities are closed with security gates, requiring a visitor to punch a code or be cleared by a guard before entering the enclaves. In addition to the gates, a private security firm patrols the neighborhoods.

One researcher on the topic, Edward Blakely of the University of Southern California in Los Angeles, says that gated communities like Weston’s are the fastest growing new developments around the country. Blakely deplores the trend, claiming it creates “fortress neighborhoods,” dividing citizens, creating walls between “us” and “them.”

But obviously, many home buyers like the concept, and many of the residents of Weston say one of the things they like most about the neighborhood is its sense of community, of safety and the ability of their children to ride their bicycles on the streets.

Yet the gates cannot keep demographic change at bay. Though two of every three residents in Weston is white, most of them in their thirties, about one in four are Hispanic. But these are the most assimilated, often second-generation, solidly middle-class Cuban Americans who come north for the same new schools and golf courses as the white migrants, allowing almost everyone to continue to live within their comfort zone.

But not all. As one three-year resident, who declined to give her name, observed, “I keep hearing more and more Spanish in the grocery store. I don’t know if they live here or are just working here. But I started to see some Spanish magazines for sale. Maybe I didn’t move far enough north.”

Special correspondent Catharine Skipp contributed to this report from Miami.

America’s Racial and Ethnic Divides

Immigrants Shunning Idea of Assimilation

Maria and Aristeo Jacinto Maria Jacinto, with her husband, Aristeo, and one of their five children, speaks only Spanish. “When my skin turns white and my hair turns blonde, then I’ll be an American,” she says.
(By William Branigin
– The Washington Post)

Third in a series of occasional articles

By William Branigin
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, May 25, 1998; Page A1

OMAHA – Night is falling on South Omaha, and Maria Jacinto is patting tortillas for the evening meal in the kitchen of the small house she shares with her husband and five children. Like many others in her neighborhood, where most of the residents are Mexican immigrants, the Jacinto household mixes the old country with the new.

As Jacinto, who speaks only Spanish, stresses a need to maintain the family’s Mexican heritage, her eldest son, a bilingual 11-year-old who wears a San Francisco 49ers jacket and has a paper route, comes in and joins his brothers and sisters in the living room to watch “The Simpsons.”

Jacinto became a U.S. citizen last April, but she does not feel like an American. In fact, she seems resistant to the idea of assimilating into U.S. society.

“I think I’m still a Mexican,” she says. “When my skin turns white and my hair turns blonde, then I’ll be an American.”

In many ways, the experiences of the Jacinto family are typical of the gradual process of assimilation that has pulled generations of immigrants into the American mainstream. That process is nothing new to Omaha, which drew waves of Czech, German and Irish immigrants early this century.

But in the current immigration wave, something markedly different is happening here in the middle of the great American “melting pot.”

Not only are the demographics of the United States changing in profound and unprecedented ways, but so too are the very notions of assimilation and the melting pot that have been articles of faith in the American self-image for generations. E Pluribus Unum (From Many, One) remains the national motto, but there no longer seems to be a consensus about what that should mean.

There is a sense that, especially as immigrant populations reach a critical mass in many communities, it is no longer the melting pot that is transforming them, but they who are transforming American society.

American culture remains a powerful force – for better or worse – that influences people both here and around the world in countless ways. But several factors have combined in recent years to allow immigrants to resist, if they choose, the Americanization that had once been considered irresistible.

In fact, the very concept of assimilation is being called into question as never before. Some sociologists argue that the melting pot often means little more than “Anglo conformity” and that assimilation is not always a positive experience – for either society or the immigrants themselves. And with today’s emphasis on diversity and ethnicity, it has become easier than ever for immigrants to avoid the melting pot entirely. Even the metaphor itself is changing, having fallen out of fashion completely with many immigration advocacy and ethnic groups. They prefer such terms as the “salad bowl” and the “mosaic,” metaphors that convey more of a sense of separateness in describing this nation of immigrants.

“It’s difficult to adapt to the culture here,” said Maria Jacinto, 32, who moved to the United States 10 years ago with her husband, Aristeo Jacinto, 36. “In the Hispanic tradition, the family comes first, not money. It’s important for our children not to be influenced too much by the gueros,” she said, using a term that means “blondies” but that she employs generally in reference to Americans. “I don’t want my children to be influenced by immoral things.”

Over the blare of the television in the next room, she asked, “Not all families here are like the Simpsons, are they?”

Among socially conservative families such as the Jacintos, who initially moved to California from their village in Mexico’s Guanajuato state, then migrated here in 1988 to find jobs in the meatpacking industry, bad influences are a constant concern. They see their children assimilating, but often to the worst aspects of American culture.

Her concerns reflect some of the complexities and ambivalence that mark the assimilation process these days. Immigrants such as the Jacintos are here to stay but remain wary of their adoptive country. According to sociologists, they are right to be concerned.

“If assimilation is a learning process, it involves learning good things and bad things,” said Ruben G. Rumbaut, a sociology professor at Michigan State University. “It doesn’t always lead to something better.”

At work, not only in Omaha but in immigrant communities across the country, is a process often referred to as “segmented” assimilation, in which immigrants follow different paths to incorporation in U.S. society. These range from the classic American ideal of blending into the vast middle class, to a “downward assimilation” into an adversarial underclass, to a buffered integration into “immigrant enclaves.” Sometimes, members of the same family end up taking sharply divergent paths, especially children and their parents.

The ambivalence of assimilation can cut both ways. Many native-born Americans also seem to harbor mixed feelings about the process. As a nation, the United States increasingly promotes diversity, but there are underlying concerns that the more emphasis there is on the factors that set people apart, the more likely that society will end up divided.

With Hispanics, especially Mexicans, accounting for an increasing proportion of U.S. population growth, it is this group, more than any other, that is redefining the melting pot.

Hispanics now have overtaken blacks as the largest minority group in Nebraska and will become the biggest minority in the country within the next seven years, according to Census Bureau projections. The nation’s 29 million Hispanics, the great majority of them from Mexico, have thus become the main focus for questions about how the United States today is assimilating immigrants, or how it is being transformed.

In many places, new Hispanic immigrants have tended to cluster in “niche” occupations, live in segregated neighborhoods and worship in separate churches. In this behavior they are much like previous groups of immigrants. But their heavy concentrations in certain parts of the country, their relatively close proximity to their native lands and their sheer numbers give this wave of immigrants an unprecedented potential to change the way the melting pot traditionally has worked.

Never before have so many immigrants come from a single country – Mexico – or from a single linguistic source-Spanish-speaking Latin America. Since 1970, more than half of the estimated 20 million foreign-born people who have settled in the United States, legally and illegally, have been Spanish speakers.

Besides sheer numbers, several factors combine to make this influx unprecedented in the history of American immigration. This is the first time that such large numbers of people are immigrating from a contiguous country. And since most have flowed into relatively few states, congregating heavily in the American Southwest, Mexican Americans have the capacity to develop much greater cohesion than previous immigrant groups. Today Hispanics, mostly of Mexican origin, make up 31 percent of the population of California and 28 percent of the population of Texas.

In effect, that allows Mexican Americans to “perpetuate themselves as a separate community and even strengthen their sense of separateness if they chose to, or felt compelled to,” said David M. Kennedy, a professor of American history at Stanford University.

To be sure, assimilation today often follows the same pattern that it has for generations. The children of immigrants, especially those who were born in the United States or come here at a young age, tend to learn English quickly and adopt American habits. Often they end up serving as translators for their parents. Schools exert an important assimilating influence, as does America’s consumer society.

But there are important differences in the way immigrants adapt these days, and the influences on them can be double-edged. Gaps in income, education and poverty levels between new immigrants and the native-born are widening, and many of the newcomers are becoming stuck in dead-end jobs with little upward mobility.

In L.A., a Sense of Future Conflicts

Hilda Bueno and Jose Manuel Cuevas at King hospital Hilda Bueno leaves the Martin Luther King Jr. Medical Center in South Central Los Angeles with her son Jose Manuel Cuevas, 2.

(By Todd Bigelow for The Washington Post)

Second in a series of occasional articles

By Michael A. Fletcher
Washington Post Staff Writer
Tuesday, April 7, 1998; Page A1

LOS ANGELES – Two pictures hanging in the lobby of Martin Luther King Jr. Medical Center offer silent testimony to a view shared by many blacks here that the hospital was built by and for African Americans.

King hospital rose from the ashes of the 1965 riots, a belated answer to the long-ignored complaint that the county’s white-run health system neglected the black community. Before the facility opened in 1972, there was no public hospital in predominantly black South Central Los Angeles.

But the regal visages of the slain civil rights leader and black county Supervisor Yvonne Brathwaite Burke now overlook a new, often disconcerting reality: Most of the patients and visitors in the hospital are Latino, not black. Many are holding conversations in Spanish. And increasingly, they are pressing the hospital to hire doctors and other top staff members who look and talk like them – a demand Latino leaders say is met largely with indifference, if not indignation, from the hospital’s black managers and its political patrons.

“At King, you now have a black island in a brown sea,” said Rees Lloyd, a lawyer for an Indian American doctor who alleges he was continuously passed over for promotions because he is not black. “A lot of people are uncomfortable with that.”

The change rumbling through King hospital is just a fraction of the fallout from a seismic shift in the racial makeup of Los Angeles County. In 1960, four out of five people in the county were white. But a wave of immigration has transformed the jurisdiction into one where no ethnic or racial group holds the majority. The county’s population of 9.5 million is now 41 percent Hispanic, 37 percent white, 11 percent Asian and 10 percent black. The Latino and Asian populations each have more than doubled in the past 20 years, dramatically altering the dynamics of race here.

Just over a decade ago, the broad swath of the county popularly known as South Central was synonymous with black Los Angeles. But now middle-class African Americans are leaving, often dispersing to communities that once were all white. Asian Americans, who once congregated in enclaves near downtown, are moving into suburban communities that ring L.A. Meanwhile, many non-Hispanic whites are often relocating to even more distant suburbs or leaving California altogether.

What is happening here represents the leading edge of racial and ethnic changes affecting communities across America. Demographers predict that by the middle of the next century the nation as a whole will look much like Los Angeles does now: a rich tapestry of people whose sheer diversity makes once familiar notions of racial interaction obsolete.

“Politicians like to say that diversity is our greatest strength,” said Ron Wakabayashi, executive director of the Los Angeles County Commission on Human Relations. “That is b.s. Diversity simply is. The core question is how do we extract its assets while minimizing its liabilities?”

To be sure, the new immigrants have renewed old neighborhoods, created new businesses and enriched the culture of Los Angeles. But the exploding diversity also has changed the nature of racial conflict and drawn new groups into battles that once were waged almost exclusively between blacks and whites. Here, black and Latino civil servants square off over public jobs. Blacks activists and Asian store owners fight over control of local businesses. And Latino and Asian gangs battle for control of their turf.

This new reality fuels the racial isolation evident in many walks of life here. Researchers have found deep racial divisions in the Los Angeles job market – partly the result of discrimination but reinforced because people typically find jobs through personal connections that most often do not cross racial or ethnic lines. Many of the furniture factories in South Central have only Latino workers. The toy factories near downtown employ mainly Chinese. Many of the small grocery stores are owned and run by Koreans. And African Americans disproportionately work in government jobs, where they are desperately trying to hold their place in the face of fierce competition from Latinos who want in.

Biggest Bigots: Often, It’s Minorities

As Los Angeles is learning, minorities are often quick to embrace negative racial stereotypes of one another. A poll by the National Conference, a nonprofit organization that promotes racial dialogue, found that minorities tend to share bitter feelings toward whites, whom they call bigoted and bossy. But the national survey found that minorities often harbored even harsher views of one another.

Nearly half of Latinos and 40 percent of African Americans agree that Asian Americans are “unscrupulous, crafty and devious in business.” Only one in four whites agrees with that statement. More than two out of three Asian Americans and half of African Americans and whites believe Latinos tend to “have bigger families than they are able to support.” Meanwhile, Latinos are almost three times as likely as whites to believe that blacks “aren’t capable of getting ahead” even if given the opportunity, the poll found.

Those attitudes contribute to the friction that often marks racial interaction in Los Angeles. Rather than prompting people to come together, the more common reality of the new diversity is people living separate lives in often vibrant but segregated communities. In Los Angeles, there are suburban developments, such as Monterey Park, that are almost exclusively Chinese. There is a Little Saigon and enclaves of Samoans and Hmong and Russians and Iranians.

And when people from diverse backgrounds find themselves thrust together in the same neighborhoods, the same jobs or the same schools, the result can often be conflict.

Nowhere is that more vivid than in the county’s South Central corridor, where the number of Latinos is overwhelming the African American population. Much as blacks demanded a fairer share of the power and resources from whites a generation ago, Latinos are now demanding that blacks and others share jobs, special school programs and political control. And like whites before them, many African Americans feel threatened by those demands.

“Latinos have their own. Blacks have their own,” said Royce Esters, former president of the NAACP branch that includes Compton, a city in the South Central corridor. “It’s a power play. Blacks feel like they have marched and marched and the Latinos have not marched. As a result, blacks are afraid of another race coming in and taking something they have worked so hard to get.”

For much of its history, Compton was a virtually all-white suburb of Los Angeles, where segregation was enforced with racist attacks and laws that barred African Americans from buying homes. A 1948 Supreme Court decision lifted the legal barriers, but the acceptance of African Americans was slow and difficult. The first blacks who dared venture to Compton were greeted with white hostility: Paint was smeared on their homes, flower gardens were uprooted, crosses were burned on their lawns.

But blacks persevered and by the 1960s had established a racial majority. When they finally wrested political control of Compton from whites in the 1960s, that ascendancy became a source of racial pride, with residents boasting that Compton was the largest black-run city west of the Mississippi.

Blacks Face a New Challenge

Now, three decades later, an extraordinary wave of immigration has pushed Latinos into the majority in Compton, except in the corridors of power. Blacks still control the mayor’s office, the city council, all but one school board seat and four out of five municipal jobs in Compton. Just as a generation ago blacks questioned that kind of white domination, blacks find themselves being challenged by Latino demands for power.

The long-simmering tension boiled over in 1994 when a black Compton police officer was caught on videotape beating Latino teenager Felipe Soltero. The incident angered Latinos in Compton much the same way as the bludgeoning of black motorist Rodney G. King by white police officers incensed African Americans. The incident pushed the city toward the edge of rioting, and resulted in a civil suit against the officer. The officer was found to have violated Soltero’s rights but the youth was awarded only $1 in damages by a federal judge after a racially mixed jury refused to award anything.

“It was kind of like the first Rodney King trial,” said Danilo Becerra, Soltero’s lawyer. “I’ve never seen a more blatant example of injustice.”

Latino leaders in Compton call the outcome of that case one small manifestation of the disparities that routinely go unaddressed by the city’s black leadership. Nearly two-thirds of the city’s 29,000 public school students are Latino but less than 10 percent of its teaching staff is. There are separate chamber of commerces, one for Latinos and one for blacks. But only the group with black members receives city funds. “As far as I can tell, everything in this city is directed to the blacks,” said John Ortega, a longtime Compton resident. “Not so long ago, [school officials] even took a load of students to Africa. … I sure don’t see them going to Mexico.”

In few places has the tension between blacks and Latinos emerged more vividly than in the pitched racial battle occurring at King hospital, a linchpin in the nation’s second largest public health care system.

From the beginning, King was more than a medical center for many blacks in South Central, who felt their forebears had fought – and died – to see it built.

A Flurry of Activism

It was what many saw as the unnecessary death of a black man that brought the need for the hospital into sharp focus. In 1966, Leonard Deadwyler ran several lights as he sped his pregnant wife toward the closest county hospital 20 miles away. He was stopped by police and a confrontation ensued. Deadwyler was shot and killed. Police said Deadwyler was drunk and acting irrationally, a claim refuted by his widow and her attorney, Johnnie L. Cochran Jr.

Many in South Central were convinced that Deadwyler would not have died that day if the neighborhood had had its own hospital. That galvanized a flurry of protest and activism that culminated in the construction of King and the adjoining Charles R. Drew University of Medicine and Science.

Los Angles County may have built King, but for much of its history it has been run largely by blacks who view it as the fruit of their protest and subsequent empowerment. Now, to many others attempting to gain a foothold in the new South Central, that pride often resembles the racial bias that blacks so vigorously fought when it was being dished out by whites.

‘Let Us Get Our Fair Share’

Dr. Subramaniam Balasubramaniam began working as acting head of King’s busy emergency room two decades ago, passing up other jobs to follow what he saw as his calling to work in a poor community. After six years in an acting role, he was offered the job permanently, under the condition that he appoint a black doctor to be his eventual successor.

Balasubramaniam, who is from India, said his African American bosses explained that he had to hire a black vice chair because King is a “black hospital.” But Balasubramaniam refused, citing the inexperience of the doctor hospital officials wanted him to hire, according to a 1995 Civil Service Commission opinion.

For that, he paid. Balasubramaniam was stripped of his title, which was given to a black doctor a few months later. Balasubramaniam’s duties remained the same, but he was passed over for numerous other promotions. Finally, in 1991, the hospital hired a veteran white surgeon to be its first permanent chief of emergency medicine, but only after he agreed to groom a young black doctor to eventually assume the post.

Eventually, the white chief was removed and a black doctor took his place. Balasubramaniam was never considered for the job he had held for years because hospital officials said he was “unqualified.”

Balasubramaniam filed a complaint with the county’s Civil Service Commission, which found that King followed an “unwritten policy of reserving leadership positions for blacks, to the exclusion of non-blacks.”

This was one of a series of discrimination complaints, including several by Latinos, that eventually led a federal agency to order the county to increase its recruitment, hiring and promotion of Latinos across its health care system.

“What they found as far as Latino workers go is similar to findings you’d have found in Alabama years ago to how African Americans were treated,” said Alan Clayton, a researcher for the Los Angeles County Chicano Employees Association. “We’re not trying to replace anybody. We’re just trying to say ‘let us get our fair share’ [of county jobs].”

Others have filed successful complaints against King. And many of the rulings in favor of Latinos and other non-blacks who worked at King have left some African American officials fuming. They say that Latinos finger them for discrimination but ignore similar treatment at the hands of whites. They point to statistics showing that other county hospitals, including the sprawling County-USC hospital in heavily Latino East Los Angeles, have overwhelmingly white physician and management staffs – yet that fact, they say, draws little scrutiny from Latino leaders.

“Blacks have bent over backward to accommodate Latinos, but we remain easy targets,” said Clyde Johnson, president of the Los Angeles County Black Employees Association. “Blacks are open-minded, very caring and sympathetic people.” But, he added, “We don’t think [Latino] progress should come out of our hides.”

‘We Don’t Understand Each Other’

Yet if blacks are clinging to health care and government as their place of employment, many immigrants are claiming their own niches while keeping blacks – and everyone else – out. Many low-skill jobs such as janitors, gardeners and light factory workers are dominated by recent immigrants, often with Mexicans, Vietnamese or Koreans claiming specific slices of the job market.

In 1990, Francisco Pinedo launched Cisco Brothers Corp., a manufacturer of upscale, upholstered furniture. The factory began in a garage and had only three employees. But as business picked up Pinedo quickly expanded, almost exclusively hiring people he knew or people referred by his employees.

After several years of stunning growth, he had a large work force, but one that was almost entirely Latino. “A lot of the hiring they did was word-of-mouth,” said Yvette Nunez, director of operations for the Community Development Technologies Center in Los Angeles. “That is something we found in doing surveys with a lot of the manufacturers that have almost entirely Latino work forces. They hire through personal networks.”

At the urging of economic development officials, Pinedo began advertising some of his openings in the newspaper. But, while his 15-person management team has three non-Latinos, virtually all of the 100 manufacturing jobs in his South Central plant are filled by Latinos.

“Pretty much the entire upholstery industry is 99 percent Hispanics,” said Pinedo, whose firm now does $10 million a year in sales. “I put ads in, but don’t get much response from African Americans. Besides, it helps to hire people who someone knows. It gives you more references. You don’t have to worry about not knowing who these people are.”

The tensions between racial and ethnic groups are often compounded by the fact that residents of the area do not even share the same base of information. Greater Los Angeles has more than 50 foreign language newspapers and television shows broadcast not only in Spanish but in Mandarin, Armenian, Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese.

“We don’t understand each other because of the cultural and language barriers,” said Kapson Lee, an editor at the Korean Times, a 100,000-circulation Korean language daily. “And the mainstream press has no ongoing relationship with us. They just come here when some unfortunate incident happens and scramble for a sound bite or some piece of information out of nowhere. It is disgusting.”

In 1991, when a Korean shopkeeper fatally shot a 15-year-old black girl in the back of the head during a dispute over a $1.79 bottle of orange juice, the Korean and black press handled the story in distinctly different ways. Korean papers ran a stream of stories about the daily harassment faced by Korean merchants. At one point, one Korean paper kept a running tally of the number of merchants who were assaulted in their stores.

The black press ran stories about the suspicion and general disrespect law-abiding customers often faced when they ventured into Korean-owned stores in their own neighborhoods.

And when the shop owner was convicted of manslaughter but got off with a light sentence of probation and a $500 fine, the reaction was predictable: many Koreans applauded the sentence, while many African Americans saw it as another example of the injustice that they endured for years to the benefit of whites.

“People don’t see their common purpose,” said Wakabayashi, of the county human relations commission. “It seems like everybody has a different bad guy.”

Football and the Decline of Man

Football and the Decline of Man

The Vulgar Lie of World Sports

Where can I hide until they think it’s all over? There must be somewhere where I can be sheltered from the shouting, insulated from inarticulate punditry, blissfully unaware of other people’s metatarsals and the progress of a leather sphere moving between 22 men about whom I know nothing and care rather less. But even if I decide, Trappistically, not to look at TV, listen to radio, surf the web, or open a newspaper between now and whenever the pestiferous thing limps to its inevitably inglorious end, sadly I will be unable entirely to ignore the World Cup.

The year-round football season is bad enough, with its 24/7 coverage of some of the world’s least interesting and least attractive people (and their harridan WAGs) interfering with important matters. But whenever World Cups come round (and the gaps between them feel like they’re getting shorter), most of the few remaining outposts of rationality succumb straightaway to footie frenzy — gossiping, groaning, marveling, moaning, diagnosing and deciding how some Italian bloke should deploy 11 other blokes on a soccer pitch thousands of miles away, as if it mattered.

England is suddenly abloom with men, too often shirtless, who feel constrained to brandish Chinese-made St. George’s flags (the only kind of “patriotism” these helots are permitted) while they glug Danish lager and periodically arise from Chinese-made, popcorn-plastered DFS sofas to do Mexican waves — that is, when they are not apostrophizing the blind ref, or the mistakes of Rooney or Ferdinand or somebody else who has spent much of his life musing on his metatarsals and endeavoring to remember the salient fact that he is engaged in a game of two halves.

This time, to add to all the usual drivel, there is a new annoying ingredient — this is “Africa’s World Cup,” a chance for Africa to show what it can do, a time for stereotypes to be confounded, for a divided nation to come together and face down the apartheid legacy, vibrant continent, diverse, colorful, etc., etc.

This weeklong sermonizing is accompanied by winsome imagery — townshippers with names like Precious dancing the toyi-toyi while waving plastic assegais — gap-toothed, grinning, barefoot, ebullient boys bending it like Beckham on fields fashioned apparently from broken glass and landmines — multiracial (though actually almost entirely black) crowds swaying and harmonizing below the outsized, fluttering Y-Front symbols of the “Rainbow Nation.”

Behind all this, of course, lie stubborn shabby realities — of a country slipping rapidly from the Second World into the Third, rampant crime, soaring debt, abysmal public health and education, political corruption and extremism, effective expulsion of whites, intertribal divisions, and violent tension against immigrants from even worse-off countries pressing down from the overpeopled north.

Then there is the legacy the World Cup will leave behind in the (Once) Beloved Country — vast, empty stadia rising up amongst shacks and AIDS clinics, white elephants of wishful thinking, the troubled land and its hapless peoples abandoned as quickly as they have been adopted by the tacky merchandizers and political grandstanders.

As SA, so the UK — for even as the England soccer team is going down to defeat in the Southern Hemisphere, east London is raising up white elephants of its own, as Olympics 2012 organizers emit phalanxes of fumes to excite the easily excited.

At a time of alleged austerity, an alliance of politicians, sad sportaholics, leotard manufacturers, construction firms and others are expending £12 billion to replace historic suburbs with hectares of horse-jumps, sandpits, changing rooms, super-mosques, places to purchase leotards, and other vital structures. Special mention must be made of the branding consultants, who have brainstormed into being a 2012 logo combining those classic Games motifs, breakdancers and power station warning signs.

But there is a yet greater achievement — the world’s worst Olympic mascots, whose very names, Wenlock and Mandeville, convey their copper-bottomed crapness, their committee-chosen, bland blend of mobile-phone-meets-manga-meets-squid, the meaningless mush cobbled cursorily together by the lamest “story concept” devisable by man. Unfortunately, the concept was never developed into a story. The viewer is left in suspense at the climax, when the metallic chums jump out of a window and run away along a conveniently passing rainbow, because “Wenlock and Mandeville knew it was time to go.”

Faced as I am with the prospect of the World Cup, followed by a long hot summer of European-Cup-FA-Cup-Cup-Winners’-Cup-Formula-1-tennis-darts-golf-‘live’-snooker-and-probably-more, sometimes I know exactly how poor Wenlock and Mandeville feel.


Article Info

Derek Turner

Derek Turner

Derek Turner is the editor of the UK-based Quarterly Review. His articles have appeared in the Times, Sunday Telegraph, Literary Review, Chronicles, This England and many other journals, and have been translated into 12 languages.

Secession? No, Ejection!

Secession? No, Ejection!

By Joseph Somsel

The issue of whether or not a state can secede from the Union seemed well-settled following the Civil War. The answer was not “no,” but “hell no!”
But the issue has arisen again, what with the rise of an expansionist, domineering, invasive, and spendthrift federal government. Elected officials in some of the same states that gave secession a whirl back in 1861 have subtly hinted that maybe we should reopen the issue.
Personally, I think rethinking the right to secede from the Union is a dead end. However, maybe there is another route to a similar result. Maybe most of the states in the Union can kick a few others out! After all, a handful of states and/or localities seem to be causing most of our troubles with their consistently liberal voting patterns. Drilling down, we could also do some internal rearranging within a state so as to separate the wheat from the chaff, so to speak.
For example, California tends to vote very liberal overall. But that aggregate vote is dominated by a few coastal, urban counties. Let’s just split off the urban counties around San Francisco Bay and let them form their own microstate. Since many in these counties crave some sort of aristocracy of liberalism, the new citizens could make it a principality like Monaco. One quandary they would have is to reconcile is their self-proclaimed “inclusiveness” with the heredity nature of the rulers in such political organizations. One could see the exclusion of the large gay populations from such a structure, or at least the possibility of instability as one ruling house after another dies off barren.
Los Angeles could be another split-off mini-state. Hollywood could provide some good-looking royals, able to match IQs with the best Eurotrash and with the same entertainment value. Without these two hotbeds of liberalism, the state would vote much more conservatively and with more respect for the U.S. Constitution.
Back east, Vermont would be a good candidate for ejection. They would take their Socialist senator with them. We’d want to guarantee free trade in maple syrup and the right of access to their ski slopes as a condition of ejection. In spite of Scott Brown, Massachusetts could find a Kennedy to lead them — somewhere else. If somewhere in Joe Kennedy’s family tree there’s an Earl Kennedy, he would be a natural for the throne. Harvard would supply the court jesters in perpetuity and be granted an exclusive royal charter for the same. Maine might feel left out in the cold, but hey, it is cold in Maine! Rhode Island could formalize their status as a kleptocracy rather than just pretending like they do now.
Back in the center of the country, more than a few down-state Illinois citizens would be quite happy to see Cook County become its own independent political entity — so long as it took its state legislators with it. Michigan without Detroit (Wayne County) might start to look like a viable business again. Detroit could someday be self-sufficient in food production with the way they are tearing down houses within the city limits for reversion to farmland — if they can find the hardworking farmers needed.
So such a few simple boundary rearrangements could clarify our political debates and make America strong and good again. As with the Quebec independence movement and the rest of Canada, the matter of how to equably divide the national debt would be contentious. The remaining U.S. citizens would argue that the liberals in the ejected areas should assume more than a simple per capita division since liberal policies have been disproportionally responsible for the accumulation. But like many a party to a difficult divorce, I’m sure we’d all settle for even-Steven just to get it over with.
If the question of secession was answered with a “hell no!” then maybe the answer to the question of ejection will be “Why didn’t we think of that sooner?”
Joseph Somsel, a sometimes contributor and SF Bay Area resident, is just joking.

The Buckley Myth

The Buckley Myth

William F. Buckley, Jr.: The Maker of a Movement. By Lee Edwards. ISI Books, 2010. 223 pages. Originally published at

Lee Edwards has written a very useful book. He is a longstanding conservative activist and intends to celebrate William F. Buckley as the founder of the political movement to which he adheres. For Edwards, Buckley’s “vision of ordered liberty shaped and molded and guided American conservatism from its infancy to its maturity, from a cramped suite of offices on Manhattan’s East Side to the Oval Office of the White House, from a set of ‘irritable mental gestures’ to a political force that transformed American politics.” (p.191) But this book discloses a great deal that supports Lew Rockwell’s verdict that the “‘conservatism created by William Buckley . . . gave us the most raw and stupid form of imperial big government one can imagine.’” (p.175) Edwards, by the way, calls Rockwell an “ultralibertarian,” in the same way leftists used to call those on the Right “ultraconservatives.”

Buckley, Edwards tells us, began as a follower of the libertarian Albert Jay Nock; and Nock’s disciple, Frank Chodorov, guided his early writing. (To Edwards, Nock is an “archlibertarian.” Whether there is a difference between “arch” and “ultra,” Edwards does not disclose.) Edwards mentions Nock’s “radical antistatism” but he tells us next to nothing about the views of Nock and his great follower. From Edwards’s account, one might imagine that Nock wished merely to curtail the New Deal. In fact, of course, Nock condemned the “political means,” i.e., the State, as of its nature predatory. Edwards also ignores completely Nock’s views on foreign policy. Nock opposed militarism and interventionism and his Myth of a Guilty Nation was an early revisionist classic.

Despite Buckley’s early exposure to Nock, his fundamental premise thrust libertarianism aside. Buckley stated this premise early in his career: “[I]n his January 1952 essay in Commonweal Buckley wrote that given the ‘thus-far invincible aggressiveness of the Soviet Union. . .we have got to accept Big Government for the duration.’” (p.53) Buckley here expressed no mere passing thought. Putting into action his belief in a crusade against Communism, he had after graduation from Yale joined the CIA for a brief period from 1950–51. Though he ostensibly left that agency, ex-CIA agents, as we shall soon see, played a major role in National Review.

Edwards mentions three other writers, besides Nock, as “seminal” influences on Buckley’s political thinking. Each of these was a determined enemy of Nock’s libertarianism. The first of these, Willmoore Kendall, taught Buckley political science at Yale. (Edwards, by the way, is probably wrong that “Kendall taught the young conservative [Buckley] to read with the close attention to the text that the political philosopher Leo Strauss advocated.” [pp.34–5]. Kendall’s Straussian period came later than Buckley’s time at Yale.) Kendall rejected with scorn natural rights. Instead, he followed Rousseau: for him, the general will was the “deliberate sense of the community,” in America best incarnated in Congress. He attacked John Stuart Mill on freedom of opinion and called for the imposition of a public orthodoxy. His position would have justified the Athenians in executing Socrates, an implication he readily acknowledged. It will come as no surprise that he too had been a CIA agent.

James Burnham, the major influence on Buckley’s approach to foreign policy, managed the difficult feat of being worse than Kendall. Edwards tells us that Burnham, after his break with Leon Trotsky, “published [in 1941] The Managerial Revolution, which described the emergence of a new and unelected ruling elite, the managerial class, and its profound implications for Western society. In subsequent books, Burnham argued that the Soviet Union was the most advanced managerial regime and sought global power through subversion, aggression, and intimidation – an argument that Buckley fully endorsed.” (p.42)

Edwards’s account of Burnham grievously misleads the reader by what it omits. Someone who gained his knowledge of Burnham from Edwards would naturally think that Burnham opposed rule by the managerial elite just described. In fact, Burnham celebrated this elite. In a notable review, “Second Thoughts on James Burnham,” George Orwell denounced Burnham as an incipient totalitarian, fascinated by power, who could barely conceal an admiration for Hitler and Stalin. Edwards notes that Burnham was a consultant to the CIA, but he does not tell us that in The Struggle for the World (1947), Burnham proposed a preventive nuclear war against the Soviets.

Whittaker Chambers, “the fourth seminal influence on Buckley’s political thinking” (p.61), also vehemently opposed libertarianism. For Chambers, Ludwig von Mises was a superficial and dogmatic thinker; and in a notorious review of Atlas Shrugged, he said: “From almost any page of Atlas Shrugged, a voice can be heard, from painful necessity, commanding: “To a gas chamber – go!” (Edwards fails to quote this.) Like Burnham, this vest-pocket Dostoyevsky saw the world in apocalyptic terms.

As if this were not enough, two other early editors of National Review, Frank S. Meyer and Willi Schlamm, also favored preventive nuclear war.

If Buckley betrayed the libertarianism he had learned from Nock, he showed himself an apt pupil of his other mentors. Like Meyer, he was willing to risk nuclear annihilation to overthrow communism: better dead than red. “In May 1983. . .Buckley delivered a lecture at a Catholic college on ‘moral distinctions and modern warfare.’ A central proposition of his remarks: “To venerate life is to attach to it first importance. Surely if we were to do that, any talk of war, just or unjust, prudent or imprudent, limited or unlimited, provoked or unprovoked, would be an exercise in moral atavism.’” (p.145). In other words, when thinking about war, do not rate preserving life too highly. So much for the just war tradition.

Buckley and war had an elective affinity. “Following Tet [in 1968], Buckley called for the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam as a way to bring the war to a swift end, a radical course of action that even Barry Goldwater, the alleged wild-eyed bomb thrower, had never suggested.” (p.111). Buckley was here nothing if not consistent. “In the first half of 1982, Bill Buckley, intractable anti-Communist, pressed the Reagan administration to declare war on Cuba because ‘it is difficult to think of a measure that would give greater heart to the entire anti-communist defense enterprise.’” (p.141)

But what of those who declined to join Buckley and Burnham in the struggle for the world? These remnants of the Old Right had to be purged. Murray Rothbard thought that the Cold War could be ended through peaceful negotiation. Buckley could not tolerate such views at his journal. Peace? Who ever heard of such nonsense!

Edwards misstates the reason for Buckley’s dispute with Rothbard. He says, “Buckley treated laissez-faire economist Murray Rothbard and ‘his merry anarchists’ more gently [than he treated Rand], but no less firmly, stating that their antistatism collided with conservatives who recognize that the ‘state sometimes is, and is today as never before, the necessary instrument of proximate deliverance’ from Communism.” (p.79) But Rothbard’s challenge to Buckley over the Cold War did not center on anarchism. Rather, he opposed Buckley’s reckless bellicosity. Buckley, echoed by Edwards, sought to portray Rothbard and his followers as head-in-the clouds utopians. In point of fact, the Rothbardians had a realistic perception of the dangers of nuclear adventurism.

The dominant theme of Buckley’s politics, as we have seen, was the need for a Big State to combat communism. But he was hardly a paragon of classical liberal virtue on domestic policy, either. In his Four Reforms, which Edwards calls “an intriguing and too-little-known work” (p. 123), Buckley suggested a radical Constitutional reform. He proposed “that the Fifth Amendment be repealed.” (p.124) So much for civil liberties! He also suggested a “voluntary” year of national service for high school graduates. Edwards neglects to inform his readers of the considerable pressures contemplated in Buckley’s scheme to make sure that the “voluntary” decisions of the graduates went the “right” way.

Murray Rothbard, as usual, has the best comment on Buckley’s brand of conservatism. The theoreticians of National Review “transformed the Right from a movement that, at least roughly, believed first of all in individual liberty (and its corollaries: civil liberties domestically, and peace and ‘isolation’ in foreign affairs) into a movement that, in fact glorifies total war and the suppression of civil liberty.” (Confidential Memo to the Volker Fund, “What Is to Be Done?” July 1961)


Article Info

David Gordon

David Gordon

David Gordon is a senior fellow at the Ludwig von Mises Institute and and a columnist for He is the author, most recently, of The Essential Rothbard.

Life on the Right

Life on the Right

The following address was given to the 2010 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. It was originally published at

When I first envisioned the idea of this Society, more than 10 years ago and then still a society without a name, I had direct experience with only two other Societies from which to learn.

My first experience was with the Mont Pelerin Society which Friedrich Hayek had founded in 1947.

During the 1990s, I was three times invited as a speaker to Mont Pelerin Society meetings in Cannes, Cape Town, and Barcelona. Each time, with papers attacking democracy and egalitarianism, defending monarchies vs. democracies, eviscerating the classical-liberal idea of a minimal-state as self-contradictory, and propagating a stateless, anarcho-capitalist natural order, my appearance was considered somewhat scandalous: too irreverent, too confrontational, and too sensational.

Whatever the function of the Mont Pelerin Society may have been in the immediate aftermath of WW II, at the time of my encounter with it, I did not find it particularly to my liking.

To be sure, I met many bright and interesting people. But essentially, Mont Pelerin Society meetings were junkets for “free-market” and “limited-government” think-tank and foundation staffers, their various professorial affiliates and protégées, and the principal donor-financiers of it all, mostly from the U.S., and more specifically from Washington D.C. Characteristically, Ed Feulner, long-time President of the Heritage Foundation, the major GOP think-tank and intellectual shill to the welfare-warfare state politics of every Republican government administration, from Reagan to Bush, Junior, is a former Mont Pelerin Society president and, more significantly, has been its long-time treasurer.

There had been skepticism concerning the Mont Pelerin Society from the beginning. Ludwig von Mises, Hayek’s teacher and friend, had expressed severe doubt concerning his plan simply in view of Hayek’s initial invitees: how could a society filled with certified state-interventionists promote the goal of a free and prosperous commonwealth?

Despite his initial reservations, however, Mises became a founding member of the Mont Pelerin Society. Yet his prediction turned out correct. Famously, at an early Mont Pelerin Society meeting, Mises would walk out denouncing speakers and panelists as a bunch of socialists.

Essentially, this was also my first impression when I came in contact with the Mont Pelerin Society and this impression has been confirmed since. The Mont Pelerin Society is a society in which every right-wing social democrat can feel at home. True, occasionally a few strange birds are invited to speak, but the meetings are dominated and the range of acceptable discourse is delineated by certified state-interventionists: by the heads of government-funded or connected foundations and think-tanks, by central bank payrollees, paper-money enthusiasts, and assorted international educrats and researchocrats in and out of government. No discussion in the hallowed halls of the Mont Pelerin Society of U.S. imperialism or the Bush war crimes, for instance, or of the financial crimes committed by the Federal Reserve Bank—and no discussion of any sensitive race issue, of course.

Not all of this can be blamed on Hayek, needless to say. He had increasingly lost control of the Mont Pelerin Society already long before his death in 1992.

But then: Hayek did have much to do with what the Mont Pelerin Society had become. For, as Mises could have known already then, and as would become apparent at last in 1960, with the publication of Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty, Hayek himself was a proven interventionist. In the third part of this famous book, Hayek had laid out a plan for a “free” society so riddled with interventionist designs that every moderate social-democrat—of the Scandinavian-German variety—could easily subscribe. When, at the occasion of Hayek’s 80th birthday in 1979, the Social Democratic then-Chancellor of West Germany, Helmut Schmidt, sent Hayek a congratulatory note proclaiming “we are all Hayekians now”, this was not an empty phrase. It was true, and Schmidt meant it.

What I came to realize, then, was this: The deplorable development—as judged from a classic-liberal vantage point—of the Mont Pelerin Society was not an accident. Rather, it was the necessary consequence of a fundamental theoretical flaw committed not only by Hayek but, ultimately, also by Mises, with his idea of a minimal state.

This flaw did not merely afflict the Mont Pelerin Society. It afflicted the entire “limited-government” think-tank industry that had sprung up as its offspring since the 1960s throughout the Western, U.S. dominated world, and for which the Mont Pelerin Society had assumed the function of an “International”.

The goal of “limited”—or “constitutional”—government, which Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, James Buchanan and other Mont Pelerin Society grandees had tried to promote and that every “free-market” think-tank today proclaims as its goal, is an impossible goal, much as it is an impossible goal to try squaring the circle. You cannot first establish a territorial monopoly of law and order and then expect that this monopolist will not make use of this awesome privilege of legislating in its own favor. Likewise: You cannot establish a territorial monopoly of paper money production and expect the monopolist not to use its power of printing up ever more money.

Limiting the power of the state, once it has been granted a territorial monopoly of legislation, is impossible, a self-contradictory goal. To believe that it is possible to limit government power—other than by subjecting it to competition, i.e., by not allowing monopoly privileges of any kind to arise in the first place—is to assume that the nature of Man changes as the result of the establishment of government (very much like the miraculous transformation of Man that socialists believe to happen with the onset of socialism).

That is the whole thing: limited government, is an illusory goal. To believe it to be possible is to believe in miracles.

The strategy of Hayek and of the Mont Pelerin Society, then, had to fail. Instead of helping to reform—liberalize—the (Western) State, as they intended (or pretended?) to do, the Mont Pelerin Society and the international “limited-government” think-tank industry would become an integral part of a continuously expanding welfare-warfare state system.

Indicators for this verdict abound: The typical location of the think tanks is in or near the capital city, most prominently Washington, DC., because their principal addressee is the central government. They react to measures and announcements of government, and they suggest and make proposals to government. Most contacts of think-tankers outside their own institution are with politicians, government bureaucrats, lobbyists, and assorted staffers and assistants. Along with connected journalists, these are also the regular attendees of their conferences, briefings, receptions and cocktail parties. There is a steady exchange of personnel between think tanks and governments. And the leaders of the limited government industry are frequently themselves prominent members of the power elite and the ruling class.

Most indicative of all: For decades, the limited government movement has been a growth industry. Its annual expenditures currently run in the hundreds of millions of dollars, and billions of dollars likely have been spent in total. All the while, government expenditures never and nowhere fell, not even once, but instead always and uninterruptedly increased to ever more dizzying heights.

And yet, this glaring failure of the industry to deliver the promised good of limited government is not punished but, perversely, rewarded with still more ample funds. The more the think tanks fail, the more money they get.

The State and the free market think tank industry thus live in perfect harmony with each other. They grow together, in tandem.

For limited government advocates such as Hayek and the entire free market think tank industry, this is an embarrassment. They must try to explain it away somehow, as accidental or coincidental. And they typically do so, simply enough, by arguing that without their continued funding and operations matters would be even worse.

Thus excused, then, the industry continues on as before, undisturbed by any fact or event past or future.

But the embarrassing facts are not accidental or coincidental and could have been systematically predicted—if only one had better understood the nature of the state, and did not believe in miracles.

As a territorial monopolist of legislation and the money-printing press, the State has a natural tendency to grow: to use its “fiat” laws and “fiat” money to gain increasing control of society and social institutions. With “fiat laws”, the State has the unique power of threatening and punishing or incentivizing and rewarding whatever it pleases. And with its “fiat money”, it can buy-up support, bribe, and corrupt more easily than anyone else.

Certainly, an extraordinary institution such as this will have the means at its disposal, legal and financial, to deal with the challenge posed by a limited government industry. Historically, the State has successfully dealt with far more formidable opponents—like organized religion, for instance!

Unlike the Church or churches, however, the limited government industry is conveniently located and concentrated at or near the center of State power, and the industry’s entire raison d’etre is to talk and have access to the State. That is what its donor-financiers typically expect.

Yet so much the easier, then, was it for the State to target and effectively control this industry. The State only had to set up its own bureaucracy in charge of free-market-relations and lure the limited-government NGOs with conferences, invitations, sponsorships, grants, money and employment prospects. Without having to resort to threats, these measures alone were sufficient to ensure compliance on the part of the free-market think-tank industry and its associated intellectuals. The market demand for intellectual services is low and fickle and hence intellectuals can be bought up cheaply!

Moreover, through its cooperation with the free market industry, the State could enhance its own legitimacy and intellectual respectability as an “economically enlightened”, institution—and thus open up still further room for State growth.

Essentially, as with all so-called NGOs [non-government organizations], the State managed to transform the limited government industry into just another vehicle for its own aggrandizement.

What I learned from my experience with the Mont Pelerin Society, then, was that an entirely different strategy had to be chosen if one wanted to limit the power of the state. For socialists or social-democrats, it is perfectly rational to talk and seek access to the State and to try “marching through its institutions“, because the Left wants to increase the power of the State. That is, the Left wants what the State is disposed to do anyway, by virtue of its nature as a territorial monopolist of law and order.

But the same strategy is inefficient or even counterproductive if one wants to roll the power of the State back—regardless of whether one wants to roll it back completely and establish a stateless natural order or roll it back only “sharply” or “drastically” to some “glorious” or “golden” status quo ante.

In any case, this goal can only be reached if, instead of talking and seeking access to the State, the State is openly ignored, avoided and disavowed; and its agents and propagandists are explicitly excluded from one’s proceedings. To talk to the State and include its agents and propagandists is to lend legitimacy and strength to it. To ostentatiously ignore, avoid and disavow it and to exclude its agents and propagandists as undesirable is to withdraw consent from the State and to weaken its legitimacy.

In sharp contrast to the Mont Pelerin Society and its multiple offspring, which wanted to reform and liberalize the welfare-warfare state system from within—pursuing a “system-immanent” strategy of change, as Marxists would say—and which failed precisely for this reason and was instead co-opted by the State as part of the political establishment, my envisioned society, the Property and Freedom Society was to pursue a “system-transcending” strategy.

That is, it would try to reform, and ultimately revolutionize, the ever more invasive welfare-warfare State system from the outside, through the creation of an anti-statist counterculture that could attract a steadily growing number of defectors—of intellectuals, educated laymen and even the much-cited “man on the street”—away from the dominant State culture and institutions. The Property And Freedom Society was to be the international spearhead, the avant-garde, of this intellectual counterculture.

Central to this counterculture was this insight into the perversity of the institution of a State: A territorial monopolist of law and order that can make and change laws in its own favor does not and cannot, without assuming miracles, protect the life and property of its subjects (clients); but is and always will be a permanent danger to them—the sure road to serfdom and tyranny.

Based on this insight, then, the Property And Freedom Society was to have a twofold goal.

On the one hand, positively, it was to explain and elucidate the legal, economic, cognitive and cultural requirements and features of a free, state-less natural order.

On the other hand, negatively, it was to unmask the State and showcase it for what it really is: an institution run by gangs of murderers, plunderers and thieves, surrounded by willing executioners, propagandists, sycophants, crooks, liars, clowns, charlatans, dupes and useful idiots—an institution that dirties and taints everything it touches.

For purposes of full disclosure I must add this: At the urging of my friend Jesus Huerta de Soto, who had been inducted at a very young age into the Mont Pelerin Society by Hayek personally, I reluctantly applied for membership sometime in the mid-1990s. Besides Huerta de Soto the late Arthur Seldon, who was then Honorary President of the Mont Pelerin Society, had endorsed my membership. Nonetheless, I was turned down—and, as I must admit, deservedly so, because I simply did not fit into such a society.

From reliable sources I have been told that it was, in particular, Leonard Liggio, a former friend of Murray Rothbard’s, who must have realized this and most vigorously opposed my membership; seconded, from the German contingent of Mont Pelerin Society movers and shakers, by Christian Watrin. Both Liggio and Watrin would later become Mont Pelerin Society presidents.

My second experience with intellectual societies was with the John Randolph Club [JRC], which had been founded in 1989 by libertarian Murray Rothbard and conservative Thomas Fleming.

From the outset, this society was far more to my liking. For a while, I played a leading role in the John Randolph Club. But I also played a prominent part in its breakup that occurred shortly after Rothbard’s death in 1995, and that essentially resulted in the exit of the Rothbardian wing of the society.

Nonetheless, I look back to those early John Randolph Club years with fond memories. So it is no surprise that quite a few of my old John Randolph Club comrades have also appeared here in Bodrum, at Property And Freedom Society meetings: Peter Brimelow, Tom DiLorenzo, Paul Gottfried, Walter Block, Justin Raimondo, Yuri Maltsev, David Gordon. In addition, I should mention my friend Joe Sobran, who had wanted to appear at our inaugural meeting but couldn’t attend because of ill health.

In contrast to the “international” Mont Pelerin Society, the John Randolph Club was an “American” Society. This did not mean that the JRC was more provincial, however. To the contrary. Not only had the JRC numerous “foreign” members, but also, whereas the Mont Pelerin Society was dominated by professional economists, the John Randolph Club represented a much broader, interdisciplinary and trans-disciplinary spectrum of intellectual interests and endeavors.

On the average, foreign language proficiency among John Randolph Club-ers ranked well above that encountered in Mont Pelerin Society circles. In its habits and ways, the Mont Pelerin Society was multi-cultural, egalitarian and non-discriminating, while it was highly restrictive and intolerant regarding the range of permissible subjects and intellectual taboos. In sharp contrast, the JRC was a decidedly bourgeois, anti-egalitarian and discriminating society, but at the same time a society far more open and tolerant intellectually, without any taboo-subjects.

In addition, whereas Mont Pelerin Society meetings were large and impersonal—they could exceed 500 participants—John Randolph Club meetings had rarely more than 150 attendees and were small and intimate.

I liked all of these aspects of the John Randolph Club. (I didn’t much care for the venues of its meetings: typically some business hotel in the outskirts of a major city. In this regard, Mont Pelerin Society meetings had clearly more to offer—although for a stiff price.)

But, as I indicated, not all was well with the John Randolph Club, and my encounter with it also taught me a few lessons on what not to imitate.

The breakup of the John Randolph Club shortly after Rothbard’s death had partly personal reasons. Tom Fleming, the surviving principal of the Club, is, to put it diplomatically, a difficult man, as everyone who has dealt with him can testify. In addition, there were organizational quarrels. The meetings of the John Randolph Club were organized annually alternating by the Center for Libertarian Studies, which represented Murray Rothbard and his men, and by the Rockford Institute, which represented Thomas Fleming and his. This arrangement had perhaps unavoidably led to various charges of free-loading. Ultimately, however, the breakup had more fundamental reasons.

The John Randolph Club was a coalition of two distinct groups of intellectuals. On the one hand was a group of anarcho-capitalist Austro-libertarians, led by Rothbard, mostly of economists but also philosophers, lawyers, historians and sociologists (mostly of a more analytical-theoretical bend of mind). I was a member of this group. On the other hand was a group of writers associated with the conservative monthly Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture and its editor, Tom Fleming. Paul Gottfried was a member of that group. The conservative group did not have any economist of note and generally displayed a more empirical bend of mind. Apart from historians and sociologists, it included in particular also men of letters: of philologists, literary writers, and cultural critics.

On the libertarian side, the cooperation with conservatives was motivated by the insight that while libertarianism may be logically compatible with many cultures, sociologically it requires a conservative, bourgeois core culture. The decision to form an intellectual alliance with conservatives then involved for the libertarians a double break with “Establishment Libertarianism” as represented, for instance, by the Washington DC “free market” CATO Institute.

This Establishment Libertarianism was not only theoretically in error, with its commitment to the impossible goal of limited government (and centralized government at that): it was also sociologically flawed, with its anti-bourgeois—indeed, adolescent—so-called “cosmopolitan” cultural message: of multiculturalism and egalitarianism, of “respect no authority”, of “live-and-let-live”, of hedonism and libertinism.

The anti-establishment Austro-libertarians sought to learn more from the conservative side about the cultural requirements of a free and prosperous commonwealth. And by and large they did and learned their lesson. At least, I think that I did.

For the conservative side of the alliance, the cooperation with the Austrian anarcho-capitalists signified a complete break with the so-called neoconservative movement that had come to dominate organized conservatism in the US and which was represented, for instance, by such Washington DC think tanks as the American Enterprise Institute and the Heritage Foundation. The paleo-conservatives, as they came to be known, opposed the neo-conservative goal of a highly and increasingly centralized, “economically efficient” welfare-warfare State as incompatible with the traditional conservative core values of private property, of family and family households, and of local communities and their protection. There were some points of contention between the paleo-cons and the libertarians: on the issues of abortion and immigration and on the definition and necessity of government. But these differences could be accommodated in agreeing that their resolution must not be attempted on the level of the central state or even some supra-national institution such as the UN, but always on the smallest level of social organization: on the level of families and of local communities.

For the paleo-cons, secession from a central State was not a taboo, and for the Austro-libertarians secession had the status of a natural human right (while establishment libertarians typically treat it as a taboo subject); hence, cooperation was possible. Moreover, the cooperation with the Austro-libertarians was to afford the conservatives the opportunity of learning sound (Austrian school) economics, which was an acknowledged gap and weakness in their intellectual armor, especially vis-à-vis their neo-conservative opponents. However, with some notable exceptions the conservative group failed to live up to these expectations.

This, then, was the ultimate reason for the breakup of the libertarian-conservative alliance accomplished with the John Randolph Club: that while the libertarians were willing to learn their cultural lesson the conservatives did not want to learn their economics.

This verdict, and the consequent lesson, was not immediately clear, of course. It was driven home only in the course of the events. In the case of the John Randolph Club, the event had a name. It was Patrick Buchanan, TV personality, commentator, syndicated columnist, best-selling book author, including serious works on revisionist history, a very charismatic man, witty and with great personal charm, but also a man with a deep and lasting involvement in Republican Party politics, first as a Nixon speech-writer and then as White House Director of Communications under Ronald Reagan.

Pat Buchanan did not participate directly in the John Randolph Club, but he had personal ties to several of its leading members (on both sides of the Club but especially to the Chronicles group, which included some of his closest advisors) and he was considered a prominent part of the counter-cultural movement represented by the John Randolph Club. In 1992, Buchanan challenged then sitting president George Bush for the GOP presidential nomination. (He would do so again in 1996, challenging Senator Bob Dole for the Republican nomination, and in 2000 he would run as the presidential candidate for the Reform Party.) Buchanan’s challenge was impressive at first, nearly upsetting Bush in the New Hampshire primary, and it initially caused considerable enthusiasm in John Randolph Club circles. However, in the course of Buchanan’s campaign and in reaction to it open dissent between the two John Randolph Club camps broke out as regards the “correct” strategy.

Buchanan pursued a populist “America First” campaign. He wanted to talk and appeal to the so-called “Middle Americans,” who felt betrayed and dispossessed by the political elites of both parties. After the collapse of communism and the end of the cold war, Buchanan wanted to bring all American troops back home, dissolve NATO, leave the UN, and conduct a non-interventionist foreign policy (which his neo-conservative enemies smeared as “isolationist“). He wanted to cut all but economic ties to Israel in particular, and he openly criticized the “un-American” influence of the organized Jewish-American lobby, something that takes considerable courage in contemporary America.

He wanted to eliminate all “affirmative action,” non-discrimination and quota laws that had pervaded all aspects of American life, and which were essentially anti-white and especially anti-white-male laws. In particular, he promised to end the non-discriminatory immigration policy that had resulted in the mass immigration of low-class third-world people and the attendant forced integration or, euphemistically, “multiculturalism.” Further, he wanted to end the entire “cultural rot” coming out of Washington DC by closing down the federal Department of Education and a multitude of other federal indoctrination agencies.

But instead of emphasizing these widely popular “rightist” cultural concerns, Buchanan, in the course of his campaign, increasingly intoned other, economic matters and concerns, all the while his knowledge of economics was rather skimpy.

Concentrating on what he was worst at, then, he increasingly advocated a “leftist” economic program of economic and social nationalism. He advocated tariffs to protect “essential” American industries and save American jobs from “unfair” foreign competition, and he proposed to “protect” Middle Americans by safeguarding and even expanding the already existing welfare-State programs of minimum wage laws, unemployment insurance, Social Security, Medicaid and Medicare.

When I explained, in a speech before the club, that Buchanan’s rightist-cultural and leftist-economic program was theoretically inconsistent and that his strategy must consequently fail to reach its own goal, that you cannot return America to cultural sanity and strengthen its families and communities and at the same time maintain the institutional pillars that are the central cause for the cultural malaise, that protectionist tariffs cannot make Americans more prosperous, but less, and that a program of economic nationalism must alienate the intellectually and culturally indispensible bourgeoisie while attracting the (for us and our purposes) “useless” proletariat, it almost came to an éclat. The conservative group was up in arms about this critique of one of its heroes.

I had hoped that, notwithstanding feelings of friendship or personal loyalty, after some time of reflection reason would prevail, especially after it had become clear by the ensuing events that Buchanan’s strategy had also failed numerically, at the polls. I thought that the John Randolph Club conservatives would sooner or later come to realize that my critique of Buchanan was an “immanent” critique; that is, that I had not criticized or distanced myself from the goal of the John Randolph Club, and presumably also Buchanan’s, of a conservative cultural counterrevolution, but that, based on elementary economic reasons, I had simply found the means—the strategy—chosen by Buchanan to accomplish this goal unsuitable and ineffective. But nothing happened. There was no attempt to refute my arguments. Nor was there any sign that one was willing to express some intellectual distance to Buchanan and his program.

From this experience I learned a twofold lesson. First, a lesson that I had already come away with from my encounter with the Mont Pelerin Society was reinforced: Do not put your trust in politicians and do not get distracted by politics. Buchanan, notwithstanding his many appealing personal qualities, was still at heart a politician who believed in government, above all, as a means of effecting social change. Second and more generally, however, I learned that it is impossible to have a lasting intellectual association with people who are either unwilling or incapable of grasping the principles of economics. Economics—the logic of action—is the queen of the social sciences. It is by no means sufficient for an understanding of social reality, but it is necessary and indispensible. Without a solid grasp of economic principles, say on the level of Henry Hazlitt’s Economics in One Lesson, one is bound to commit serious blunders of historical explanation and interpretation.

Thus, I concluded that the property and freedom society not only had to exclude all politicians and government agents and propagandists as objects of ridicule and contempt, as emperors without clothes and the butt of all jokes rather than objects of admiration and emulation, but it also had to exclude all economic ignoramuses.

When the John Randolph Club broke apart, this did not mean that the ideas that had inspired its formation had died out or did no longer find an audience. In fact, in the U.S., a think tank dedicated to the same ideas and ideals had grown up. The Ludwig von Mises Institute, founded in 1982 by Lew Rockwell, with Murray Rothbard as its academic head, had started out as just another limited government think tank—although Rothbard and all other leading Mises Institute associates were anarcho-capitalist Austrians. Yet by the mid-1990s—and I pride myself in having played an important role in this development—Lew Rockwell had transformed the institute, significantly located far away from Washington DC, in provincial Auburn, Alabama, into the very first and only free market think tank that had openly renounced the goal of limited government as impossible and come out instead as an unabashed advocate of anarcho-capitalism, deviating thereby from a narrow, “literal” interpretation of its name sake and yet staying true to his spirit in pursuing the rigorous, Misesian praxeo-logical method to its ultimate conclusion. This move was financially costly at first, but under Rockwell’s brilliant intellectual entrepreneurship it had eventually become an enormous success, easily outcompeting its far richer “limited-government-libertarian” rivals such as the CATO Institute in terms of reach and influence. Moreover, in addition to the Mises Institute, which focused more narrowly on economic matters, and in the wake of the disappointing experience with the John Randolph Club and its breakup, Lew Rockwell had set up, in 1999, an anti-state, anti-war, pro-market website——that added an interdisciplinary, cultural dimension to the Austro-libertarian enterprise and proved to be even more popular, laying the intellectual groundwork for the present Ron Paul movement.

The Property And Freedom Society was not supposed to compete with the Mises Institute or It was not supposed to be a think tank or another publication outlet. Rather, it was to complement their and other efforts by adding yet another important component to the development of an anti-statist intellectual counterculture. What had disappeared with the break-up of the original John Randolph Club was an intellectual Society dedicated to the cause. Yet every intellectual movement requires a network of personal acquaintances, of friends and comrades in arms to be successful, and for such a network to be established and grow, a regular meeting place, a society, is needed. The Property And Freedom Society was supposed to be this society.

I wanted to create a place where likeminded people from around the world could gather regularly in mutual encouragement and in the enjoyment of unrivalled and uncensored intellectual radicalism. The society was supposed to be international and interdisciplinary, bourgeois, by invitation only, exclusive and elitist: for the few “elect,” who can see through the smokescreen put up by our ruling classes of criminals, crooks, charlatans, and clowns.

After our first meeting, 5 years ago, here at the Karia Princess, my plan became more specific still. Inspired by the charm of the place and its beautiful garden, I decided to adopt the model of a salon for the Property And Freedom Society and its meetings. The dictionary defines a salon as “a gathering of intellectual, social, political, and cultural elites under the roof of an inspiring hostess or host, partly to amuse one another and partly to refine their taste and increase their knowledge through conversation.” Take the “political” out of this definition—and there you have it what I have tried to accomplish for the last few years, together with Guelcin, my wife and fellow Misesian, without whose support none of this would be possible: to be hostess and host to a grand and extended annual salon, and to make it, with your help, the most attractive and illustrious salon there is.

I hope—and indeed I am confident—that this, our fifth meeting, will mark another step forward toward this end.


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Hans-Hermann Hoppe

Hans-Hermann Hoppe

Hans-Hermann Hoppe, an Austrian school economist and libertarian/anarcho-capitalist philosopher, is Professor Emeritus of Economics at UNLV, Distinguished Fellow with the Ludwig von Mises Institute, Founder and President of The Property and Freedom Society, and former Editor of the Journal of Libertarian Studies. He’s the author of Democracy–The God That Failed among other books.

Immigration: Secession Is The Solution

Immigration: Secession Is The Solution

It is often amusing to observe the attempts of left-wing proponents of “immigrants’ rights” to depict themselves as noble defenders of the oppressed and downtrodden against tyrannical and exploitive elites. As is often the case with leftists, reality diverges sharply from their beliefs. There are few issues where elite opinion and the views of “the common people” are more in conflict than on the immigration issue, and “the people” come down firmly against open borders. One study on this question from 2002, and commissioned by no less than the Council on Foreign Relations, indicated that among others discrepancies between elite and popular opinion, 60 percent of the public regards the present level of immigration to be a “critical threat to the vital interests of the United States,” compared to only 14 percent of the nation’s leadership, a 46 percentage point gap.” The study concluded that “even on such divisive issues as globalization or strengthening the United Nations, the public and the elite are much closer together than they are on immigration.” Of course, the first epithet to be thrown against advocates of immigration restriction is “racist.” Yet, the research shows that a majority of each of America’s largest minority groups likewise opposes open borders. Sixty-eight percent of African-Americans, fifty-seven percent of Asian-Americans, fifty-six percent of Hispanics, and fifty-percent of Jews agree that immigration rates are too high at present. Plenty of voices that are critical of mass immigration can be found among other minority ethnic groups as well.

The principal reason for the sharp difference between public and elite opinion on this issue is that immigration policy as presently constituted involves an upward redistribution of wealth, power, and resources. Mass immigration involves the suppression of wage levels by increasing the supply of labor, provides clients for social services bureaucrats and other public sector institutions, creates additional constituents for political parties, and new recruits for ethnic lobbies. The ideological interests of self-congratulatory cultural elites are likewise enhanced. All of this is well-known, of course. Yet, the degree to which immigration is directly enhanced and subsidized outright by the state is often underestimated. An article by Rob Freeman at The Occidental Quarterly provides a shocking overview of how deeply ingrained into the system this situation actually is. It is a situation that imposes great costs on ordinary people in terms of lower wages and higher unemployment, taxes, diminished quality of schools and other public institutions, reduced availability of social services, crime and increased ethnic conflict, loss of community cohesion, neighborhood blight, and eventual demographic overrun and cultural dispossession. In other words, open borders is essentially a tool of class warfare being waged by elites against the peasants, i.e. us ordinary people. Sam Francis coined the term “anarcho-tyranny” to refer to this system whereby the state demands the authority to intrude into areas of society previously or traditionally recognized as inviolable, while slacking on the job with regards to the traditional or conventional responsibilities of government, e.g. crime control and border defense.

Imagine a scenario where immigration is taken out of the hands of elites and made accountable to public opinion, say, along the lines of the Swiss system as Srdja Trifkovic has described it: “Switzerland has the toughest naturalization rules in Europe. If you want to become Swiss you must live in the country legally for at least 12 years—and pay taxes, and have no criminal record—before you can apply for citizenship. It still does not mean that your wish will be granted, however, and the fact that you were born in Zurich or Lugano does not make any difference. There are no “amnesties” and illegals are deported if caught. Even if an applicant satisfies all other conditions, the local community in which he resides has the final say: it can interview the applicant and hold a public vote before naturalization is approved. If rejected he can apply again, but only after ten years.

If every city, town, or county in the United States were suddenly granted veto power over immigration or naturalization requests, we can be relatively certain that mass immigration would end overnight. Virtually all of the “red counties” depicted on the typical electoral map would halt immigration tomorrow, and so would most of the majority-black big cities. This would leave only trendy liberal areas like Santa Cruz or Madison, border areas where immigrants and their immediate descendents are already a majority, and plutocratic/bureaucratic headquarters like New York, L.A. and D.C., to continue with the “come one, come all” approach. Of course, the Swiss model would never be allowed under the present federal leviathan, so its implementation would have to be accompanied by secession, which would further curb immigration by halting federal subsidies to it. It is unlikely that the present trend towards demographic overrun and cultural dispossession will be reversed as long as the present regime/ruling class maintains power, just as it was unlikely that political and economic reform of a genuinely substantive and enduring nature could have been achieved in Russia if the Soviet system has survived. Therefore, more extreme paths toward cultural self-preservation need to be explored.


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Keith Preston

Keith Preston

Keith Preston is the chief editor of AttacktheSystem.Com and holds graduate degrees in history and sociology. He was awarded the 2008 Chris R. Tame Memorial Prize by the United Kingdom’s Libertarian Alliance for his essay, “Free Enterprise: The Antidote to Corporate Plutocracy.”