What will happen if Europeans-Americans lose the Western World?

Here are some documents, from many different Authors, experts in their fields.  What will Happen if Europeans lost Europe, and Americans of European Ancestry lose America?

Updated 9/4/2010

Dark Age Ahead Jane Jacobs is the author of several books, including the classic The Death and Life of Great American Cities, which redefined urban studies and economic policy, and the bestselling Systems of Survival. She lives and works in Toronto. The Hazard This is both a gloomy and a hopeful book. The subject itself is gloomy. A Dark Age is a culture's dead end. We in North America and Western Europe, enjoying the many benefits of the culture conventionally known as the West, customarily think of a Dark Age as happening once, long ago, following the collapse of the Western Roman Empire. But in North America we live in a graveyard of lost aboriginal cultures, many of which were decisively finished off by mass amnesia in which even the memory of what was lost was also lost. Throughout the world Dark Ages have scrawled finis to successions of cultures receding far into the past. Whatever happened to the culture whose people produced the splendid Lascaux cave paintings some seventeen thousand years ago, in what is now southwestern France? Or the culture of the builders of ambitious stone and wood henges in Western Europe before the Celts arrived with their Iron Age technology and intricately knotted art? Mass amnesia, striking as it is and seemingly weird, is the least mysterious of Dark Age phenomena. We all understand the harsh principle Use it or lose it. A failing or conquered culture can spiral down into a long decline, as has happened in most empires after their relatively short heydays of astonishing success. But in extreme cases, failing or conquered cultures can be genuinely lost, never to emerge again as living ways of being. The salient mystery of Dark Ages sets the stage for mass amnesia. People living in vigorous cultures typically treasure those cultures and resist any threat to them. How and why can a people so totally discard a formerly vital culture that it becomes literally lost? This is a question that has practical importance for us here in North America, and possibly in Western Europe as well. Dark Ages are instructive, precisely because they are extreme examples of cultural collapse and thus more clear-cut and vivid than gradual decay. The purpose of this book is to help our culture avoid sliding into a dead end, by understanding how such a tragedy comes about, and thereby what can be done to ward it off and thus retain and further develop our living, functioning culture, which contains so much of value, so hard won by our forebears. We need this awareness because, as I plan to explain, we show signs of rushing headlong into a Dark Age. Surely, the threat of losing all we have achieved, everything that makes us the vigorous society we are, cannot apply to us! How could it possibly happen to us? We have books, magnificent storehouses of knowledge about our culture; we have pictures, both still and moving, and oceans of other cultural information that every day wash through the Internet, the daily press, scholarly journals, the careful catalogs of museum exhibitions, the reports compiled by government bureaucracies on every subject from judicial decisions to regulations for earthquake-resistant buildings, and, of course, time capsules. Dark Ages, surely, are pre-printing and pre-World Wide Web phenomena. Even the Roman classical world was skimpily documented in comparison with our times. With all our information, how could our culture be lost? Or even almost lost? Don't we have it as well preserved as last season's peach crop, ready to nourish our descendants if need be? Writing, printing, and the Internet give a false sense of security about the permanence of culture. Most of the million details of a complex, living culture are transmitted neither in writing nor pictorially. Instead, cultures live through word of mouth and example. That is why we have cooking classes and cooking demonstrations, as well as cookbooks. That is why we have apprenticeships, internships, student tours, and on-the-job training as well as manuals and textbooks. Every culture takes pains to educate its young so that they, in their turn, can practice and transmit it completely. Educators and mentors, whether they are parents, elders, or schoolmasters, use books and videos if they have them, but they also speak, and when they are most effective, as teachers, parents, or mentors, they also serve as examples. As recipients of culture, as well as its producers, people attend to countless nuances that are assimilated only through experience. Men, women, and children in Holland conduct themselves differently from men, women, and children in England, even though both share the culture of the West, and very differently from their counterparts in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or Singapore. Travel writers, novelists, visual artists, and photographers draw attention to subtle, everyday differences in conduct rooted in experience, including the experience of differing cultural histories, but their glosses are unavoidably sketchy, compared with the experience of living a culture, soaking it up by example and word of mouth. Another thing: a living culture is forever changing, without losing itself as a framework and context of change. The reconstruction of a culture is not the same as its restoration. In the fifteenth century, scholars and antiquarians set about reconstructing the lost classical culture of Greece and Rome from that culture's writing and artifacts. Their work was useful and remains so to this day; Western Europeans relearned their cultural derivations from it. But Europeans also plunged, beginning in the fifteenth century, into the post-Renaissance crises of the Enlightenment. Profoundly disturbing new knowledge entered a fundamentalist and feudal framework so unprepared to receive it that some scientists were excommunicated and their findings rejected by an establishment that had managed to accept reconstructed classicism--and used it to refute newer knowledge. Copernicus's stunning proofs forced educated people to realize that the earth is not the center of the universe, as reconstructed classical culture would have it. This and other discoveries, especially in the basic sciences of chemistry and physics, pitted the creative culture of the Enlightenment against the reconstructed culture of the Renaissance, which soon stood, ironically, as a barrier to cultural development of the West--a barrier formed by canned and preserved knowledge of kinds which we erroneously may imagine can save us from future decline or forgetfulness. Dark Ages are horrible ordeals, incomparably worse than the temporary amnesia sometimes experienced by stunned survivors of earthquakes, battles, or bombing firestorms who abandon customary routines while they search for other survivors, grieve, and grapple with their own urgent needs, and who may forget the horrors they have witnessed, or try to. But later on, life for survivors continues for the most part as before, after having been suspended for the emergency. During a Dark Age, the mass amnesia of survivors becomes permanent and profound. The previous way of life slides into an abyss of forgetfulness, almost as decisively as if it had not existed. Henri Pirenne, a great twentieth-century Belgian economic and social historian, says that the famous Dark Age which followed the collapse of the Western Roman Empire reached its nadir some six centuries later, about 1000 c.e. Here, sketched by two French historians, is the predicament of French peasantry in that year: The peasants...are half starved. The effects of chronic malnourishment are conspicuous in the skeletons exhumed....The chafing of the teeth...indicates a grass-eating people, rickets, and an overwhelming preponderance of people who died young....Even for the minority that survived infancy, the average life span did not exceed the age of forty....Periodically the lack of food grows worse. For a year or two there will be a great famine; the chroniclers described the graphic and horrible episodes of this catastrophe, complacently and rather excessively conjuring up people who eat dirt and sell human skin....There is little or no metal; iron is reserved for weapons. So much had been forgotten in the forgetful centuries: the Romans' use of legumes in crop rotation to restore the soil; how to mine and smelt iron and make and transport picks for miners, and hammers and anvils for smiths; how to harvest honey from hollow-tile hives doubling as garden fences. In districts where even slaves had been well clothed, most people wore filthy rags. Some three centuries after the Roman collapse, bubonic plague, hitherto unknown in Europe, crept in from North Africa, where it was endemic, and exploded into the first of many European bubonic plague epidemics. The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, conventionally depicted as Famine, War, Pestilence, and Death, had already been joined by a fifth demonic horseman, Forgetfulness. A Dark Age is not merely a collection of subtractions. It is not a blank; much is added to fill the vacuum. But the additions break from the past and themselves reinforce a loss of the past. In Europe, languages that derived from formerly widely understood Latin diverged and became mutually incomprehensible. Everyday customs, rituals, and decorations diverged as old ones were lost; ethnic awarenesses came to the fore, often antagonistically; the embryos of nation-states were forming. Citizenship gave way to serfdom; old Roman cities and towns were largely deserted and their underpopulated remnants sank into poverty and squalor; their former amenities, such as public baths and theatrical performances, became not even a memory. Gladiatorial battles and hungry wild animals unleashed upon prisoners were forgotten, too, but here and there, in backwaters, the memory of combat between a man on foot and a bull was retained because it was practiced. Diets changed, with gruel displacing bread, and salt fish and wild fowl almost displacing domesticated meat. Rules of inheritance and property holding changed. The composition of households changed drastically with conversion of Rome's traditional family-sized farms to feudal estates. Methods of warfare and ostensible reasons for warfare changed as the state and its laws gave way to exactions and oppressions by warlords. Writers disappeared, along with readers and literacy, as schooling became rare. Religion changed as Christianity, formerly an obscure cult among hundreds of obscure cults, won enough adherents to become dominant and to be accepted as the state religion by Constantine, emperor of the still intact Eastern Roman Empire, and then, also as the state religion, in territorial remnants of the vanished Western Empire. The very definitions of virtue and the meaning of life changed. In Western Christendom, sexuality became highly suspect. In sum, during the time of mass amnesia, not only was most classical culture forgotten, and what remained coarsened; but also, Western Europe underwent the most radical and thoroughgoing revolution in its recorded history--a political, economic, social, and ideological revolution that was unexamined and even largely unnoticed, as such, while it was under way. In the last desperate years before Western Rome's collapse, local governments had been expunged by imperial decree and were replaced by a centralized military despotism, not a workable organ for governmental judgments and reflections. Similar phenomena are to be found in the obscure Dark Ages that bring defeated aboriginal cultures to a close. Many subtractions combine to erase a previous way of life, and everything changes as a richer past converts to a meager present and an alien future. During the conquest of North America by Europeans, an estimated twenty million aboriginals succumbed to imported diseases, warfare, and displacement from lands on which they and their hundreds of different cultures depended. Their first response to the jolts of European invasion was to try to adapt familiar ways of life to the strange new circumstances. Some groups that had been accustomed to trading with one another, for example, forged seemingly workable trade links with the invaders. But after more conquerors crowded in, remnants of aboriginal survivors were herded into isolated reservations. Adaptations of the old cultures became impossible and thus no longer relevant; so, piece by piece, the old cultures were shed. Some pieces were relinquished voluntarily in emulation of the conquerors, or surrendered for the sake of the invaders' alcohol, guns, and flour; most slipped away from disuse and forgetfulness. As in Europe after Rome's collapse, everything changed for aboriginal survivors during the forgetful years: education of children; religions and rituals; the composition of households and societies; food; clothing; habitations; recreations; laws and recognized systems of ownership and land use; concepts of justice, dignity, shame, esteem. Languages changed, with many becoming extinct; crafts, skills--everything was gone. In sum, the lives of aboriginals have been revolutionized, mostly by outside forces but also, to a very minor extent, from within. In the late twentieth century, as some survivors gradually became conscious of how much had been lost, they began behaving much like the scholarly pioneers of the fifteenth-century Italian Renaissance who searched for relics of classical Greek and Roman culture. Cree and Cherokee, Navajo and Haida groped for fragments of lost information by searching out old records and artifacts dispersed in their conquerors' museums and private collections. Jeered at by an uncomprehending white public of cultural winners, they began impolitely demanding the return of ancestral articles of clothing and decoration, of musical instruments, of masks, even of the bones of their dead, in attempts to retrieve what their peoples and cultures had been like before their lives were transformed by mass amnesia and unsought revolution. When the abyss of lost memory by a people becomes too deep and too old, attempts to plumb it are futile. The Ainu, Caucasian aborigines of Japan, have a known modern history similar in some ways to that of North American aboriginals. Centuries before the European invasion of North America, the Ainu lost their foraging territories to invading ancestors of the modern Japanese. Surviving remnants of Ainu were settled in isolated reservations, most on Hokkaido, Japan's northernmost island, where they still live. The Ainu remain a mysterious people, to themselves as well as to others. Physical characteristics proclaim their European ancestry; they may be related to Norse peoples. But where in Europe they came from can only be conjectured. They retain no information about their locations or cultures there, nor by what route theyreached Japan, nor why they traveled there. Cultures that triumphed in unequal contests between conquering invaders and their victims have been meticulously analyzed by a brilliant twenty-first-century historian and scientist, Jared Diamond, who has explained his analyses in a splendidly accessible book, Guns, Germs, and Steel. He writes that he began his exploration with a question put to him by a youth in New Guinea, asking why Europeans and Americans were successful and rich. The advantages that Diamond explored and the patterns he traces illuminate all instances of cultural wipeout. Diamond argues persuasively that the difference between conquering and victim cultures is not owing to genetic discrepancies in intelligence or other inborn personal abilities among peoples, as racists persist in believing. He holds that, apart from variations in resistance to various diseases, the fates of cultures are not genetically influenced, let alone determined. But, he writes, successful invaders and conquerors have historically possessed certain crucial advantages conferred on them long ago by the luck of what he calls biogeography. The cultural ancestors of winners, he says, got head starts as outstandingly productive farmers and herders, producing ample and varied foods that could support large and dense populations. Large and dense populations--in a word, cities--were able to support individuals and institutions engaged in activities other than direct food production. For example, such societies could support specialists in tool manufacturing, pottery making, boatbuilding, and barter, could organize and enforce legal codes, and could create priesthoods for celebrating and spreading religions, specialists for keeping accounts, and armed forces for defense and aggression. "A World Without Power," Foreign Policy, July/August 2004 Critics of U.S. global dominance should pause and consider the alternative. If the United States retreats from its hegemonic role, who would supplant it? Not Europe, not China, not the Muslim world—and certainly not the United Nations. Unfortunately, the alternative to a single superpower is not a multilateral utopia, but the anarchic nightmare of a new Dark Age. We tend to assume that power, like nature, abhors a vacuum. In the history of world politics, it seems, someone is always the hegemon, or bidding to become it. Today, it is the United States; a century ago, it was the United Kingdom. Before that, it was France, Spain, and so on. The famed 19th-century German historian Leopold von Ranke, doyen of the study of statecraft, portrayed modern European history as an incessant struggle for mastery, in which a balance of power was possible only through recurrent conflict. The influence of economics on the study of diplomacy only seems to confirm the notion that history is a competition between rival powers. In his bestselling 1987 work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Yale University historian Paul Kennedy concluded that, like all past empires, the U.S. and Russian superpowers would inevitably succumb to overstretch. But their place would soon be usurped, Kennedy argued, by the rising powers of China and Japan, both still unencumbered by the dead weight of imperial military commitments. In his 2001 book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, University of Chicago political scientist John J. Mearsheimer updates Kennedy's account. Having failed to succumb to overstretch, and after surviving the German and Japanese challenges, he argues, the United States must now brace for the ascent of new rivals. “[A] rising China is the most dangerous potential threat to the United States in the early twenty-first century,” contends Mearsheimer. “[T]he United States has a profound interest in seeing Chinese economic growth slow considerably in the years ahead.” China is not the only threat Mearsheimer foresees. The European Union (EU) too has the potential to become “a formidable rival.” Power, in other words, is not a natural monopoly; the struggle for mastery is both perennial and universal. The “unipolarity” identified by some commentators following the Soviet collapse cannot last much longer, for the simple reason that history hates a hyperpower. Sooner or later, challengers will emerge, and back we must go to a multipolar, multipower world. But what if these esteemed theorists are all wrong? What if the world is actually heading for a period when there is no hegemon? What if, instead of a balance of power, there is an absence of power? Such a situation is not unknown in history. Although the chroniclers of the past have long been preoccupied with the achievements of great powers—whether civilizations, empires, or nation-states—they have not wholly overlooked eras when power receded. Unfortunately, the world's experience with power vacuums (eras of “apolarity,” if you will) is hardly encouraging. Anyone who dislikes U.S. hegemony should bear in mind that, rather than a multipolar world of competing great powers, a world with no hegemon at all may be the real alternative to U.S. primacy. Apolarity could turn out to mean an anarchic new Dark Age: an era of waning empires and religious fanaticism; of endemic plunder and pillage in the world's forgotten regions; of economic stagnation and civilization's retreat into a few fortified enclaves. Pretenders to the Throne Why might a power vacuum arise early in the 21st century? The reasons are not especially hard to imagine. The clay feet of the U.S. colossus | Powerful though it may seem—in terms of economic output, military might, and “soft” cultural power—the United States suffers from at least three structural deficits that will limit the effectiveness and duration of its quasi-imperial role in the world. The first factor is the nation's growing dependence on foreign capital to finance excessive private and public consumption. It is difficult to recall any past empire that long endured after becoming so dependent on lending from abroad. The second deficit relates to troop levels: The United States is a net importer of people and cannot, therefore, underpin its hegemonic aspirations with true colonization. At the same time, its relatively small volunteer army is already spread very thin as a result of major and ongoing military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Finally, and most critically, the United States suffers from what is best called an attention deficit. Its republican institutions and political traditions make it difficult to establish a consensus for long-term nation-building projects. With a few exceptions, most U.S. interventions in the past century have been relatively short lived. U.S. troops have stayed in West Germany, Japan, and South Korea for more than 50 years; they did not linger so long in the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, or Vietnam, to say nothing of Lebanon and Somalia. Recent trends in public opinion suggest that the U.S. electorate is even less ready to sacrifice blood and treasure in foreign fields than it was during the Vietnam War. Old Europe” grows older | Those who dream the EU might become a counterweight to the U.S. hyperpower should continue slumbering. Impressive though the EU's enlargement this year has been—not to mention the achievement of 12-country monetary union—the reality is that demography likely condemns the EU to decline in international influence and importance. With fertility rates dropping and life expectancies rising, West European societies may, within fewer than 50 years, display median ages in the upper 40s. Europe's “dependency ratio” (the number of non-working-age citizens for every working-age citizen) is set to become cripplingly high. Indeed, Old Europe will soon be truly old. By 2050, one in every three Italians, Spaniards, and Greeks is expected to be 65 or older, even allowing for ongoing immigration. Europeans therefore face an agonizing choice between Americanizing their economies, i.e., opening their borders to much more immigration, with the cultural changes that would entail, or transforming their union into a fortified retirement community. Meanwhile, the EU's stalled institutional reforms mean that individual European nation-states will continue exercising considerable autonomy outside the economic sphere, particularly in foreign and security policy. China's coming economic crisis | Optimistic observers of China insist the economic miracle of the past decade will endure, with growth continuing at such a sizzling pace that within 30 or 40 years China's gross domestic product will surpass that of the United States. Yet it is far from clear that the normal rules for emerging markets are suspended for Beijing's benefit. First, a fundamental incompatibility exists between the free-market economy, based inevitably on private property and the rule of law, and the Communist monopoly on power, which breeds corruption and impedes the creation of transparent fiscal, monetary, and regulatory institutions. As is common in “Asian tiger” economies, production is running far ahead of domestic consumption—thus making the economy heavily dependent on exports—and far ahead of domestic financial development. Indeed, no one knows the full extent of the problems in the Chinese domestic banking sector. Those Western banks that are buying up bad debts to establish themselves in China must remember that this strategy was tried once before: a century ago, in the era of the Open Door policy, when U.S. and European firms rushed into China only to see their investments vanish amid the turmoil of war and revolution. Then, as now, hopes for China's development ran euphorically high, especially in the United States. But those hopes were dashed, and could be disappointed again. A Chinese currency or banking crisis could have earth-shaking ramifications, especially when foreign investors realize the difficulty of repatriating assets held in China. Remember, when foreigners invest directly in factories rather than through intermediaries such as bond markets, there is no need for domestic capital controls. After all, how does one repatriate a steel mill? The fragmentation of Islamic civilization | With birthrates in Muslim societies more than double the European average, the Islamic countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East are bound to put pressure on Europe and the United States in the years ahead. If, for example, the population of Yemen will exceed that of Russia by 2050 (as the United Nations forecasts, assuming constant fertility), there must either be dramatic improvements in the Middle East's economic performance or substantial emigration from the Arab world to aging Europe. Yet the subtle Muslim colonization of Europe's cities—most striking in places like Marseille, France, where North Africans populate whole suburbs—may not necessarily portend the advent of a new and menacing “Eurabia.” In fact, the Muslim world is as divided as ever, and not merely along the traditional fissure between Sunnis and Shiites. It is also split between those Muslims seeking a peaceful modus vivendi with the West (an impulse embodied in the Turkish government's desire to join the EU) and those drawn to the revolutionary Islamic Bolshevism of renegades like al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden. Opinion polls from Morocco to Pakistan suggest high levels of anti-American sentiment, but not unanimity. In Europe, only a minority expresses overt sympathy for terrorist organizations; most young Muslims in England clearly prefer assimilation to jihad. We are a long way from a bipolar clash of civilizations, much less the rise of a new caliphate that might pose a geopolitical threat to the United States and its allies. In short, each of the potential hegemons of the 21st century—the United States, Europe, and China—seems to contain within it the seeds of decline; and Islam remains a diffuse force in world politics, lacking the resources of a superpower. Dark and Disconnected Suppose, in a worst-case scenario, that U.S. neoconservative hubris is humbled in Iraq and that the Bush administration's project to democratize the Middle East at gunpoint ends in ignominious withdrawal, going from empire to decolonization in less than two years. Suppose also that no aspiring rival power shows interest in filling the resulting vacuums—not only in coping with Iraq but conceivably also Afghanistan, the Balkans, and Haiti. What would an apolar future look like? The answer is not easy, as there have been very few periods in world history with no contenders for the role of global, or at least regional, hegemon. The nearest approximation in modern times could be the 1920s, when the United States walked away from President Woodrow Wilson's project of global democracy and collective security centered on the League of Nations. There was certainly a power vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman empires, but it did not last long. The old West European empires were quick to snap up the choice leftovers of Ottoman rule in the Middle East. The Bolsheviks had reassembled the czarist empire by 1922. And by 1936, German revanche was already far advanced. One must go back much further in history to find a period of true and enduring apolarity; as far back, in fact, as the ninth and 10th centuries. In this era, the remains of the Roman Empire—Rome and Byzantium—receded from the height of their power. The leadership of the West was divided between the pope, who led Christendom, and the heirs of Charlemagne, who divided up his short-lived empire under the Treaty of Verdun in 843. No credible claimant to the title of emperor emerged until Otto was crowned in 962, and even he was merely a German prince with pretensions (never realized) to rule Italy. Byzantium, meanwhile, was dealing with the Bulgar rebellion to the north. By 900, the Abbasid caliphate initially established by Abu al-Abbas in 750 had passed its peak; it was in steep decline by the middle of the 10th century. In China, too, imperial power was in a dip between the T'ang and Sung dynasties. Both these empires had splendid capitals—Baghdad and Ch'ang-an—but neither had serious aspirations of territorial expansion. The weakness of the old empires allowed new and smaller entities to flourish. When the Khazar tribe converted to Judaism in 740, their khanate occupied a Eurasian power vacuum between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. In Kiev, far from the reach of Byzantium, the regent Olga laid the foundation for the future Russian Empire in 957 when she converted to the Orthodox Church. The Seljuks—forebears of the Ottoman Turks—carved the Sultanate of Rum as the Abbasid caliphate lost its grip over Asia Minor. Africa had its mini-empire in Ghana; Central America had its Mayan civilization. Connections between these entities were minimal or nonexistent. This condition was the antithesis of globalization. It was a world broken up into disconnected, introverted civilizations. One feature of the age was that, in the absence of strong secular polities, religious questions often produced serious convulsions. Indeed, religious institutions often set the political agenda. In the eighth and ninth centuries, Byzantium was racked by controversy over the proper role of icons in worship. By the 11th century, the pope felt confident enough to humble Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV during the battle over which of them should have the right to appoint bishops. The new monastic orders amassed considerable power in Christendom, particularly the Cluniacs, the first order to centralize monastic authority. In the Muslim world, it was the ulema (clerics) who truly ruled. This atmosphere helps explain why the period ended with the extraordinary holy wars known as the Crusades, the first of which was launched by European Christians in 1095. Yet, this apparent clash of civilizations was in many ways just another example of the apolar world's susceptibility to long-distance military raids directed at urban centers by more backward peoples. The Vikings repeatedly attacked West European towns in the ninth century—Nantes in 842, Seville in 844, to name just two. One Frankish chronicler lamented “the endless flood of Vikings” sweeping southward. Byzantium, too, was sacked in 860 by raiders from Rus, the kernel of the future Russia. This “fierce and savage tribe” showed “no mercy,” lamented the Byzantine patriarch. It was like “the roaring sea … destroying everything, sparing nothing.” Such were the conditions of an anarchic age. Small wonder that the future seemed to lie in creating small, defensible, political units: the Venetian republic—the quintessential city-state, which was conducting its own foreign policy by 840—or Alfred the Great's England, arguably the first thing resembling a nation-state in European history, created in 886. Superpower Failure Could an apolar world today produce an era reminiscent of the age of Alfred? It could, though with some important and troubling differences. Certainly, one can imagine the world's established powers—the United States, Europe, and China—retreating into their own regional spheres of influence. But what of the growing pretensions to autonomy of the supranational bodies created under U.S. leadership after the Second World War? The United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (formerly the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) each considers itself in some way representative of the “international community.” Surely their aspirations to global governance are fundamentally different from the spirit of the Dark Ages? Yet universal claims were also an integral part of the rhetoric of that era. All the empires claimed to rule the world; some, unaware of the existence of other civilizations, maybe even believed that they did. The reality, however, was not a global Christendom, nor an all-embracing Empire of Heaven. The reality was political fragmentation. And that is also true today. The defining characteristic of our age is not a shift of power upward to supranational institutions, but downward. With the end of states' monopoly on the means of violence and the collapse of their control over channels of communication, humanity has entered an era characterized as much by disintegration as integration. If free flows of information and of means of production empower multinational corporations and nongovernmental organizations (as well as evangelistic religious cults of all denominations), the free flow of destructive technology empowers both criminal organizations and terrorist cells. These groups can operate, it seems, wherever they choose, from Hamburg to Gaza. By contrast, the writ of the international community is not global at all. It is, in fact, increasingly confined to a few strategic cities such as Kabul and Pristina. In short, it is the nonstate actors who truly wield global power—including both the monks and the Vikings of our time. So what is left? Waning empires. Religious revivals. Incipient anarchy. A coming retreat into fortified cities. These are the Dark Age experiences that a world without a hyperpower might quickly find itself reliving. The trouble is, of course, that this Dark Age would be an altogether more dangerous one than the Dark Age of the ninth century. For the world is much more populous—roughly 20 times more—so friction between the world's disparate “tribes” is bound to be more frequent. Technology has transformed production; now human societies depend not merely on freshwater and the harvest but also on supplies of fossil fuels that are known to be finite. Technology has upgraded destruction, too, so it is now possible not just to sack a city but to obliterate it. For more than two decades, globalization—the integration of world markets for commodities, labor, and capital—has raised living standards throughout the world, except where countries have shut themselves off from the process through tyranny or civil war. The reversal of globalization—which a new Dark Age would produce—would certainly lead to economic stagnation and even depression. As the United States sought to protect itself after a second September 11 devastates, say, Houston or Chicago, it would inevitably become a less open society, less hospitable for foreigners seeking to work, visit, or do business. Meanwhile, as Europe's Muslim enclaves grew, Islamist extremists' infiltration of the EU would become irreversible, increasing trans-Atlantic tensions over the Middle East to the breaking point. An economic meltdown in China would plunge the Communist system into crisis, unleashing the centrifugal forces that undermined previous Chinese empires. Western investors would lose out and conclude that lower returns at home are preferable to the risks of default abroad. The worst effects of the new Dark Age would be felt on the edges of the waning great powers. The wealthiest ports of the global economy—from New York to Rotterdam to Shanghai—would become the targets of plunderers and pirates. With ease, terrorists could disrupt the freedom of the seas, targeting oil tankers, aircraft carriers, and cruise liners, while Western nations frantically concentrated on making their airports secure. Meanwhile, limited nuclear wars could devastate numerous regions, beginning in the Korean peninsula and Kashmir, perhaps ending catastrophically in the Middle East. In Latin America, wretchedly poor citizens would seek solace in Evangelical Christianity imported by U.S. religious orders. In Africa, the great plagues of AIDS and malaria would continue their deadly work. The few remaining solvent airlines would simply suspend services to many cities in these continents; who would wish to leave their privately guarded safe havens to go there? For all these reasons, the prospect of an apolar world should frighten us today a great deal more than it frightened the heirs of Charlemagne. If the United States retreats from global hegemony—its fragile self-image dented by minor setbacks on the imperial frontier—its critics at home and abroad must not pretend that they are ushering in a new era of multipolar harmony, or even a return to the good old balance of power. Be careful what you wish for. The alternative to unipolarity would not be multipolarity at all. It would be apolarity—a global vacuum of power. And far more dangerous forces than rival great powers would benefit from such a not-so-new world disorder. Inevitability and Collapse By Leon H Wolf Posted in War — Comments (120) / Email this page » / Leave a comment » Peggy Noonan is worried. The current Presidency is in trouble, the institution of the Presidency is in trouble, the bureacracy cannot maintain itself, the center does not hold. In other words, Peggy Noonan is worried about the survival of Western Civilization itself. And she is right to be so worried. It is easy, from the comfort and warmth of our living rooms, surrounded by the safe light of civlization and freedom, to call Ms. Noonan the chicken little of our time. But while most of us have only ever known civilization and safety, only a fool who is ignorant of history would fail to realize that civilization and safety are fragile things, and that centuries of progress can be swept away in the blink of an eye. Indeed, the norm throughout history has not been democracy, freedom and light - but rather oppression, tyranny and darkness. Not only has this been the norm throughout history, but it is even the norm, planet-wide, to this very day. We have chiseled out a small section of light in a world of darkness, let us not pretend that this light must, of necessity, last forever. Indeed, in the last few short years, Western Civilization has been on the collapse in Western Europe at an alarming rate. For decades, decay has been on the march, held at bay by the last vestiges of anti-fascism and the anti-Soviet bloc strategic interests of the United States. These forces served to mask the fact that by and large, Christianity had died on the European continent, and nothing held Westernism together as a cohesive force apart from fear of domination by the fascists/communists. When that fear was vanquished in the early 90s, Europe was forced to gradually face the fact that while their churches stood empty, their mosques had come alive with a brightness and intensity that Christianity had not known there for centuries. Having long since decided that religion was neither friend to coddle nor foe to reckon with, Western Europe contented itself that this, too, would pass, and that even Radical Islam would bow before the combined forces of the Enlightenment and Postmodernism. This, as Johnny Depp, the Spanish commuter train riders, and British victims of 7/7 can now attest, was a serious miscalculation on their part. The attacks in question were certainly alarming enough, but the incredibly obtuse response, at least on the part of the Spanish and the French, has convinced many (including myself), that Western Europe is largely lost. They have crumbled under the weight of their own ineptitude - they have institutionalized the socialist welfare state and found to their dismay that it led to crushing unemployment and widespread abuse of the system (who could have predicted such an outcome?). They have ousted peaceful religion from their public consciousness and have tacitly allowed fascist religion to fill the void left behind. They have stirred their socialism, secularism, and Islamofascism into a brew, and in the process set France on fire. If Western Civilization is to survive, it will be up to America - and to a lesser extent, the tottering Britons. We will determine whether the Caliphate will cover Western Europe - and if Western Europe falls, we shall not be far behind. Every day that goes by, I become more concerned that we are simply not up to the task. The media is probably not to be blamed for this phenomenon, but we have, for perhaps the first time, been exposed to a daily real-time documentary of the hell-on-earth that is war - and if the recent poll numbers are accurate, as a nation we have shown that we do not have the stomach for it. As time goes forward, the media exposure will likely grow worse, not better. The last time Western Civilization dealt with a threat of this kind - during the Cold War- there were two competing foreign policy visions on this country. There were, first of all, the isolationists. These were those who advocated a turtle-like approach to the rest of the world - if we just stayed over here, protected by oceans on either side, and didn’t make any provoking moves, we would surely be safe from harm. The isolationists believed there was no point in intervening in far-off areas of the world, and that everything we tried was just a bunch of pointless meddling where we didn’t belong. We should leave Vietnam because the Vietnamese were no threat to us, and they didn’t even want us there. The Marshall Plan shouldn’t be used to strategically weaken the Eastern Bloc - we ought to instead indiscriminately distribute welfare to Soviet Bloc countries as well. Pretty much everything Reagan ever did was “needlessly provocative,” but most especially all that defense expenditure. Oh yeah, and nobody lost China. The other foreign policy vision understood the value of weakening your enemy by having outposts right in his face. This vision recognized the reality of geopolitical consequences - that maybe if Vietnam fell, the rest of Southeast Asia might be in for a rough time, too. They understood that a strong and prosperous Western Europe could lead to an envious and agitating Eastern Bloc - that West Berlin was an important beacon of hope in a dark area of the world, and that there are some enemies who simply can’t be trusted to engage in honest diplomacy, to whom you must simply say, “Nyet.” It was my foolish and naive hope that after the Cold War was over - when Reagan was compared with Carter/McGovern, no one would be foolish enough to pretend that the ostrich was the most cunning of all animals, and geopolitical consequences either weren’t real or shouldn’t be considered. I have, sadly, been disabused of this notion in a rather harsh way over the last six months. In the face of this evidence that their worldview simply will not be informed, I have resolved myself to ensure that they must never be allowed control of the national security apparatus of this country ever again. No matter how much they insist that they are willing to fight, just not this fight, I will remember that the inevitable conclusion for the isolationist is that there is never an appropriate enemy for right now - and if there is such an enemy, it will never be the one the United States is currently engaged with. Constant deflection and maneuvering are merely the tools of those who wish to hide the fact that the shell is warm and cozy, and they don’t want to leave. I have also come to realize that they are not unpatriotic, in the way most people understand the word. They don’t hate the United States. Many of them may actually like the United States quite a bit. They feel about the United States the way I used to feel about Arkansas - it’s a nice enough place to live, and there’s work to be had here, but surely there are better places out there. What they don’t do - or at least what they don’t show - is that they love America as the special and unique country that she is. They have measured her by the yardstick of their ideology and found that she is nothing special - especially compared to, say, Canada or Sweden. What they fail to realize is that everything they hate about America - from her cowboy foreign policy to her tenacious grasp of the Christian religion - are the things that make America the one country that can save Westernism from the encroaches of Islamofascism. I don’t care much more open Canada is to gay rights, and I don’t care how much better Sweden’s health care system is than ours, Osama Bin Laden is not holed up in a cave somewhere because he’s afraid of Canada. And, God bless the Irish for their protection of the unborn, but Ireland is simply not going to stand in the gap and protect civilization and freedom as we know them, and 400+ years of progress, from a rampaging Islamofascist horde. If anyone will do so, it will be us. And that’s because of our cowboy attitude. And it’s because we value a Christian culture that we have not wholly abandoned. And it’s partly because of that Christian culture that we identify strongly enough with this country to love her as the greatest country on earth, and the defender of civilization and order across the globe. Perhaps I’m overreacting somewhat to the current state of American politics. After all, about exactly a year ago, Americans elected a President who personified, to some degree or another, all of those qualities. However, they did so by a very small margin. And I’ve been thorougly dismayed throughout the ensuing year with the ridiculous amount of hand-holding that our society apparently requires. I’ve been even more dismayed by the antipathy that has been displayed toward this country and its success abroad by those who have the most to lose, politically speaking, from the potential fall of Westernism. Unless, that is, Teddy Kennedy thinks his social ideas would go over well on the “Arab Street” today. I sincerely hope that I am overreacting. I hope that we are made of sterner stuff than I suppose. But I am not optimistic that this is so. Civilization is fragile, and “progress” so much more so. Secular hubris is on the advance in this country as it was in Europe some generations ago - and such hubris has a way of being punished. Is there a way to stem the tide? The Morality of Survival "[The West] has not yet understood we, as westerners, in a world become too small for its inhabitants, are now a minority and that the proliferation of other races dooms our race, my race, irretrievably to extinction in the century to come, if we hold fast to our present moral principles."[emphasis added] --Jean Raspail, The Camp Of The Saints-- 1973 The Camp of the Saints puts the western man's dilemma in the most difficult terms: slaughter hundreds of thousands of women and children or face oblivion. Of course, a nation that had the confidence to shed blood in the name of its own survival would never be put to such a test; no mob of beggars would threaten it The loss of ethnic identity in the Western world is symptomatic of a deeper crisis within the European peoples, whose culture and technology have provided the world with much of what we know today as modern civilization. At its core, the crisis is the inevitable consequence of a profound, and perhaps fatal, misunderstanding of the nature of morality. We have lost sight of ancient and eternal laws of Nature on which our civilization must be based if we are to survive. We no longer have the luxury of indulging in universalist altruistic principles that, no matter how noble they may appear, have driven us to the brink of ruin. Demographic projections based on American and European immigration policies, as well as the evidence of one's own senses as one walks the streets of any large Western city, point to a bleak future. Within a century or two, perhaps less, the peoples of the West, those whose ancestry derives from the Nordic and Alpine subraces of Europe, will have ceased to exist as a cohesive entity. How quickly the end will come depends on immigration rates, differential birthrates among ethnic groups, and mixed-race childbearing rates. But the final outcome is fixed so long as we adhere to our present course. And yet, frank discussion of the outcome, the submergence of the race that produced the world's first, and perhaps only technological civilization, is usually silenced with words like "racist," "bigot," and "xenophobe." Neither the flawed moral system that enforces this silence nor the people who support it will outlive the demise of the West. But when the West is gone, it will be of little consolation that those responsible will have expired as well. If we are to reverse course, it is vital that we take steps now, before it is too late. If, today, the West's moral system is flawed, how can it be corrected? The first question we must ask is whether it is moral for ethnic groups as well as individuals to seek survival. And if so, what are the moral actions we may undertake to secure survival? What must be the moral basis of our civilization if it is not to be lost? In his book, Destiny of Angels, Richard McCulloch calls these questions a matter of "ultimate ethics." The Moral Dilemma of the West The dilemma of our people is the product of a deep misconception about nature and morality. It arises from the mistaken, sentimental belief that altruism can be extended beyond its evolutionary origin--kinship and within-group altruism--to the whole of humanity. It results from failure to accept the role of genetic factors in defining human temperament and potential. The standards that govern public debate are reminiscent of the Dark Ages in that they have no basis in science or in human experience. Instead, they consist of moralistic assertions derived from a world view rooted in radical egalitarianism. The long term consequence of adherence to these principles is rarely examined, let alone subjected to scientific scrutiny. Most Western people would agree that an innate sense of right and wrong plays a key role in the Western moral system, a system that values individual worth and reciprocal fairness. The tragedy of this moral view is that it has been extended to the world at large--seemingly the most noble behavior humanity has ever exhibited--and has become the threat to the survival of the West. As biologist Garrett Hardin demonstrated in his 1982 essay, "Discriminating Altruisms," universalism--a chimerical One World without borders or distinctions--is impossible. Groups that practice unlimited altruism, unfettered by thoughts of self-preservation, will be disadvantaged in life's competition and thus eliminated over time in favor of those that limit their altruistic behavior to a smaller subset of humanity, usually their own genetic kin,(third world)from whom they receive reciprocal benefits. Professor Hardin writes: "Universalism is altruism practiced without discrimination of kinship, acquaintanceship, shared values, or propinquity in time or space . . . . To people who accept the idea of biological evolution from amoeba to man, the vision of social evolution from egoism to universalism may seem plausible. In fact, however, the last step is impossible . . . . Let us see why. "In imagination, picture a world in which social evolution has gone no further than egoism or individualism. When familialism appears on the scene, what accounts for its persistence? It must be that the costs of the sacrifices individuals make for their relatives are more than paid for by the gains realized through family solidarity . . . . "The argument that accounts for the step to familialism serves equally well for each succeeding step--except for the last. Why the difference? Because the One World created by universalism has--by definition--no competitive base to support it . . . [Universalism] cannot survive in competition with discrimination." [emphasis in original] Professor Hardin adds: It is to the advantage of non-Europeans, virtually all of whom retain their cohesion as distinctive, discriminating groups, to exploit the economic wealth and social order of the West, benefits many demonstrably cannot create for themselves. When this cohesive drive is placed in competition with self-sacrificing Western altruism, there can be only one outcome. In the near term, Europeans will be displaced by groups acting in their own self-interest. In the long run, biological destruction awaits us. Since those who displace us do not, by definition, maintain our morals standards--for if they did, they would not be replacing us--our flawed moral system will vanish with us. The fact that universal, self-sacrificing altruism destroys its practitioners is its most obvious flaw. Any survivable moral order must recognize this. The Cosmic Race The dream of a Utopia in which racial harmony prevails, has never come true. Today, racial encroachment is a threat to the very existence of Western peoples. Lawrence Auster, author of The Path to National Suicide, An Essay on Immigration and Multiculturalism, has elsewhere summarized the situation thus: "Modern liberalism told us that racial differences don't matter, and on the basis of that belief, liberals then set about turning America into a multiracial, integrated, race-blind society. But now that very effort has created so much race consciousness, race conflict and race inequality, that the same liberals have concluded that the only way to overcome those problems is to merge all the races into one. The same people who have always denounced as an extremist lunatic anyone who warned about `the racial dilution of America,' are now proposing, not just the dilution of America, but its complete elimination. Race-blind ideology has led directly to the most race-conscious---and indeed genocidal---proposal in the history of the world." This change of strategy was signaled by the cover story of a Fall 1993 special edition of Time. The story featured a computer synthesized image of a woman representing the intermixture of all of the ethnic population elements of the United States in their present proportions. The subliminal message conveyed by this computerized android, obviously still of predominantly European ancestry, was: "Don't worry, this is harmless." Or, in the current idiom of multiculturalism, "let us celebrate our diversity." Of course, this image represents the utter destruction of diversity, not its conservation. This computer-generated android is a lie. The American population base is in a state of rapid change. westerners are now having fewer children, and there are thus fewer westerners of child bearing age than Time assumes. This is happening worldwide. The question is, what would be the result of this plan being carried forward on a larger scale, carried to its logical conclusion in a world sans borders? Time's android is but a way station on the road to what some lovingly call the Cosmic Race. People of European ancestry constitute something over ten percent of the world's population, but since 1980, westerners births amount to only a little more than five percent of the world's new children. The birth rate in the West has fallen to dangerously low levels, now about 1.8 children per woman. A level of 2.1 is required to balance deaths. Birth rates in the third world remain very high, thanks in large measure to the infusion of western food, medicine, and "peacekeeping." Because people are not computer morphs but have discrete ancestors, let us assume that the fraction of people with European ancestry is now one-sixteenth of the child-bearing population. When the Time experiment is complete on a world-wide scale, the resulting human will have only one western great-great-grandparent. He will be visibly Asian since about 60 percent of the world's population is Asian. In round numbers, this amounts to ten of the sixteen great-great-grandparents, including four from China alone. Three would come from India and three more from Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Africa would supply three and non-western Latin America and the Caribbean basing the remaining two. In this scenario, which is already unfolding on the North American continent and in Europe and Australia, the single European ancestor would leave no discernible residue in homo cosmicus. Europeans would be extinct, fulfilling the nightmare vision that Jean Raspail described in The Camp Of The Saints. This is not a condemnation of any real human being with such an ancestry. Nevertheless, this process would eradicate the biological diversity that multiculturalists claim to cherish. In its place would be only uniformity, the irreversible submergence of all races. The passing of any race is an event of great significance. The destruction of an entire population is, in fact, genocide by the definitions of the UN Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as ". . . the destruction, in whole or in part, of an ethnic, racial or national group. The acts so defined include. . . the destruction of the conditions of life necessary for the physical existence of the group . . . ." The debate about race must be framed in these terms in order to convey its true importance. The battle cannot be won by allowing the other side to limit the terms of debate by declaring certain subjects beyond discussion. The consequences are too important. The Dual Code of Morality Why, though, does race matter? The answer lies in the biology of genes and in the impact of genetic kinship on altruism. For many decades, altruism was a paradox for theories of evolution. Darwin himself realized that altruism was difficult to explain in terms of individual "survival of the fittest." In his book, Race, Evolution and Behavior, Philippe Rushton writes, "If the most altruistic members of a group sacrifice themselves for others, they run the risk of leaving fewer offspring to pass on the very genes that govern the altruistic behavior. Hence, altruism would be selected against, and selfishness would be selected for." Prof. Rushton suggests that this paradox is resolved by genetic similarity theory, a field pioneered by biologist W.D. Hamilton and others. Prof Rushton writes: "By a process known as kin selection, individuals can maximize their inclusive fitness rather than only their individual fitness by increasing the production of successful offspring by both themselves and their genetic relatives . . . . Genes are what survive and are passed on, and some of the same genes will be found not only in direct offspring but in siblings, cousins, nephews/nieces, and grandchildren . . . . thus, from an evolutionary perspective, altruism is a means of helping genes to propagate." Over time, kin selection has resulted in a dual code of morality, an altruistic code for one's genetic kin and a non-altruistic code for everyone else. Anthropologists have suggested that humans evolved through a process of migration and tribal warfare between groups composed of genetically related individuals. In A New Theory of Human Evolution, Sir Arthur Keith wrote, "The process which secures the evolution of an isolated group of humanity is a combination of two principles . . . namely, cooperation with competition . . . . I hold that from the very beginning of human evolution the conduct of every local group was regulated by two codes of morality, distinguished by Herbert Spencer as the `code of amity' and the `code of enmity'." Garrett Hardin writes, "The essential characteristic of a tribe is that it should follow a double standard of morality--one kind of behavior for in-group relations, another for out-group." In-group relations are characterized by cooperation while out-group relations are characterized by conflict. Liberals have tried to discredit the role of tribal conflict, claiming that such distinctions have been lost as groups reached nation size. But in so doing, they miss the vital message of genetic similarity theory. National ethnic groups represent the growth and consolidation of genetically related tribes over time. Professor Hardin argues that, because of the nature of altruism and competition, the dual code of morality is inescapable and cannot be eliminated from human society: "In the absence of competition between tribes the survival value of altruism in a crowded world approaches zero because what ego gives up necessarily . . . goes into the commons. What is in the commons cannot favor the survival of the sharing impulses that put it there--unless there are limits placed on sharing. To place limits on sharing is to create a tribe--which means a rejection of One World. . . . A state of One World, if achieved, would soon redissolve into an assemblage of tribes." The in-group out-group distinction still operates today; it is only the battleground that has shifted. Tribal warfare has been replaced by territorial irredentism and competing birthrates. The liberal campaign to eliminate feelings of national, cultural, or racial solidarity among western peoples was undertaken largely in the hope that the abolition of "tribalism" would inaugurate an era of world peace. As Professor Hardin has shown, tribalism cannot be eliminated. Worse still, any idealistic group that unilaterally dismantles its own tribal sense will be swept away by groups that have retained theirs. Unless the current direction is changed, the West will be destroyed in this new form of biological warfare. The dual code of morality is therefore the cornerstone on which any enduring moral order must be based. It is also an answer to the question of ultimate ethics posed earlier: "Is it moral for ethnic groups to seek to survive?" Since it is impossible to eliminate "tribes" from the human race, the answer to this question must be yes. That which is built inextricably into the laws of the universe cannot be immoral. Universalists might try to caricature the dual code of morality as an invidious double standard, but it is something we practice every day without even thinking about it. Without it, no group, be it a family, club, corporation, political party, nation, or race would exist. It is how groups distinguish between members and non-members. Employees of the same company treat each other differently from the way they treat competitors. Members of the same political party cooperate with each other and run against opponents. Families draw sharp distinctions between members and strangers. It is easy to overlook the dual code of morality precisely because it is so fundamental a part of human nature. The "code of amity, code of enmity" explains racial loyalties. It is an extension of the biologically necessary fact that parents love their children more than the children of strangers. Such feelings are normal and natural. Yet "racism" has become the curse-word that stops discussion. Those who use the word as a weapon say that racial loyalty is racism when exhibited by westerners but is justifiable pride when exhibited by non-westerners. The word is simply a means of gaining power over people who have exaggerated moral scruples. The Biology of Diversity Feelings of racial loyalty are grounded in biological differences. These are discussed authoritatively in J. Philippe Rushton's Race, Evolution, and Behavior, but they do not imply that one race has a right to rule over another. Frank discussion of real differences must not be considered morally repugnant. Scientific truth cannot be racism, at least not in the pejorative sense that the word is now used. Most forms of behavior (by westerners) that are characterized as racism do not involve unprovoked assault on people of other races, but are simply the natural loyalty of humans for their own group. They are necessary for survival. Unprovoked violence is a moral evil, but by all statistical measures, westerners are overwhelmingly the victims of crimes of racial violence, not the perpetrators. Blacks are twelve percent of the population but commit almost two-thirds of the violent crime in America, are over twelve times more likely to murder westerners than the reverse, are more than a thousand times more likely to rape western women than the reverse, and choose westerners as crime victims fifty percent of the time compared to westerners choosing blacks as victims only two percent of the time. Interracial crime is just one manifestation of a fundamental biological principle called Gause's Law of Exclusion. In his book, The Mammals of North America, University of Kansas biology professor Raymond Hall states the law as follows: "Two subspecies of the same species do not occur in the same geographic area." [emphasis in original] One will inevitably eliminate or displace the other. Prof. Hall specifically includes humans in this rule: "To imagine one subspecies of man living together on equal terms for long with another subspecies is but wishful thinking and leads only to disaster and oblivion for one or the other." Oblivion need not come in the form of physical destruction. It may simply involve the loss of habitat. Harlem, Watts, East St. Louis, and many other black neighborhoods were once occupied originally by westerners. The arrival of blacks (or other non-westerners) in sufficient numbers makes it impossible for westerners to survive, whereas the process does not work in reverse. Even without the carnage of inter-racial crime, westerners could be eliminated through sheer loss of territory. Viewed in biological terms, ethnic diversity is prelude to destruction. The great majority of people, of any age and origin, do not concern themselves with the rise and fall of civilizations. Like fish in water, they are conscious of their environment only when it changes rapidly and threateningly, a rarity in most people's lifetimes. Yet civilizations do fall, and the warning signs for ours have been present for more than a century. Rudyard Kipling's line, "East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet," presaged the message of early twentieth century Americans, Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard, whose books, The Passing of the Great Race and The Rising Tide of Color, helped bring about the immigration restrictions of 1924. The 1924 national origins quota system was dismantled in 1965 during the wave of self-recrimination that accompanied the Civil Rights era. Should Chinese historians of the twenty-second century be writing the final history of western civilization, no doubt they will cite the 1965 Immigration Act as the blow that broke the back of western man. Elmer Pendell, in his book, Why Civilizations Self-Destruct, surveyed historians' theories as to why civilizations fall. They include Oswald Spengler's analogy to individual aging and death, theories of moral decay, and theories based on ecological deterioration. Concerning the latter, Garrett Hardin notes in The Limits of Altruism: "No civilization has ever recovered after ruining its environment." [emphasis in original] All of these theories have their appeal, yet none is a complete explanation for what is happening to the West. Pendell's own hypothesis seems closer to the mark. A civilization arises when natural selection produces a people of above-average intelligence. As the founders conquer natural culling forces, those who would have been removed from the population due to their lesser abilities survive and produce more children than the more intelligent founders. Francis Galton, Charles Darwin's cousin and author of Hereditary Genius, first noted that `men of eminence' have fewer children than the average. Eventually the intelligence level of the population falls below that needed to sustain civilization. Pendell suggests another factor in the collapse of civilizations, the gradual adulteration of ethnically homogeneous founding populations through losses in wars and, in ancient times, the taking of slaves. The modern analogue of slavery is immigration. Tenny Frank, in his book History of Rome, wrote, "The original peoples were wasted in wars and scattered in migrations and colonization and their places were filled chiefly with Eastern slaves." We cannot speak of the spirit of Rome or the culture of Rome, Frank said, "without defining whether the reference is to the Rome of 200 BC or 200 AD." Theodor Mommsen wrote in The History of Rome, "The patrician body. . . had dwindled away more and more in the course of centuries and in the time of Caesar there were not more than fifteen or sixteen patrician gentes (clans) still in existence." In 9 A. D. laws were passed requiring each patrician family to have three children. Lead poisoning has been implicated in the failure to reverse the decline of Roman blood, but the reasons do not change the outcome. Even in ancient Rome, slaves did not stay slaves forever, and their gradual suffusion through the population by intermixture would have contributed to Rome's demise. The same situation, massive infusion of non-Western peoples and a birthrate below replacement level, threatens the West, and for reasons quite unrelated to lead poisoning. After The Fall Eric Fischer, writing in The Passing of the European Age, said that a new civilization never arises where an earlier civilization has died. If Pendell's theory is correct and if the hypothesis of Tenny Frank and others explains the loss of a hereditary capacity for civilization, then Fischer's observation has a genetic explanation. Civilization cannot arise on the site of an earlier civilization once the hereditary character of the people is permanently altered. This process is happening in the Western world today through immigration, welfare, and liberal policies that promote the submergence of ethnic groups into a global "melting pot." Should the West suffer the fate of Rome, there will be no recovery. Whether or not other civilizations arise among other peoples remains to be seen. Present economic success indicates that East Asia may be a future center of civilization. However, modern innovations flow predominantly from the creative wellsprings of the West. Whether innovation could be sustained in the absence of Western peoples remains to be seen. There is evidence that this might not happen; intelligence testing of Asians shows a relatively small standard deviation, suggesting a smaller right tail of the IQ distribution and a smaller percentage of innovative individuals. Although dire predictions about the future are often ridiculed, it is wise to remember Rome--catastrophes can and do occur, and in a globally linked world, the consequences could be shattering. In The Limits of Altruism, Garrett Hardin cites Harrison Brown, author of The Challenge of Man's Future, as the first person to recognize the vulnerability of the West's advanced civilization. Brown focused on the role of metals in modern civilization and on the technology required to obtain metals. Prof. Hardin summarizes the situation: "Looking only at the copper component of the problem, we should note that preliterate man managed to create the Bronze Age only because of the ready availability of copper ores assaying greater than 20 percent. . . . Only the most primitive of means are required to process high grade ores. But now we are reduced to extracting our copper from ores that assay less than 1 percent, and soon we will have nothing better than 0.1 percent. It takes a very sophisticated technology to deal with low-grade ores, a technology that only a large population of technologically advanced people can muster." Prof. Hardin continues, "Our many technologies form an incredible network of mutual support, mutual dependence. If this network were disrupted . . . it is doubtful if our kind of technology could ever be rebuilt. . . . On all counts, it looks as though our civilization, once fallen, will never be replaced by another of comparable quality." Prof. Hardin suggests two possible causes for the destruction of modern civilization: nuclear warfare and a population crash brought on by exceeding the Earth's carrying capacity. However, genetic submergence of the peoples with the innate ability to sustain civilization will do just as well. The Roots of Western Order The Map of Freedom, published annually by Freedom House, graphically demonstrates that free forms of government generally track population concentrations of people of European descent, a strong suggestion that freedom has a genetic origin. Although there are exceptions, notably Japan, which lost a nuclear war to the West and had a Western constitution imposed on it, the world of the free is largely the world of the Western European. The partially free include newly emerged Eastern Europeans and a scattering of other nations around the world. Much of Africa and Asia remains in the not free category. Thomas Jefferson foresaw this. Fearing "importation of foreigners," he wrote in Notes on Virginia, "They will bring with them the principles of the governments they leave, or if able to throw them off, it will be in exchange for an unbounded licentiousness, passing, as usual, from one extreme to the other. . . . In proportion to their number, they will infuse into it [the nation] their spirit, warp or bias its direction, and render it a heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass." Because economic inequality between groups inevitably produces envy, stable societies are almost always homogeneous. Multi-ethnic and multicultural societies live on the edge of dissolution. In such cases, the role of government turns to conflict management, as Brent Nelson points out in America Balkanized. "Government as conflict management is an emerging theme of public life in the U.S., a theme which recurrently manifests itself in the concepts of dialogue, mediation, sensitivity, tolerance, and balance. The latter terms are increasingly the shibboleths of American public life. The fiction is maintained that these concepts . . . will produce a final resolution of intergroup conflicts. . . . [T]he reality is something quite other." Laws against "hate crime" and "hate speech" reflect that other reality. If today's ethnic minorities become a majority it will be beyond the power of Western peoples to control, peacefully by means of the ballot, the destiny of the nations that were once their own. There is no guarantee that protections prevalent in Western societies will be preserved in societies that become non-Western. There is no historical reason to believe that governments based on principles of individual liberty will survive the disappearance of Western peoples. Post-colonial Africa is enlightening. For the most part, the Dark Continent is reverting to its ancestral ways, suitably updated by the infusion of Western weapons, as evidenced by carnage in Somalia and Rwanda. That this disturbs our heightened Western sense of compassion is understandable. But sentimentality should not blind us to the long term implications for our own survival. Nature's books are being balanced in Africa, and they will be balanced in the West, either by us or by Nature itself. Just as giving food to people who cannot feed themselves simply hastens an inevitable population crash, bringing third world people into the West simply hastens the transformation of the West into an extension of the third world. The European tradition of ordered, self-governing liberty is probably part of our genetic heritage. Throughout the third world, governments range from anarchy to dictatorship. That too, is surely genetic. Those few non-European countries that appear to be free have generally maintained democracy through intimate contact with the West. If Europeans are marginalized and ultimately absorbed by the third world, the idealism of Western liberalism that permitted the third world invasion will have proved to be a lethal genetic flaw. Few concepts are more ingrained in Western thought than respect for the "rule of law." The West has a history of order that predates the eight-hundred-year-old Magna Carta. Roman Law was supreme in the Mediterranean world for nearly a thousand years. Unique among the peoples of the earth, the people of the West recognize, at least in theory, the subordination of government to individual rights. But laws have been instrumental in bringing on the current crisis. Although there is virtually no popular support for immigration in the Western world, it is everywhere proceeding under laws passed by governments elected by the people. In the end, laws are no better at ensuring liberty than the people who make and enforce them. Sir Roger L'Estrange said, "The greatest of all injustice is that which goes under the name of law." America's Founders recognized the existence of a natural order to freedom that supersedes laws made by men. Although the American concept of liberty owed much to British and French political thought, the American act of creation, the Declaration of Independence, provided perhaps the best-known expression of "natural law" ever penned. Writing about securing "unalienable Rights" endowed by "Nature and Nature's God," Thomas Jefferson wrote: "That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, having the foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness." The rights Jefferson identified, "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness," were set forth by George Mason in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, ratified on May 6th, 1776. Mason's work was the basis for Jefferson's statement, but the Mason version is superior because it eschews Jefferson's poetic nonsense about all men being created equal. Mason's language still stands as a monument of Western political thought: "[A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety." Mason's words are preferable to Jefferson's for two reasons. First, he said that men are "equally free," not "equal." The difference is vast. There is ample evidence that Jefferson understood the difference as well as Mason, but much of the dispossession of Europeans in their own homelands can be traced to exploitation of this egalitarian philosophy by later Western liberals. Second, Mason states directly the central thesis of natural law: People cannot, by any agreement, deprive their posterity of rights. Natural law is therefore the fulcrum on which rests the case that immigration is genocide. The governments of the West have no right to impose present levels of immigration and race mixing on their people. Nor are we morally bound to accept them. The Ultimate Moral Principle Mason recognized the role of "safety" as a motive for the creation of law and government. Others have said the same thing. William Blackstone wrote, "self-defense is justly called the primary law of nature. . . [It] cannot be taken away by the laws of society." Jefferson wrote, "A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the highest duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation." Their message is simple. Laws alone, independent of their survival utility, are not, and cannot be, the underlying basis of civilization. In the end, whoever makes and enforces the laws has the power to determine who lives and who dies. Survival is the ultimate principle upon which all enduring moral systems must be based. This is the third, and final, cornerstone of any permanent moral order, for any people who "divest" their posterity of the right to existence will vanish, and their flawed moral system will vanish with them. All systems of law and government must serve the imperative of survival. Speaking on the eve of the War for Southern Independence, and in the aftermath of John Brown's attempt to incite a slave uprising at Harper's Ferry, President James Buchanan expressed the fear felt by Southerners who saw their very existence imperiled: "Self-preservation is the first law of nature, and therefore any state of society in which the sword is all the time suspended over the heads of the people must at last become intolerable." Where law and survival were in conflict the Founders took their cue from Cicero: "Laws are silent in the midst of arms." The West is surrendering the power of life and death into the hands of third world aliens. In a world ruled by the dual "code of amity, code of enmity," this decision, which was never subjected to systematic scrutiny by an informed electorate, is tantamount to suicide. Sometime in the next century, the sword Western society has suspended over its own head will become intolerable. What our response will be remains to be seen. If there is no response, the long descent into night is sure to follow. Which Way Western Man? What would be lost with the passing of Western civilization and its peoples? Two thousand years ago, the Roman historian, Tacitus, wrote in De Germania that the peoples of the Germanic tribes possessed a fondness for personal freedom, an independence of spirit, an unusually high status accorded women and a deep affection for the land. These traits have survived twenty centuries. Without the West, will the spirit of individual liberty persevere? The Map of Freedom suggests not. Despite the tendency of liberals to denigrate the only culture on earth that would tolerate their presence, these virtues uniquely characterize only Europeans and their civilization. Now, the descendants of those same Germanic tribes, the ancestors of much of the westerners world, and the creators of the only advanced technological civilization the world has ever known, are on the road to extinction. Do Western moral principles require that its creators commit suicide in order to fulfill those principles? Such a belief is insane. It therefore follows that if the West is to survive it must come to grips, as Jean Raspail foresaw, with the profoundly destructive nature of its moral beliefs. Any enduring moral order must be based on the following principles: 1) a dual code of morality, which is of evolutionary origin, binds the members of ethnic and racial groups together; 2) universal, self-sacrificing altruism in a world in which racial cohesion is elsewhere the norm is lethal; and 3) the imperative of survival and the primacy of self-preservation supersede all laws made by man. What then, must we do? Raymond Cattell, in his book A New Morality From Science: Beyondism, called for a reversal of the universalist creed and creation of many social laboratories where evolution can proceed without harm or subjugation of anyone by anyone else. Wilmot Robertson urged this path as the basis of nationhood in The Ethnostate. Richard McCulloch has elevated this principle to a "racial Golden Rule" in The Racial Compact. The only course that gives cohesive groups a chance to survive is ethnic separation. Without separation, the dual code of morality will ensure a long, chaotic period of strife and bloodshed. Eventually, what racial conflict does not finish, miscegenation, diminished birthrates, and physical and psychological displacement will. Personal liberty and individuality, without which Europeans simply cannot exist, will disappear long before the European genetic heritage is completely submerged. Lest this outcome seem remote and therefore of no concern, let the time scale of Rome's decline be always kept in mind. Though those reading this may or may not live to see the collapse of the West, the westerners children being born today may well suffer it. Jean Raspail also believed that the end was not far off. In the introduction to the 1985 edition of The Camp of the Saints, he wrote, "The Roman empire did not die any differently, though, it's true, more slowly, whereas this time we can expect a more sudden conflagration . . . . Christian charity will prove itself powerless. The times will be cruel." Louis Veuillot, the 19th century French writer, captured the dilemma facing the West in confronting peoples who do not conform to Western moral principles. "When I am the weaker, I ask you for my freedom, because that is your principle; but when I am the stronger, I take away your freedom, because that is my principle." The West must recognize this appeal for compassion by "the wretched refuse of [the non-Western world's] teeming shore," for what it is: a form of beguiling parasitism that can, by definition, only seduce those with Western moral principles. In The Decline of the West, Oswald Spengler wrote, "One grows or dies. There is no third possibility." The peoples of the West must come to believe in and act in accordance with the only moral principle Nature recognizes: for those who live in harmony with Nature, survival is moral. For those who do not, the penalty is extinction. Without this understanding, Western Man, progenitor of law, compassion, technology and a spirit of quest that is unparalleled in the history of the human race, will perish at the hands of those who do not possess the same innate spark. For the sake of our children who are yet to be, let us choose life--by whatever means we must--while the choice is still ours. The Morality of Survival (Part I) Race; Posted on: 2007-06-22 20:05:57 [ Printer friendly / Instant flyer ] "If we are to reverse course, it is vital that we take steps now, before it is too late." by Michael W. Masters American Renaissance, July 1995 [The West] has not yet understood that whites, in a world become too small for its inhabitants, are now a minority and that the proliferation of other races dooms our race, my race, irretrievably to extinction in the century to come, if we hold fast to our present moral principles.“[emphasis added] Jean Raspail, The Camp of the Saints The loss of racial identity in the Western world is symptomatic of a deeper crisis within the European peoples, whose culture and technology have provided the world with much of what we know today as modern civilization. At its core, the crisis is the inevitable consequence of a profound, and perhaps fatal, misunderstanding of the nature of morality. We have lost sight of ancient and eternal laws of Nature on which our civilization must be based if we are to survive. We no longer have the luxury of indulging in universalist altruistic principles that, no matter how noble they may appear, have driven us to the brink of ruin. Demographic projections based on American and European immigration policies, as well as the evidence of one’s own senses as one walks the streets of any large Western city, point to a bleak future. Within a century or two, perhaps less, the peoples of the West, those whose ancestry derives from the Nordic and Alpine subraces of Europe, will have ceased to exist as a cohesive entity. How quickly the end will come depends on immigration rates, differential birthrates among ethnic groups, and mixed-race childbearing rates. But the final outcome is fixed so long as we adhere to our present course. And yet, frank discussion of the outcome, the submergence of the race that produced the world’s first, and perhaps only technological civilization, is usually silenced with words like “racist,” “bigot,” and “xenophobe.” Neither the flawed moral system that enforces this silence nor the people who support it will outlive the demise of the West. But when the West is gone, it will be of little consolation that those responsible will have expired as well. If we are to reverse course, it is vital that we take steps now, before it is too late. If, today, the West’s moral system is flawed, how can it be corrected? The first question we must ask is whether it is moral for ethnic groups as well as individuals to seek survival. And if so, what are the moral actions we may undertake to secure survival? What must be the moral basis of our civilization if it is not to be lost? In his book, Destiny of Angels, Richard McCulloch calls these questions a matter of “ultimate ethics.” The Moral Dilemma of the West The dilemma of our people is the product of a deep misconception about nature and morality. It arises from the mistaken, sentimental belief that altruism can be extended beyond its evolutionary origin—kinship and within-group altruism—to the whole of humanity. It results from failure to accept the role of genetic factors in defining human temperament and potential. The standards that govern public debate are reminiscent of the Dark Ages in that they have no basis in science or in human experience. Instead, they consist of moralistic assertions derived from a world view rooted in radical egalitarianism. The long term consequence of adherence to these principles is rarely examined, let alone subjected to scientific scrutiny. Most Western people would agree that an innate sense of right and wrong plays a key role in the Western moral system, a system that values individual worth and reciprocal fairness. The tragedy of this moral view is that it has been extended to the world at large—seemingly the most noble behavior humanity has ever exhibited—and has become the threat to the survival of the West. As biologist Garrett Hardin demonstrated in his 1982 essay, “Discriminating Altruisms,” universalism—a chimerical One World without borders or distinctions—is impossible. Groups that practice unlimited altruism, unfettered by thoughts of self-preservation, will be disadvantaged in life’s competition and thus eliminated over time in favor of those that limit their altruistic behavior to a smaller subset of humanity, usually their own genetic kin, from whom they receive reciprocal benefits. Professor Hardin writes: Universalism is altruism practiced without discrimination of kinship, acquaintanceship, shared values, or propinquity in time or space…. To people who accept the idea of biological evolution from amoeba to man, the vision of social evolution from egoism to universalism may seem plausible. In fact, however, the last step is impossible…. Let us see why. In imagination, picture a world in which social evolution has gone no further than egoism or individualism. When familialism appears on the scene, what accounts for its persistence? It must be that the costs of the sacrifices individuals make for their relatives are more than paid for by the gains realized through family solidarity…. The argument that accounts for the step to familialism serves equally well for each succeeding step—except for the last. Why the difference? Because the One World created by universalism has—by definition—no competitive base to support it…. [Universalism] cannot survive in competition with discrimination.” [emphasis in original] Professor Hardin adds: [W]e must not forget that for three billion years, biological evolution has been powered by discrimination. Even mere survival in the absence of evolutionary change depends on discrimination. If universalists now have their way, discrimination will be abandoned. Even the most modest impulse toward conservatism should cause us to question the wisdom of abandoning a principle that has worked so well for billions of years. It is a tragic irony that discrimination has produced a species (homo sapiens) that now proposes to abandon the principle responsible for its rise to greatness.” It is to the advantage of non-Europeans, virtually all of whom retain their cohesion as distinctive, discriminating groups, to exploit the economic wealth and social order of the West, benefits many demonstrably cannot create for themselves. When this cohesive drive is placed in competition with self-sacrificing Western altruism, there can be only one outcome. In the near term, Europeans will be displaced by groups acting in their own self-interest. In the long run, biological destruction awaits us. Since those who displace us do not, by definition, maintain our morals standards—for if they did, they would not be replacing us—our flawed moral system will vanish with us.” The fact that universal, self-sacrificing altruism destroys its practitioners is its most obvious flaw. Any survivable moral order must recognize this. The Cosmic Race The dream of a Utopia in which racial harmony prevails, has never come true. Today, racial encroachment is a threat to the very existence of Western peoples. Lawrence Auster, author of The Path to National Suicide, An Essay on Immigration and Multiculturalism, has elsewhere summarized the situation thus: Modern liberalism told us that racial differences don’t matter, and on the basis of that belief, liberals then set about turning America into a multiracial, integrated, race-blind society. But now that very effort has created so much race consciousness, race conflict and race inequality, that the same liberals have concluded that the only way to overcome those problems is to merge all the races into one. The same people who have always denounced as an extremist lunatic anyone who warned about ‘the racial dilution of white America,’ are now proposing, not just the dilution of white America, but its complete elimination. Race-blind ideology has led directly to the most race-conscious—-and indeed genocidal—-proposal in the history of the world.” This change of strategy was signaled by the cover story of a Fall 1993 special edition of Time. The story featured a computer synthesized image of a woman representing the intermixture of all of the ethnic population elements of the United States in their present proportions. The subliminal message conveyed by this computerized android, obviously still of predominantly European ancestry, was: “Don’t worry, this is harmless.” Or, in the current idiom of multiculturalism, “let us celebrate our diversity.” Of course, this image represents the utter destruction of diversity, not its conservation. This computer-generated android is a lie. The American population base is in a state of rapid change. Whites are now having fewer children, and there are thus fewer whites of child bearing age than Time assumes. This is happening worldwide. The question is, what would be the result of this plan being carried forward on a larger scale, carried to its logical conclusion in a world sans borders? Time’s android is but a way station on the road to what some lovingly call the Cosmic Race. People of European ancestry constitute something over ten percent of the world’s population, but since 1980, white births amount to only a little more than five percent of the world’s new children. The birth rate in the West has fallen to dangerously low levels, now about 1.8 children per woman. A level of 2.1 is required to balance deaths. Birth rates in the third world remain very high, thanks in large measure to the infusion of Western food, medicine, and “peacekeeping.” Because people are not computer morphs but have discrete ancestors, let us assume that the fraction of people with European ancestry is now one-sixteenth of the child-bearing population. When the Time experiment is complete on a world-wide scale, the resulting human will have only one white great-great- grandparent. He will be visibly Asian since about 60 percent of the world’s population is Asian. In round numbers, this amounts to ten of the sixteen great-great-grandparents, including four from China alone. Three would come from India and three more from Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Africa would supply three and non-white Latin America and the Caribbean basin the remaining two. In this scenario, which is already unfolding on the North American continent and in Europe and Australia, the single European ancestor would leave no discernible residue in homo cosmicus. Europeans would be extinct, fulfilling the nightmare vision that Jean Raspail described in The Camp Of The Saints. This is not a condemnation of any real human being with such an ancestry. Nevertheless, this process would eradicate the biological diversity that multiculturalists claim to cherish. In its place would be only uniformity, the irreversible submergence of all races. The passing of any race is an event of great significance. The destruction of an entire population is, in fact, genocide by the definitions of the UN Genocide Convention, which defines genocide as “the destruction, in whole or in part, of an ethnic, racial or national group. The acts so defined include … the destruction of the conditions of life necessary for the physical existence of the group….” The debate about race must be framed in these terms in order to convey its true importance. The battle cannot be won by allowing the other side to limit the terms of debate by declaring certain subjects beyond discussion. The consequences are too important. The Dual Code of Morality Why, though, does race matter? The answer lies in the biology of genes and in the impact of genetic kinshiip on altruism. For many decades, altruism was a paradox for theories of evolution. Darwin himself realized that altruism was difficult to expalain in terms of individual “survival of the fittest.” In his book, Race, Evolution and Behavior, Philippe Rushton writes, “If the most altruistic members of a group sacrifice themselves for others, they run the risk of leaving fewer offspring to pass on the very genes that govern the altruistic behavior. Hence, altruism would be selected against, and selfishness would be selected for.” Prof. Rushton suggests that this paradox is resolved by genetic similarity theory, a field pioneered by biologist W.D. Hamilton and others. Prof Rushton writes: By a process known as kin selection, individuals can maximize their inclusive fitness rather than only their individual fitness by increasing the production of successful offspring by both themselves and their genetic relatives…. Genes are what survive and are passed on, and some of the same genes will be found not only in direct offspring but in siblings, cousins, nephews/nieces, and grandchildren…. thus, from an evolutionary perspective, altruism is a means of helping genes to propagate.” Over time, kin selection has resulted in a dual code of morality, an altruistic code for one’s genetic kin and a non-altruistic code for everyone else. Anthropologists have suggested that humans evolved through a process of migration and tribal warfare between groups composed of genetically related individuals. In A New Theory of Human Evolution, Sir Arthur Keith wrote, “The process which secures the evolution of an isolated group of humanity is a combination of two principles … namely, cooperation with competition…. I hold that from the very beginning of human evolution the conduct of every local group was regulated by two codes of morality, distinguished by Herbert Spencer as the ‘code of amity’ and the ‘code of enmity’.” Garrett Hardin writes, “The essential characteristic of a tribe is that it should follow a double standard of morality—one kind of behavior for in-group relations, another for out-group.” In-group relations are characterized by cooperation while out-group relations are characterized by conflict. Liberals have tried to discredit the role of tribal conflict, claiming that such distinctions have been lost as groups reached nation size. But in so doing, they miss the vital message of genetic similarity theory. National ethnic groups represent the growth and consolidation of genetically related tribes over time. Professor Hardin argues that, because of the nature of altruism and competition, the dual code of morality is inescapable and cannot be eliminated from human society: In the absence of competition between tribes the survival value of altruism in a crowded world approaches zero because what ego gives up necessarily … goes into the commons. What is in the commons cannot favor the survival of the sharing impulses that put it there—unless there are limits placed on sharing. To place limits on sharing is to create a tribe—which means a rejection of One World…. A state of One World, if achieved, would soon redissolve into an assemblage of tribes.” The in-group out-group distinction still operates today; it is only the battleground that has shifted. Tribal warfare has been replaced by territorial irredentism and competing birthrates. The liberal campaign to eliminate feelings of national, cultural, or racial solidarity among Western peoples was undertaken largely in the hope that the abolition of “tribalism” would inaugurate an era of world peace. As Professor Hardin has shown, tribalism cannot be eliminated. Worse still, any idealistic group that unilaterally dismantles its own tribal sense will be swept away by groups that have retained theirs. Unless the current direction is changed, the West will be destroyed in this new form of biological warfare. The dual code of morality is therefore the cornerstone on which any enduring moral order must be based. It is also an answer to the question of ultimate ethics posed earlier: “Is it moral for ethnic groups to seek to survive?” Since it is impossible to eliminate “tribes” from the human race, the answer to this question must be yes. That which is built inextricably into the laws of the universe cannot be immoral. Universalists might try to caricature the dual code of morality as an invidious double standard, but it is something we practice every day without even thinking about it. Without it, no group, be it a family, club, corporation, political party, nation, or race would exist. It is how groups distinguish between members and non-members. Employees of the same company treat each other differently from the way they treat competitors. Members of the same political party cooperate with each other and run against opponents. Families draw sharp distinctions between members and strangers. It is easy to overlook the dual code of morality precisely because it is so fundamental a part of human nature. The “code of amity, code of enmity” explains racial loyalties. It is an extension of the biologically necessary fact that parents love their children more than the children of strangers. Such feelings are normal and natural. Yet “racism” has become the curse-word that stops discussion. Those who use the word as a weapon say that racial loyalty is racism when exhibited by whites but is justifiable pride when exhibited by non-whites. The word is simply a means of gaining power over people who have exaggerated moral scruples. The Biology of Diversity Feelings of racial loyalty are grounded in biological differences. These are discussed authoritatively in J. Philippe Rushton’s Race, Evolution, and Behavior, but they do not imply that one race has a right to rule over another. Frank discussion of real differences must not be considered morally repugnant. Scientific truth cannot be racism, at least not in the pejorative sense that the word is now used. Most forms of behavior (by whites) that are characterized as racism do not involve unprovoked assault on people of other races, but are simply the natural loyalty of humans for their own group. They are necessary for survival. Unprovoked violence is a moral evil, but by all statistical measures, whites are overwhelmingly the victims of crimes of racial violence, not the perpetrators. Blacks are twelve percent of the population but commit almost two-thirds of the violent crime in America, are over twelve times more likely to murder whites than the reverse, are more than a thousand times more likely to rape white women than the reverse, and choose whites as crime victims fifty percent of the time compared to whites choosing blacks as victims only two percent of the time. Interracial crime is just one manifestation of a fundamental biological principle called Gause’s Law of Exclusion. In his book, The Mammals of North America, University of Kansas biology professor Raymond Hall states the law as follows: “Two subspecies of the same species do not occur in the same geographic area.” [emphasis in original] One will inevitably eliminate or displace the other. Prof. Hall specifically includes humans in this rule: “To imagine one subspecies of man living together on equal terms for long with another subspecies is but wishful thinking and leads only to disaster and oblivion for one or the other.” Oblivion need not come in the form of physical destruction. It may simply involve the loss of habitat. Harlem, Watts, East St. Louis, and many other black neighborhoods were once occupied by whites. The arrival of blacks (or other non-whites) in sufficient numbers makes it impossible for whites to survive, whereas the process does not work in reverse. Even without the carnage of inter-racial crime, whites could be eliminated through sheer loss of territory. Viewed in biological terms, ethnic diversity is prelude to destruction. The Morality of Survival (Part II) Race; Posted on: 2007-07-01 18:06:11 [ Printer friendly / Instant flyer ] In Part I, Mr. Masters demonstrated that it is logically impossible for all people to subscribe to a one-world, “universal morality,” and that those groups that practice it will surely be displaced by those that do not. Mr. Masters now outlines the basis of a morality that would ensure survival. by Michael Masters American Renaissance, August 1995 (Editor’s Note: Part 1 of this article can be read here.) The great majority of people, of any age and origin, do not concern themselves with the rise and fall of civilizations. Like fish in water, they are conscious of their environment only when it changes rapidly and threateningly, a rarity in most people’s lifetimes. Yet civilizations do fall, and the warning signs for ours have been present for more than a century. Rudyard Kipling’s line, “East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet,” presaged the message of early twentieth century Americans, Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard, whose books, The Passing of the Great Race and The Rising Tide of Color, helped bring about the immigration restrictions of 1924. The 1924 national origins quota system was dismantled in 1965 during the wave of self-recrimination that accompanied the Civil Rights era. Should Chinese historians of the twenty-second century be writing the final history of Western civilization, no doubt they will cite the 1965 Immigration Act as the blow that broke the back of Western man. Elmer Pendell, in his book, Why Civilizations Self-Destruct, surveyed historians’ theories as to why civilizations fall. They include Oswald Spengler’s analogy to individual aging and death, theories of moral decay, and theories based on ecological deterioration. Concerning the latter, Garrett Hardin notes in The Limits of Altruism: “No civilization has ever recovered after ruining its environment.” [emphasis in original] All of these theories have their appeal, yet none is a complete explanation for what is happening to the West. Pendell’s own hypothesis seems closer to the mark. A civilization arises when natural selection produces a people of above-average intelligence. As the founders conquer natural culling forces, those who would have been removed from the population due to their lesser abilities survive and produce more children than the more intelligent founders. Francis Galton, Charles Darwin’s cousin and author of Hereditary Genius, first noted that ‘men of eminence’ have fewer children than the average. Eventually the intelligence level of the population falls below that needed to sustain civilization. Pendell suggests another factor in the collapse of civilizations, the gradual adulteration of ethnically homogeneous founding populations through losses in wars and, in ancient times, the taking of slaves. The modern analogue of slavery is immigration. Tenny Frank, in his book History of Rome, wrote, “The original peoples were wasted in wars and scattered in migrations and colonization and their places were filled chiefly with Eastern Slaves.” We cannot speak of the spirit of Rome or the culture of Rome, Frank said, “without defining whether the reference is to the Rome of 200 BC or 200 AD.” Theodor Mommsen wrote in The History of Rome, “The patrician body … had dwindled away more and more in the course of centuries and in the time of Caesar there were not more than fifteen or sixteen patrician gentes (clans) still in existence.” In 9 A.D. laws were passed requiring each patrician family to have three children. Lead poisoning has been implicated in the failure to reverse the decline of Roman blood, but the reasons do not change the outcome. Even in ancient Rome, slaves did not stay slaves forever, and their gradual suffusion through the population by intermixture would have contributed to Rome’s demise. The same situation, massive infusion of non-Western peoples and a birthrate below replacement level, threatens the West, and for reasons quite unrelated to lead poisoning. After The Fall Eric Fischer, writing in The Passing of the European Age, said that a new civilization never arises where an earlier civilization has died. If Pendell’s theory is correct and if the hypothesis of Tenny Frank and others explains the loss of a hereditary capacity for civilization, then Fischer’s observation has a genetic explanation. Civilization cannot arise on the site of an earlier civilization once the hereditary character of the people is permanently altered. This process is happening in the Western world today through immigration, welfare, and liberal policies that promote the submergence of ethnic groups into a global “melting pot.” Should the West suffer the fate of Rome, there will be no recovery. Whether or not other civilizations arise among other peoples remains to be seen. Present economic success indicates that East Asia may be a future center of civilization. However, modern innovations flow predominantly from the creative wellsprings of the West. Whether innovation could be sustained in the absence of Western peoples remains to be seen. There is evidence that this might not happen; intelligence testing of Asians shows a relatively small standard deviation, suggesting a smaller right tail of the IQ distribution and a smaller percentage of innovative individuals. Although dire predictions about the future are often ridiculed, it is wise to remember Rome—catastrophes can and do occur, and in a globally linked world, the consequences could be shattering. In The Limits of Altruism, Garrett Hardin cites Harrison Brown, author of The Challenge of Man’s Future, as the first person to recognize the vulnerability of the West’s advanced civilization. Brown focused on the role of metals in modern civilization and on the technology required to obtain metals. Prof. Hardin summarizes the situation: Looking only at the copper component of the problem, we should note that preliterate man managed to create the Bronze Age only because of the ready availability of copper ores assaying greater than 20 percent…. Only the most primitive of means are required to process high grade ores. But now we are reduced to extracting our copper from ores that assay less than 1 percent, and soon we will have nothing better than 0.1 percent. It takes a very sophisticated technology to deal with low-grade ores, a technology that only a large population of technologically advanced people can muster.” Prof. Hardin continues, “Our many technologies form an incredible network of mutual support, mutual dependence. If this network were disrupted … it is doubtful if our kind of technology could ever be rebuilt…. On all counts, it looks as though our civilization, once fallen, will never be replaced by another of comparable quality.” Prof. Hardin suggests two possible causes for the destruction of modern civilization: nuclear warfare and a population crash brought on by exceeding the Earth’s carrying capacity. However, genetic submergence of the peoples with the innate ability to sustain civilization will do just as well. The Roots of Western Order The Map of Freedom, published annually by Freedom House, graphically demonstrates that free forms of government generally track population concentrations of people of European descent, a strong suggestion that freedom has a genetic origin. Although there are exceptions, notably Japan, which lost a nuclear war to the West and had a Western constitution imposed on it, the world of the free is largely the world of the Western European. The partially free include newly emerged Eastern Europeans and a scattering of other nations around the world. Much of Africa and Asia remains in the not free category. Thomas Jefferson foresaw this. Fearing “importation of foreigners,” he wrote in Notes on Virginia, “They will bring with them the principles of the governments they leave, or if able to throw them off, it will be in exchange for an unbounded licentiousness, passing, as usual, from one extreme to the other…. In proportion to their number, they will infuse into it [the nation] their spirit, warp or bias its direction, and render it a heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass.” Because economic inequality between groups inevitably produces envy, stable societies are almost always homogeneous. Multi-ethnic and multicultural societies live on the edge of dissolution. In such cases, the role of government turns to conflict management, as Brent Nelson points out in America Balkanized. “Government as conflict management is an emerging theme of public life in the U.S., a theme which recurrently manifests itself in the concepts of dialogue, mediation, sensitivity, tolerance, and balance. The latter terms are increasingly the shibboleths of American public life. The fiction is maintained that these concepts … will produce a final resolution of intergroup conflicts…. [T]he reality is something quite other.” Laws against “hate crime” and “hate speech” reflect that other reality. If today’s ethnic minorities become a majority it will be beyond the power of Western peoples to control, peacefully by means of the ballot, the destiny of the nations that were once their own. There is no guarantee that protections prevalent in Western societies will be preserved in societies that become non-Western. There is no historical reason to believe that governments based on principles of individual liberty will survive the disappearance of Western peoples. Post-colonial Africa is enlightening. For the most part, the Dark Continent is reverting to its ancestral ways, suitably updated by the infusion of Western weapons, as evidenced by carnage in Somalia and Rwanda. That this disturbs our heightened Western sense of compassion is understandable. But sentimentality should not blind us to the long term implications for our own survival. Nature’s books are being balanced in Africa, and they will be balanced in the West, either by us or by Nature itself. Just as giving food to people who cannot feed themselves simply hastens an inevitable population crash, bringing third world people into the West simply hastens the transformation of the West into an extension of the third world. The European tradition of ordered, self-governing liberty is probably part of our genetic heritage. Throughout the third world, governments range from anarchy to dictatorship. That too, is surely genetic. Those few non-European countries that appear to be free have generally maintained democracy through intimate contact with the West. If Europeans are marginalized and ultimately absorbed by the third world, the idealism of Western liberalism that permitted the third world invasion will have proved to be a lethal genetic flaw. Few concepts are more ingrained in Western thought than respect for the “rule of law.” The West has a history of order that predates the eight-hundred-year-old Magna Carta. Roman Law was supreme in the Mediterranean world for nearly a thousand years. Unique among the peoples of the earth, the people of the West recognize, at least in theory, the subordination of government to individual rights. But laws have been instrumental in bringing on the current crisis. Although there is virtually no popular support for immigration in the Western world, it is everywhere proceeding under laws passed by governments elected by the people. In the end, laws are no better at ensuring liberty than the people who make and enforce them. Sir Roger L’Estrange said, “The greatest of all injustice is that which goes under the name of law.” America’s Founders recognized the existence of a natural order to freedom that supersedes laws made by men. Although the American concept of liberty owed much to British and French political thought, the American act of creation, the Declaration of Independence, provided perhaps the best-known expression of “natural law” ever penned. Writing about securing “unalienable Rights” endowed by “Nature and Nature’s God,” Thomas Jefferson wrote: That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, having the foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.” The rights Jefferson identified, “Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness,” were set forth by George Mason in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, ratified on May 6th, 1776. Mason’s work was the basis for Jefferson’s statement, but the Mason version is superior because it eschews Jefferson’s poetic nonsense about all men being created equal. Mason’s language still stands as a monument of Western political thought: [A]ll men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.” Mason’s words are preferable to Jefferson’s for two reasons. First, he said that men are “equally free,” not “equal.” The difference is vast. There is ample evidence that Jefferson understood the difference as well as Mason, but much of the dispossession of Europeans in their own homelands can be traced to exploitation of this egalitarian philosophy by later Western liberals. Second, Mason states directly the central thesis of natural law: People cannot, by any agreement, deprive their posterity of rights. Natural law is therefore the fulcrum on which rests the case that immigration is genocide. The governments of the West have no right to impose present levels of immigration and race mixing on their people. Nor are we morally bound to accept them. The Ultimate Moral Principle Mason recognized the role of “safety” as a motive for the creation of law and government. Others have said the same thing. William Blackstone wrote, “self-defense is justly called the primary law of nature…. [It] cannot be taken away by the laws of society.” Jefferson wrote, “A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the highest duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are of higher obligation.” Their message is simple. Laws alone, independent of their survival utility, are not, and cannot be, the underlying basis of civilization. In the end, whoever makes and enforces the laws has the power to determine who lives and who dies. Survival is the ultimate principle upon which all enduring moral systems must be based. This is the third, and final, cornerstone of any permanent moral order, for any people who “divest” their posterity of the right to existence will vanish, and their flawed moral system will vanish with them. All systems of law and government must serve the imperative of survival. Speaking on the eve of the War for Southern Independence, and in the aftermath of John Brown’s attempt to incite a slave uprising at Harper’s Ferry, President James Buchanan expressed the fear felt by white Southerners who saw their very existence imperiled: “Self-preservation is the first law of nature, and therefore any state of society in which the sword is all the time suspended over the heads of the people must at last become intolerable.” Where law and survival were in conflict the Founders took their cue from Cicero: “Laws are silent in the midst of arms.” The West is surrendering the power of life and death into the hands of third world aliens. In a world ruled by the dual “code of amity, code of enmity,” this decision, which was never subjected to systematic scrutiny by an informed electorate, is tantamount to suicide. Sometime in the next century, the sword Western society has suspended over its own head will become intolerable. What our response will be remains to be seen. If there is no response, the long descent into night is sure to follow. Which Way Western Man? What would be lost with the passing of Western civilization and its peoples? Two thousand years ago, the Roman historian, Tacitus, wrote in De Germania that the peoples of the Germanic tribes possessed a fondness for personal freedom, an independence of spirit, an unusually high status accorded women and a deep affection for the land. These traits have survived twenty centuries. Without the West, will the spirit of individual liberty persevere? The Map of Freedom suggests not. Despite the tendency of liberals to denigrate the only culture on earth that would tolerate their presence, these virtues uniquely characterize only Europeans and their civilization. Now, the descendants of those same Germanic tribes, the ancestors of much of the white world, and the creators of the only advanced technological civilization the world has ever known, are on the road to extinction. Do Western moral principles require that its creators commit suicide in order to fulfill those principles? Such a belief is insane. It therefore follows that if the West is to survive it must come to grips, as Jean Raspail foresaw, with the profoundly destructive nature of its moral beliefs. Any enduring moral order must be based on the following principles: 1) a dual code of morality, which is of evolutionary origin, binds the members of ethnic and racial groups together; 2) universal, self-sacrificing altruism in a world in which racial cohesion is elsewhere the norm is lethal; and 3) the imperative of survival and the primacy of self-preservation supersede all laws made by man. What then, must we do? Raymond Cattell, in his book A New Morality From Science: Beyondism, called for a reversal of the universalist creed and creation of many social laboratories where evolution can proceed without harm or subjugation of anyone by anyone else. Wilmot Robertson urged this path as the basis of nationhood in The Ethnostate. Richard McCulloch has elevated this principle to a “racial Golden Rule” in The Racial Compact. The only course that gives cohesive groups a chance to survive is ethnic separation. Without separation, the dual code of morality will ensure a long, chaotic period of strife and bloodshed. Eventually, what racial conflict does not finish, miscegenation, diminished birthrates, and physical and psychological displacement will. Personal liberty and individuality, without which Europeans simply cannot exist, will disappear long before the European genetic heritage is completely submerged. Lest this outcome seem remote and therefore of no concern, let the time scale of Rome’s decline be always kept in mind. Though those reading this may or may not live to see the collapse of the West, the white children being born today may well suffer it. Jean Raspail also believed that the end was not far off. In the introduction to the 1985 edition of The Camp of the Saints, he wrote, “The Roman empire did not die any differently, though, it’s true, more slowly, whereas this time we can expect a more sudden conflagration…. Christian charity will prove itself powerless. The times will be cruel.” Louis Veuillot, the 19th century French writer, captured the dilemma facing the West in confronting peoples who do not conform to Western moral principles. “When I am the weaker, I ask you for my freedom, because that is your principle; but when I am the stronger, I take away your freedom, because that is my principle.” The West must recognize this appeal for compassion by “the wretched refuse of [the non-Western world’s] teeming shore,” for what it is: a form of beguiling parasitism that can, by definition, only seduce those with Western moral principles. In The Decline of the West, Oswald Spengler wrote, “One grows or dies. There is no third possibility.”

The peoples of the West must come to believe in and act in accordance with the only moral principle Nature recognizes: for those who live in harmony with Nature, survival is moral. For those who do not, the penalty is extinction. Without this understanding, Western Man, progenitor of law, compassion, technology and a spirit of quest that is unparalleled in the history of the human race, will perish at the hands of those who do not possess the same innate spark. For the sake of our children who are yet to be, let us choose life—by whatever means we must—while the choice is still ours.

Text end.

Certain Destruction Ahead For United States As Tsunami Of Illegal Aliens Continues – Amnesty Is Next

All empires fall.  So says conservative Denver radio talk-show host Peter Boyles – and he has said it frequently of late. Boyles spends a lot of air-time talking about the America’s deliberate across-the-nation refusal to seal our Southern border and stop the endless waves of illegal aliens. And the failure to get the border closed has originated from both sides of the political spectrum.

The President and Congress seem oblivious to the Tsunamic flooding damage the Open Border is causing.  We’re directly in the path of  the wave, which is going to take us under and wash us toward self-initiated political and economic destruction.

Congress is oblivious to the increasingly loud roar of the approaching disaster.  For instance, United States Senator Michael Bennett was just yesterday beating the drum  for continued non-enforcement of immigration law under the rubric of Comprehensive Immigration Reform.  From reporter Mike McPhee in the Denver Post comes this story:

“About 500 supporters of immigration reform packed the Manual High School auditorium Wednesday night during the second of three nights of rallies across the state.

U.S. Sen. Michael Bennet, D-Colo, drew warm applause although he didn’t say anything specific other than that he supports reforming the nation’s system for handling foreign workers who are seeking jobs and citizenship.

Asked later for specifics, he replied: “The system is unmanageable. It’s going to require a broad coalition of groups to bring about reform.”

Reform translates to Amnesty.  Amnesty leads to Citizenship.  Studies have shown that immigrants from Latin America overwhelmingly vote for Democrats.  Citizenship for another twelve to fifty-million illegal aliens (depending on which numbers you choose to believe) will ensure domination of the Left in this nation for decades, if not for a hundred years.

Yet, the issue is not about race, as some from the Left immediately argue in response to calls for sealing our borders.  The issue is about proper enforcement of United States immigration law (long ago thrown out into the trash), a struggling economy, and the survival of a two-party political system.

Throughout history, the fall of an empire usually meant mass killing, pillaging, rape, destruction and chaos.  Like our impending destruction the fall of Rome was begun with a wave of massive immigration, granted by permission of the Roman Emperor himself, of hundreds of thousands of impoverished Goths across the Danube River during the mid-4th Century.  Experts have disagreed on the exact date of the fall of the Empire, but the concensus seems to be right around 410 A.D. when the Visigoth King Alaric’s army sacked and destroyed the City of Rome.  Thus the Western World was plunged into what became known as The Dark Ages.

Our nation may very well fall into economic ruin without a shot being fired or a city being sacked, partially as the result of the Fifth Column’s diligent work on keeping our borders open.  The porous border between Mexico and the United States has resulted in a Tsunami of overwhelming work-loads for our social services agencies, our public schools being crowded with non-English-speaking students, and hospitals going broke because of unpaid emergency room bills.  Illegal immigration is breaking us financially and is politically about to empower the Left-wing forever.

In the interests of saving ourselves from what has eventually happened to history’s great empires (collapse and ruin), we would do well to block the incoming Tsunami by sealing the borders and beginning in earnest to deport all who are here illegally.

Our survival depends on it.

How Our Civilization Can Fall

There’s a right way and a wrong way to learn from history.

The wrong way is to make an analogy between some event in the past and our present situation, and then assume that everything will work the same.

For instance: Rome was the hyperpower of the ancient world, and it fell, so we’re going to fall, too!

Analogies might make an interesting point or raise an intriguing possibility, but they prove nothing. America is like Rome in some ways, and radically different in others. You can’t just ignore the differences and think you’ve said anything smart.

What’s the right way? It’s to discover general principles and then see if they work out consistently over time.

Let’s take Rome again. First, a lot of people will point out that the Roman Empire didn’t actually fall until the 1400s — there was continuity between the Roman Republic, the great Mediterranean empire that it became, and at last the decrepit “empire” of Byzantium that consisted primarily of the single city of Constantinople when the Turks took it out in 1453.

Fair enough — but when we talk about the “fall of the Roman Empire,” we mean the utter collapse of the western half — the part that became Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Italy, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. That fall took place in the 400s, a thousand years before Byzantium finally fell.

There are all kinds of theories about why the western part of the empire fell — and the east, which was under many of the same pressures, did not.

From lead in the Roman drinking water to population-crashing plagues, from barbarian invaders to overtaxation, from Christianity’s “softening” effect to crushing bureaucracy to repeated civil wars to sheer loss of civilizational energy, there are all kinds of theories about the fall of Rome.

There is even a book that claims that Rome didn’t “fall” at all. Europe After Rome: A New Cultural History 500-1000, by Julia M.H. Smith, makes much of the fact that the invaders all regarded themselves as successors to the emperors, and the styles of Roman culture continued, changing only gradually and not becoming barbarian.

Fair enough — the barbarians weren’t trying to destroy Rome, they wanted to inherit it, to throw out the emperors and sit at the top of the tax chain themselves.

But in his incisive (and much shorter) book, The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization , Bryan Ward-Perkins takes on Smith’s (and others’) claim that there was no “fall” at all and eviscerates it by an appeal to evidence.

The problem with the “it didn’t really fall” thesis is that it is inspired far more by contemporary multiculturalism than by any new evidence. In fact, reading Smith quickly becomes an exercise in public narcissism, as page after page her book seems to be far more about her than about the period of history she’s supposedly writing about. Smith is working from the old evidence and, in best Deconstructionist fashion, reworking it to fit the new narrative she is committed to finding.

In her view it is only the political rhetoric of Renaissance Europe that labeled the period after the fall of the West “the Dark Ages.” In our modern sensitive multiculturality, we don’t use pejorative names. They weren’t post-empire, in other words, they were differently-empired. Not uncivilized, but civilization-challenged. (Though of course she does not use those terms.)

Ward-Perkins acts like a real historian. He uses the archaeological evidence to discover what life was like in the late Western Roman Empire. What he discovers is that the benefits of safe and profitable trading spread throughout the empire.

Quality Goods

Archaeology is limited, of course, to examining the artifacts that survived. Fortunately, one of the most survivable artifacts is pottery — and pottery was vastly important to life and to trade. It was in huge ceramic jars — amphorae — that wine and olive oil were transported from one end of the empire to the other.

In addition, pots were to the Roman world what Tupperware, RubberMaid, and Calphalon are to our society — a vital part of the daily life of those who cooked and stored food and drink. So there was also a thriving trade in fine-quality pots that were turned on potters’ wheels, fired at the perfect temperature, and painted and glazed with the most beautiful designs.

For instance, in Britannia there was a thriving center of pottery production that spread its wares throughout the island; other centers thrived elsewhere; and the remarkable thing, according to Ward-Perkins, is how thoroughly this high-quality pottery penetrated the whole society, even down to the peasant class that worked the land.

In other words, the economy was so robust and prosperous for nearly everyone that even those near the bottom of the economic ladder (but not at the bottom — that would be the slaves!) had access to goods of high quality. That meant that the balance between prices and earnings was favorable by the standards of the day.

Specialization

Ward-Perkins also cites the example of a Syrian village that thrived in rocky country whose soil was good only for growing olive trees. This village sustained a ridiculously high population for many, many years — a population that was far higher than could be supported from the agricultural yields of that area.

So what were they living on? Trade. They grew their olives and shipped the oil abroad. Apparently their oil was so highly regarded throughout the Mediterranean that it enabled them to import almost all the food and wine they required to sustain their population.

They had specialized. It worked very well for them — until the whole system of trade broke down and there was no way for them to get their goods out to their potential markets. Either it was no longer safe enough to transport their oil and sell it profitably, or the markets had dried up because of the crash of the economy elsewhere. Whatever the immediate cause, the result was predictable: Without the revenues to let them import food, the population crashed back to the very low levels that could be sustained by the miserable local farming.

The Roman Army

What people overlooked was that everything depended on the Roman Army. The army wasn’t carrying the goods, it wasn’t even actively protecting the trade. The army was mostly stationed at the border, while the economy boomed in an empire so safe that none of the cities had walls. But the economic system that offered so much prosperity could only last as long as merchants could trust in the safety of the goods they transported, and as long as people could remain in place to do their work instead of having to flee barbarian invaders.

It was a robust system. Ward-Perkins points out that there were lots of crises over the years, from plague to invasions to civil wars, and none of them brought the system down, except for local crashes from which the economy soon recovered.

But it takes time and space to recover — years, and the presence of nearby robust economies that can help restore the area that was hard hit.

When you have crash after crash in close succession, and the nearby economic centers are also just as beleaguered as you, there is neither time nor space for recovery.

So when the Roman Army got caught up in civil wars (“If that legion can make their general emperor, we can make our general emperor!”) so that it was distracted and weakened, the emperors began the horribly self-destructive policy of buying off the bad guys on their borders.

It seemed like a good idea at the time, of course. You give the barbarians a lot of money and they go away. It saves lives.

Except that they run out of the money and now they know how to get more. If you crush the barbarian army in battle, they think twice before coming back. If you pay them for showing up and threatening you, and you don’t kill any of them, then coming back and threatening you again will be very popular with the barbarian footsoldiers. You’ll see them a lot more.

But money isn’t infinite — the barbarian invaders shrink the tax base as they interfere with trade, both directly (“Let’s loot this city so they’ll know we’re serious!”) and indirectly (“The barbarians are coming! Let’s leave our city and run away to someplace safe!”).

So the emperors took to giving them land. They settled the Alans here, the Ostrogoths there. Of course, the land they settled them on was already occupied, so the Germans came in as overlords — essentially, they became the new tax collectors, only they kept the taxes for themselves.

Thus the government was now giving away its tax base. Meanwhile, the Germans were lousy governors. They knew about taking taxes — but their taxation wasn’t the usual corrupt system of the Romans, it was much more direct and brutal. In many places it was indistinguishable from looting. They took so much that the people didn’t have enough left to allow them to buy quality goods from abroad. So they were removed from the empire-wide trading system.

Also, the Germans did not understand or accept the burden that had been borne by the Roman Army in the areas they now occupied. They did not maintain public safety. Newly impoverished people and other tribes of invaders harassed merchants so that through large swathes of the empire, it simply wasn’t profitable to ship things anymore. Either brigands or barbarians would seize your trade goods along the way, or there’d be nobody with money to buy your goods when they reached their destination.

The robust Roman economic system could absorb a little of this, but not a lot, and not for long.

In the Crash, You Fall Farther

In Britannia, the crash was sudden and complete. Within just a couple of decades, the population had crashed — and peasants were using miserable lumpen homemade pots, badly fired, easily broken, ugly. This was true even though Britannia had recently had pottery-making centers that did work so good it was exported; now those pottery works were shut down.

Here’s the shocker: Before the Romans ever invaded, Britannia, despite its battling tribes and kingdoms, had maintained a robust economy. It was a wealthy land, by Celtic standards, with strong cultural influence across the Channel in Gaul.

But when the Roman system collapsed in Britannia, the level of the culture fell far below what had existed prior to the Roman conquest. Not only could they not recover to Roman levels, they couldn’t even restore the old British system. It was all gone.

This was partly because the Germans that invaded Britain came in greater numbers and tended to enslave or slaughter or drive out the local population — the Anglo-Saxons weren’t coming to take over Roman Britain’s existing system, they were coming to take their land and live on it as Germans.

It was partly due to the fact that while the Anglo-Saxons were attacking in the south and east, the Irish were attacking from the west and the Picts from the north. There was simply nowhere to hide long enough to recover.

But what the British experienced all at once, the rest of the Western empire experienced only a little more gradually. Pockets of prosperity remained in Gaul and eastern Spain — partly because for many years Africa remained safe and prosperous. It provided the cushion that allowed Italy and southern Gaul and eastern Spain to recover from the economic shocks that had hit them.

Then came a new wave of Germans and wiped out the cushion. The Vandals swept across the strait of Gibraltar and conquered north Africa. They may not have been worse than any of the other barbarian invaders — but they had a worse effect, because without Africa’s peaceful production and trade and tax base, there was simply no way for Roman Italy to sustain the costs of empire.

Then the Franks swept into Gaul and the Lombards into Italy and it was over. The invaders might pretend that what they ruled over was still “Roman” and “imperial,” but it wasn’t. Every region had to live on what it produced itself. The new kings might occasionally mint some coins to prove they were as good as the emperors they had replaced, but in fact coins did not circulate and a local barter economy prevailed in most areas.

Here and there you’d have a small economic recovery, and of course there were artisans — for a while at least — who could still practice the old crafts at a high level. But who could afford to pay for them? It took a powerful economy and the taxes of a huge empire to fund vast public works like aqueducts and irrigation systems and networks of roads.

What remained called itself Roman and showed only gradual decline in the quality of its goods; and if you’re a determined multiculturalist, you could claim that this wasn’t a “fall” into “dark ages,” it was merely a “cultural transformation” or “evolution” that was just as “valid” as what went before.

Try telling that to the people living in a village where there had once been a city. The people now making their own lousy little pots down by the river, where once they had been able to buy excellent ones from traders who came through all the time. The people who once were free citizens of Rome and now found themselves serfs, bound to the land as if they were slaves, and forced to serve barbarian chiefs masquerading as “kings” but unable even to speak Latin or read.

The record is clear: It was a dark age by any rational measure, and it took a thousand years to bring the economy back to the level it had been at under the protection of the Roman Army.

Is This a General Principle?

Ward-Perkins’s analysis of the fall of Rome is piercing and explains the evidence better than any of the competing stories. But that doesn’t mean there are any general principles here for us to learn from. We have no vast hordes of barbarians waiting to invade and take over. (Quiet, you who think Mexicans are the barbarian invasion. They’re just another wave of immigrants.)

It happens that there are other examples of this kind of collapse. In the opening chapter of Michael Grant’s The Rise of the Greeks , Grant, like Ward-Perkins, looks at the archaeological evidence surrounding the fall of the Minoan and Mycenaean civilizations.

They did not fall at exactly the same time — but then, the different parts of the Roman economy did not all fall at once, either. What Grant finds, though, is that an international economic system that functioned smoothly throughout the Aegean and eastern Mediterranean, despite blips like the Trojan War, staggered to a complete collapse.

Starting in the late 1200s bce, a “prolonged series of destructive movements of peoples” (i.e., barbarian invasions) swept through the area. It seemed to be closely related to the fall of the Hittite empire in Asia minor, though whether the barbarian invasions toppled the Hittites, or the fall of the Hittites provided a power vacuum into which barbarians swept is hard to determine from our present vantage point.

What is unarguable is that a high level of arts and crafts staggered downward, getting shoddier all the time; meanwhile, pollen counts showed a drastic drop in crop production, suggesting an equally drastic crash in populations sustained by local farming.

Once again, as with the fall of the Roman West, there were areas that held out a little longer or that recovered more quickly. But in this case, the collapse came in an international system. In other words, it wasn’t a single empire falling, it was a mutually dependent system of neighboring nations and city-states that plunged into chaos.

The whole eastern Mediterranean felt the shock. Egypt and Syria had the economic wherewithal (and the robust neighbors) to absorb the shock and recover — though the invading Philistines remained a permanent feature of the Palestinian coast (that’s where the name “Palestine” comes from).

So it wasn’t just Rome. It has happened before, and the footprints of collapse look remarkably similar.

Trade breaks down as merchants lose confidence and markets are disrupted by barbarian invaders. When this happens, specialization becomes impossible, local areas must become agriculturally and militarily self-sufficient again, and between disease, famine, war, and emigration, populations crash.

Could It Happen to Us?

For a century, America has been the great cushion to absorb the shocks that might have brought down western civilization. In the Great War (WWI), Europe crashed its own population through war and then crashed further through the influenza epidemic. But the American economy provided the means for France and Britain — but not Germany — to recover. Arguably, it was the failure to include Germany in the recovery that led to repeated economic crises, and when America finally joined Europe with its own Depression in the 1930s, the stage was set for the next barbarian invasion.

It wasn’t inappropriate for Hitler’s Germans to be called “the Hun.” They may have claimed to be conquering, but in fact they were destroying. Yes, they built factories in some of their conquered and allied lands, but they were chewing up the Slavic population by enslaving and slaughtering them, and they were eliminating much of their own intellectual and merchant class by killing the Jews, who had been disproportionately responsible for the German economy and culture.

In the aftermath of WWII, once again America was the economic cushion — only this time the portion of Germany under western occupation was included in the economic recovery, as was Japan.

The result, over the past sixty years, has been a pax Americana covering much of the world. And the world has prospered fantastically wherever the American military sustained it.

Let me say that again: As with Rome, the American military has been the wall behind which a system of safe trade has allowed an extraordinary degree of specialization and therefore mutually sustained prosperity.

America has not been imperial — we have not been stripping other countries. On the contrary, those nations that were able to sustain the internal peace necessary for production, and that have joined the economy presided over by America, have all been able to join in the prosperity as equals.

We don’t tax them — quite the opposite. We have taxed ourselves to pay for the military protection that maintained the safety and perception of safety that allowed the European community and Japan to flourish. Their welfare economies are only possible because they did not have to pay for their own defense at anything like the levels we have paid.

People talk about America’s enormous defense budget as if it were a menace to the world. But our enormous defense budget has allowed Japan and Europe — and Taiwan and South Korea — to thrive without having to invest much of their gross domestic product in defense.

For a long time, the Communist nations remained holdouts, remaining outside the wall of American security and struggling to subvert the economic system that was bringing prosperity to the free world.

Russia and China both had the delusion that they could simply choose to join the system, and we’ve certainly cooperated. But Russia failed to maintain the basic internal public safety that would have allowed trade to flourish and the economy to boom — it was simply too corrupt and too dangerous to do business in Russia. Putin’s response to this problem has been to restore dictatorship in all but name — and to recentralize the economy instead of providing the law enforcement to allow a decentralized market to function properly. The result will be further economic decline — which will, of course, be blamed on America.

China took a different road, maintaining ironclad control over their population. But, as Mark Steyn points out in his convincing and entertaining book America Alone: The End of the World As We Know It , China is heading toward a demographic crisis. Because of their one-child rule and the people’s response of aborting girl babies, they have a generation that has nearly two men for every woman. This is a recipe for revolution and/or aggressive war — it is safe to say that China will not have the right conditions for peaceful trade in a few years, for one reason or another. Naturally, they will blame America too.

Isn’t it odd that they all blame us for everything wrong in the world? But that’s the price you pay for being the most generous, patient, beneficent empire the world has ever known. We have not taxed anyone but our home population; we allow them to be self-governing and thumb their noses at us; we pay them for the privilege of putting the troops that protect them on their soil.

Only a handful of nations — most notably Britain — have shouldered any part of the burden of defense against the barbarians.

For the barbarians are at the gates again. No, they’re inside the gates. Throughout Europe, as Steyn demonstrates with his piercing analysis of demographics, Muslim radicals are already holding public policy hostage. Enslaved as they are by Muslim-controlled oil, European nations cannot afford to resist the increasingly absurd and civilization-destroying demands of their large and growing Muslim minorities.

Meanwhile, the Muslim world is reproducing at an enormous rate, while Europe and Japan are committing demographic suicide, producing less than 1.5 children per family — a rate that halves the population each generation. How long before the Muslim minority becomes the majority? How long before Europe is either Muslim or fighting a vicious war to expel or destroy the Muslims they have invited among them — Muslims who are committed to destroying every aspect of Western culture that produces the prosperity they moved there to take part in?

Welcome to My Nightmare

Here’s how it happens: America stupidly and immorally withdraws from the War on Terror, withdrawing prematurely from Iraq and leaving it in chaos. Emboldened, either Muslims unite against the West (unlikely) or collapse in a huge war between Shiites and Sunnis (already beginning). It almost doesn’t matter, because in the process the oil will stop flowing.

And when the oil stops flowing, Europe and Japan and Taiwan and Singapore and South Korea all crash economically; Europe then has to face the demands of its West-hating Muslim “minority” without money and without the ruthlessness or will to survive that would allow them to counter the threat. The result is accommodation or surrender to Islam. The numbers don’t lie — it is not just possible, it is likely.

America doesn’t crash right away, mind you. But we still have a major depression, because we have nowhere to sell our goods. And depending on what our desperate enemies do, it’s a matter of time before we crash as well.

Why? Because we’re that Syrian village. Except that what we make is food — enough to feed half the world.

What we don’t make for ourselves anymore is … everything else. We don’t produce steel. We don’t make most of our own computer equipment. We have exported our textile industry.

Some of these industries could recover. But they would be producing only for domestic consumption. We’d have nowhere to sell anything except to ourselves. That’s when we find out just how much of our new “service” economy is smoke and mirrors, dependent entirely on the surpluses generated by the global system of trade.

And our own oil production cannot meet the demands of transportation and production at current levels. Rationing will cripple us. We will not be able to maintain our huge fleet of trucks. Air travel will becoming shockingly expensive and airlines will fail or consolidate. We won’t even be allowed to drive our cars on long trips because gasoline will be rationed.

We will go back to the rails. Only we won’t have the money to rebuild and refurbish the railroad system — it will only be able to limp along.

It will look, even inside the United States, amazingly like the shrinkage that happened at the time of the fall of Rome.

Then, and only then, will America look — and be — vulnerable to any kind of intervention from the south. Economies that are still somewhat primitive will recover faster than economies that are absolutely dependent on specialization.

It takes two generations for the dark ages to reach America. But they will come, if we allow this nightmare to begin. Because once you reach the tipping point, there’s no turning back, as the Emperor Justinian discovered.

Our global economic system is a brilliant creation, imperfect of course, but powerful and effective in creating more prosperity for more people than ever in the history of the world. It is a creation of America’s military and America’s benign government of the world — so benign they pretend we don’t govern it.

Our enemies and most of our “allies” and many of our own citizens are working as hard as possible to bring the whole thing crashing down, though that is not at all what they intend.

They just haven’t learned the lessons — the principles — of how great economic empires are maintained. They only look at the political dogmas du jour and spout their platitudes. People like me are ridiculed for seeing the big picture and learning the lessons of history.

And if we’re lucky, and get out of this intact — i.e., if we go ahead and continue this war, break the power of Iran and Syria, and inflict crushing defeat on radical, expansionist Islamicists (which will require that Europe do the same with their own increasingly revolutionary Muslim populations, either expelling them or crushing their radical, Saudi-funded leadership) — then I will still be ridiculed, because there will be no evidence that I would have been right.

Well, I’ll be happy to be ridiculed for being such a doomsayer, if we are able to avoid collapse. I want to be wrong.

Read these books for yourself:

Bryan Ward-Perkins, The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization. Many of his pages are devoted to refuting books you haven’t read and needn’t bother reading, like the Julia M.H. Smith book. But by the end, his analysis is as clear and as fully proven as anything in Jared Diamond’s pivotal book Guns, Germs, and Steel — and should serve Americans as just as much of a wake-up call.

Mark Steyn, America Alone: The End of the World As We Know It. Steyn is a gun-totin’ anti-big-government conservative, and especially toward the end, he tries to tie his whole belief system into the argument. Ignore that — it takes about five seconds to tear apart his “individuals do it better than governments” nostrums with actual thought. (For instance: Do you really think we’d protect our borders better through vigilantism? Can’t wait for the lynchings, can you?)

What counts in his book is his piercing, well-supported argument, based on demographics and evidence about what Muslim populations actually believe and are allowing to be done in their name. It is impossible to make useful predictions without the information he presents here.

Meanwhile … merry Christmas. Remember to eat, drink, and be merry.

1. There is nothing inherently “Third World” about tribalism. On the contrary, it is universal.

2. The vast majority of non-Whites in Europe and Europe’s settler societies are complicit in the race and ethnicity-based competition for resources, social status, etc. Complicity is not conspiracy, but the percentage of non-Whites not involved in some form or another is small enough to be statistically insignificant.

3. Conservatism is a failed ideology because it was a reaction to the Enlightenment. While liberalism was individualistic and egalitarianism was communitarian, both threatened the continuity of existing institutions – the monarchy, aristocracy, church and state. Conservatism ultimately co-opted liberalism in order to endure, while maintaining a communitarian leaning by appealing to religion and nationalism. Now that Westerners can no longer agree upon the basis for communitarian affinity beyond civil definitions, conservatism is now liberalism for special interests. Liberalism fails when it is impure – whether it is co-opted by the right or left. However, given that the response to the social and demographic challenges facing the West must be communitarian, so too must the ideology driving it. It is high time to make a decision one way or another – for the individual or the group. In times of crisis, having both is a luxury ill afforded.

4. Appealing to the American constitution now is not unlike appealing to a rock for answers. Conservatives still cling to the notion that we can return to the past, when Europe was for Europeans, no one cursed, etc., etc. Those times are over.

Predictions, future of West (mainly Alpine/Central Europe) Pt 7

China has peacefully organized a kind of political-customs union with Chinese-dominant populations in Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and the Philippines, without firing a shot, simply because China has become such a dominant global force that, unlike the United States in its own heyday in the 1960’s, is also demographically secure. While China does allow in small numbers of very high-skilled and accomplished individuals from elsewhere in Asia, Africa, Europe and an increasingly turbulent Australia and North America, they are encouraged to return home after working for several years. China does not allow mass immigration of people who refuse to work and are simply seeking turf, a lesson that Britain, Australia and North America were unable to learn– instead, its labor needs are met with increasingly sophisticated robotics, ethnic Chinese Diaspora returning home, and somewhat higher birth-rate Filipinos and Vietnamese, who ultimately blend in with little difficulty. Also, the Chinese are not so obsessed with illusory, constant economic growth that they threaten their demographic and cultural foundations as North America did, and while the Chinese government has some democratic features, it selects its leaders on the basis of performance and achievement, without being vulnerable to the kind of short-term thinking, media stupidity and polarization that has done so much damage to so many Western democracies.

China is determined not to repeat the disastrous demographic blunders of Britain, the USA, Canada, Australia and Sweden, so even as the Chinese achieve great and extraordinary technological advances in medicine, space exploration and increasingly sophisticated computer technology, demographically they stay Chinese. The One Child Policy had never been fully applied to high birth rate rural regions of the country and, in any case, it is repealed for good by the year 2011, as China’s population stabilizes.

What’s left of high Western civilization and culture is by now centered in Central Europe and the Alpine bloc, with Austria and Germany (basically along the lines of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire) serving as the main focus. The catastrophe of World War I, and of the British and American involvement in it (with subsequent destruction and loss of the European overseas empires), becomes readily apparent in its awful aftermath a century-and-a-half hence. German becomes the main language for what remains of Western scientific and cultural leadership, and a German lingua franca for business, diplomacy and cultural exchange becomes common (even as French still retains some cachet for couture and cuisine). However, China and the Chinese language far exceed anything produced out of Western centers.

The Alpine bloc, having pulled through the crisis, also begins to attract embittered White emigrants from North America and Australia who’ve seen their countries fall apart. The Alpine bloc in turn begins, gingerly and cautiously, to try to unify the remnants of the West in a scientific and technological culture which, if still far behind the output of a vigorous and entrepreneurial China, will at least begin the long and difficult road to a recovery of the battered West, finally beginning to awake from a crisis that began in 1914. While German and the West in general are far from ever matching the entrepreneurial and technological prowess of China and the Chinese, the Rump West hopes that its engineers and scientists will be able to reach greater heights of creativity in its science and technology than the Chinese, in analogy to the period of the European Scientific Revolutions starting in the 1600’s.

The Rump West now has modified, but still strict immigration and entry guidelines, and cultural solidarity, along the lines of Japan– hospitable and welcoming to strangers outside Europe, allowing for strictly enforced temporary stays of highly-educated and skilled non-Westerners, and very small numbers of high achievers to stay permanently. But following in the footsteps of Japan and China, the Rump West centered in the Alpine bloc is determined to never repeat the same mistakes that have, by now, ruined Britain and North America. A pro-Natalist, partly Christian resurging returns to the Rump West, stabilizing the population, even as dwindling oil supplies demand a very careful rebalancing of growth and ecological priorities. A small remnant of a now-partitioned North America attempts to rebuild a portion of Western civilization there, although the devastation wrought by the turmoil of the previous 3 decades pushes the best and the brightest from North America to migrate to the Alpine bloc.

Predictions, future of West (mainly Alpine/Central Europe) Pt 6

2045: Russia, buffeted by decades of catastrophically low fertility, high mortality among ethnic Russians (cheap vodka still doing its damage), and rapid immigration and high birth rates of inflowing Tajiks and Kazakhs recruited for cheap labor like Mexicans in the USA, is now forced to confront its own demographic crisis, as the predominantly Muslim Turkic population reaches near-parity with the generally older native Russian population. Russia, furthermore, is stunned by the demographic shock waves sweeping through North America, Australia and especially Britain which– unlike the White settler nations– has been a White nation for millennia, now suddenly under control of a mostly Muslim, South Asian leadership. The mismanaged, corruption-prone Russian economy has been largely deprived of profits from Russia’s natural resource wealth, leading to massive riots and civil unrest across the vast land that the authorities in Moscow are completely unable to control.

Desperate for cash and on the brink of political and social collapse, the Russian government sells off portions of the Russian Far East to China, Japan and Korea, in roughly equal portions to make sure that none of them gains too much at the expense of the others– while still retaining the most oil-rich and mineral-rich portions of Siberia. (The Chinese and Korean populations in particular, are deeply angered at first by what they feel is their government’s wasteful expenditure of tens of billions of Euros for what they see as “agriculturally-poor wasteland” from Russia, similar to Americans’ reactions to “Seward’s icebox” in Alaska in the late 1860’s, but the government in Beijing mollifies the people’s irritation by suggesting that it is a reclamation of lost Qing Dynasty territory, even if of very little actual value.)

Meanwhile, in the West, Russia sells off the Kaliningrad exclave to Germany (in a joint move with Belarus, which sells off parts of its own largely worthless western lands to Germany/EU), in the wake of greatly warming relations with Germany that had been initiated by Germany’s pro-Russian Chancellor Edmund Stoiber, following the fall of Angela Merkel’s government in the wake of the global economic crisis in 2008 and the German people’s general anger with Merkel’s perceived excessive pro-USA stance. Russia also sells off portions of its northwest corridor to Finland and a surprisingly resilient Estonia, the new “Balkan tiger.”

The cash infusion provides Russia with enough capital to attract the remaining ethnic Russians still in other Central Asian and Baltic countries, with a new government-centered push, “Russian work done by the Russian people,” finally allowing Russia to move away from dependence on hiring cheap-labor Muslim Tajiks and Kazakhs. Many of the Turkic peoples still in Russia are literally bought off in return for going back to their home countries, while others (especially those in jail) are deported.

The rump Russia survives as a Western nation, but still facing economic straits, and with a roiled and still heavily Muslim southwestern/Caspian region.

2050: The shock and turmoil of “the fall of Britain,” the similar collapse of Western society in Canada, the USA and Australia, and the ongoing crises in Sweden and Russia, have fully awakened Continental Europe from its PC-induced slumber, as the effects of demographic naivete become painfully obvious to all. As an emergency measure, immigration is limited either to intra-European movements (excluding the now majority-Muslim England), or to co-ethnic Diaspora in the Western Hemisphere (such as ethnic Italians, Germans, Dutch and others in what’s left of North America and South American countries). By now, China has become the unquestioned global economic and technological center, and the remainder of the West desperately seeks to master the Mandarin Chinese language (which is fortunately published in the Roman alphabet alongside the old-fashioned Chinese characters) to keep up with advances in science, business and technology.

Predictions, future of West (mainly Alpine/Central Europe) Pt 5

So the tough truth is this: Over the next 40 years, some Western countries will collapse as Western countries (mainly Britain, Sweden, the USA, Canada, Australia, possibly also Russia), while others will not. And the survivors will be shocked enough by the fall of the other Western countries to take their demographic status seriously.

Here’s a possible timeline:

2020: Scotland finally becomes independent, at which point a newly independent England and Wales is shocked to discover that it has a South Asian/African (predominantly Muslim) majority population.

2025: Canada’s “mid-decade census” shows a majority South Asian/Muslim population, much like Britain.

2030: The USA becomes majority non-White based on the 2030 census, as Latinos consolidate their hold on the US Southwest, and both Latinos and African-Americans consolidate political control over their regions in the Southeast. Michigan becomes “Michiganistan,” a Muslim-majority state with autonomous status. Hawaii regains its independence after years of campaigning by indigenous Hawaiians, with Guam and Puerto Rico following suit. The United States, in serious financial trouble from decades of foolish imperial overextension and warfare-welfare excesses, all but sells off its Pacific Ocean island possessions to raise cash. Conservative and liberal Whites– the former headquartered in the Upper South (Kentucky, Tennessee and West Virginia, as the Deep South is now majority African-American), Great Plains and Montana/Wyoming/Idaho, and the latter with their power base in New England, are nearly at war with each other, and move toward mutual secession.

2035: Australia now declares its own non-White, heavily Muslim majority in the mid-decade census, of predominantly Malay stock (Muslim Malaysians and Indonesians), and supplemented by Lebanese, South Asians and Sudanese. With China now the world’s unquestioned superpower, both economically and technologically, the ethnic Chinese in Australia become the new economic and political elite as Australia’s White population continues to dwindle. Nevertheless, Australia is facing almost intractable challenges of drought and water management, which leads to political instability and further infrastructure disrepair. The still-predominantly White southwestern portion of Australia, headquartered at Perth, moves to secede from the predominantly non-White eastern Australia and aboriginal-dominated northern Territories.

Meanwhile, England has its first Muslim, Pakistani prime minister, and as the remaining White population deserts the now largely-devastated England for new homes mostly in Alpine Europe, a South Asian elite takes hold in England. In the South Asian and Muslim world, this is seen as “just desserts” for past British imperialism and a great victory for the “Global South,” which now has effective control of a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The rest of Europe is appalled and the PC arrogance permeating the Continent finally collapses for good, with peddlers of PC orthodoxy removed from positions of political and media power as the disastrous consequences of their muddled thinking become inescapably obvious in Britain, North America and Australia. They contemplate expelling England from the EU and closing off their borders– on the pretext that England (which is distinct from the UK, which joined originally), now a Muslim land, had never been a party to the Maastricht Treaty. Their decision is made easy, since the new leaders in London, flush with confidence and posturing, withdraw from the EU themselves, attempting to display to the world that their “island of Muslim prosperity” in England will be a new global power.

2040: Sweden, shocked by the demographic decline and collapse of Britain and North America, finally realizes the grievous blunders committed by its leftist, PC-addled politicians in previous decades, moving to halt further non-European immigration and to expel millions of Africans and Asians on the basis of “economic nonproductivity.” While the Swedes are ultimately successful in preserving their demographic majority, the sudden move toward repatriation precipitates a smoldering civil war that devastates Sweden, almost ruining it economically.

Predictions, future of West (mainly Alpine/Central Europe) Pt 4

IOW, even though France has done almost everything wrong, they’ve been lucky and they too will emerge from this crisis intact as a Western nation. Not quite as strong as the Alpine bloc, but they’ll do fine. I’d say the same is true in general for Norway and Finland, for similar historical reasons. (Sweden is the anomaly here, apparently embracing the PC extremes of Canada and Australia even though Sweden’s colonial history is in Russia, not in Africa or Western Asia where their immigrant wave is coming from. Sweden may pull through OK, if for no other reason than that they’ve started the mass immigration process late, and the Global South is a little iffy on going to the cold reaches of the Arctic circle, even given Swedish welfare. But I wouldn’t put any krone on that.)

What about the Netherlands and Belgium? A toss-up IMHO. The Low Countries seem to have been infected with much of the worst of PC multiculturalism and Proposition Nation stupidity, as your own examples above suggest. Still, the Netherlands in particular has a much stronger strain of nationalism than anywhere in North America or Australia, and in fact the Dutch have among the toughest immigration laws in Europe. The assassination of Theo van Gogh enraged the Dutch in a similar way as “les emeutes” enraged the French– mosques were burned and torn down across the Netherlands in anger. And Holland itself is a rather miserable place for Muslims, who are not only banned from wearing the headscarf, but have to pay thousands of Euros even before getting to the Netherlands, to take a difficult exam, watch almost pornographic material, and generally learn that they aren’t welcome. (Which is maybe why so many of the French and Dutch Muslims are leaving to go to Britain, Canada or Australia…)

And Belgium? Again, the Walloon-Flemish conflict probably doesn’t help things much, but it’s qualitatively different from the mutual Scottish-English hatefest, in that unlike in Britain, the two sides don’t want to ruin each other as much as they want to be free of each other. Belgium has a genuine nationalist party with the Vlaams– something we’d never see in North America or Britain– and I found most Flemings to be very nationalistic when I was there. In fact, among Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, seems like a disproportionate number are going to Flanders rather than to the Netherlands as South Africa falls apart. For similar reasons, the Walloons are also pretty nationalistic, even though it’s the more maddening and spottily effective French-style nationalism.

The best thing for Belgium IMHO is for the Flemings, the Walloons, and the small German enclave in eastern Belgium to basically become self-governing– which I guess to some extent is happening anyway. This would be the best way to guarantee their ethnic solidarity.

And regardless, the current financial crisis is itself helping to impose a check on the most idiotic PC stupidity in the Netherlands and Belgium (who have been particularly hard-hit). They’re realizing that, in fact, they can’t run a welfare state and support Third World deadbeats since they can’t push themselves so deeply into debt. With the collapse of this rather ridiculous “Anglosphere bubble,” with the fantasy of unlimited credit for welfare, military adventurism and loan-shark economy, other countries (like the Low Countries and France) are being pushed more toward common sense.

I don’t see a Western future for the White settler nations, in any case. The United States already has a majority non-White (predominantly African-American and Latino) population among elementary school students, so we can easily see the future there, and it’s not European. The US Southwest, and even much of the Southeast, will be majority Latino or Black, and essentially distinct from the rest of the country.

Australia is busy taking in millions of Sudanese, Somalis, South Asians, Filipinos, Indonesians and Malaysians, all imported onto the world’s most barren continent where the White population has already well passed the demographic transition. Australia’s future is therefore probably not Western, at least in most of the country– it’s more of a SE Asian Muslim character, something like Malaysia with an East Asian (Chinese and Vietnamese) elite class.

Canada has both among the highest per-capita Third World immigration rates in the world, with among the lowest native birth rates. Canada will likely be a Muslim/African/South Asian majority country fairly soon, with a Chinese-dominated West Coast.

The sad thing is, on an individual level, vast majority of people from these Third World countries are entirely decent, kind, good people. Problem is, when they stream into a Western country in very high numbers, tribal interests inevitably set in, with all kinds of intertribal ugliness as we’ve seen elsewhere in the world. And our Gramscian elites actively foment such group conflict.

Predictions, future of West (mainly Alpine/Central Europe) Pt 3

Britain has the bad luck of having a past imperial association with South Asia, as well as West and southern Africa, and portions of the Middle East (in particular Iraq and Yemen)– all places with very high birth rate, non-European populations (Muslim or otherwise) who retain their very high birth rates and customs generations after moving to Britain. These weren’t necessarily, in any way “strong colonies” of the British– the Afghans for example defeated the British like few other powers, annihilating an entire British army in the mid-1800s, and British imperial attempts in Iraq (the 1922 rebellion and eventual expulsion) and in the portion of Yemen that they ruled (the Aden Emergency) were generally disastrous. Still, that past association, however tenuous, is enough to basically fling the UK’s doors open to mass immigration from these countries, due to the “Pod” mentality in British media and the Lib-Lab-Con coalition’s utter supine capitulation to political correctness. And this mass wave of peoples from the Global South is not only very physically different from the native British, but also extremely distinct, often even outright hostile, religiously and culturally.

To make matters worse, in terms of pure numbers, Britain has by far the highest inflows in Europe (700,000-800,000 annually, almost all from South Asia, Africa and the Caribbean) and also the highest outflows of native Britons, with emigration levels approaching half a million annually (with Britons going especially to France, Spain, Germany, Italy or the Low Countries these days). This makes the problem even worse, since the Lib-Lab-Con major party coalition in the UK must pander to the fast-growing South Asian/African population, at the expense of the native White Britons. (Furthermore, millions among the “native-born Britons” are of Caribbean or Pakistani descent themselves.) And the BNP in Britain is virtually powerless, due to the power-sharing and coalition practices in British policies.

Among the British themselves, the English and the Scottish in particular utterly HATE each other, with the Welsh and northern Irish having their own gripes. In fact I wonder on some level, if the utter demographic destruction of England in particular over the past decade, has been perpetrated in part by the so-called “Scottish Raj” leading the Labour Party, who see themselves as covertly continuing a fight that’s been waged since the days of William Wallace. So maybe the best thing for the UK would be for the Scots to gain their independence in the next decade, which in turn might allow for some nationalist sentiment to percolate in England and Wales.

Still, Britain, and England in particular, is disappearing as a Western country, and it is probably too late to stop the process.

But France? As much as the French have royally screwed up nearly everything on this topic, I actually suspect they’ll wind up fine. Part of this, is that the Muslims in France vastly overplayed their hand– those riots in the Paris banlieues so enraged even Socialist-leaning French, that France over the past 3 years has actually passed among the toughest and most stringent immigration laws in the West. While I find Sarkozy to basically be a snake, he is indeed much tougher on mass immigration than any of his predecessors.

For another, immigration into France is generally misunderstood, as I found out when I worked there. A very, very large minority of the Syrians, Lebanese, Tunisians and Algerians in France are of Christian Arab stock and Jewish immigrants, not Muslims, so the oft-quoted figure of “4-5 million Muslims in France” is actually a lot lower when the demographic/religious mix from Arab countries is taken into account. While these immigrants– unlike the Turks in Central Europe– are physically distinct from the native population in France, the discrepancy is nowhere near as extreme as in Britain, where the South Asian, African and Caribbean population differs so much physically and culturally from the White Britons. Many Syrians and North Africans, especially the Christians, trace their descent to the Romans or even to the Germans (e.g. the Vandals, who set up a North African kingdom), and so a large proportion of the North Africans and Arabs, physically speaking, are physically indistinguishable from, say, Sicilians or Greek Islanders. (See e.g. Zinedine Zidane and other French soccer players.)

Predictions, future of West (mainly Alpine/Central Europe) Pt 2

As an example, check out these Turkish models: http://forum.politics.be/showthread.php?p=3707733

If you didn’t tell me offhand that they were Turkish, I would have guessed that these models had hailed from somewhere in Northern Europe, such as the Czech Republic or maybe Latvia, or perhaps northern Italy or the more Balkan mountainous regions of Greece. Now, I realize that the people who become models don’t necessarily reflect the physical characteristics of the population as a whole, but in my experience throughout Central Europe, the rank-and-file Turks didn’t look *that* different in their essentials from the models on that Webpage– maybe a little more toward the Tuscan Italian/Western Greek spectrum in terms of appearance. But still, the Central European Turks overall didn’t look altogether too much different from the stocky Alpine peoples in southern Germany or Austria.

Now, I realize that physical appearance isn’t everything, and that too large a population inflow could still culturally swamp out European Christian lands– which is why I don’t remotely support the idea of Turkey acceding to the European Union, and nor do the vast majority of Austrians and Germans. (Fortunately, for once, the EU did something right by requiring unanimous assent to any such accession, which Cyprus, Austria, France and many others in Europe– many of which would even demand referenda– would never allow. Ireland rejected the Lisbon Treaty, in fact, precisely because the Irish have no interest in flooding their small country with millions of Turks.)

Still, in manageable numbers, it’s fairly easy for these very European-appearing Turks– especially Christian and secular Turks– to blend into German and Austrian society almost as well as the Czechs, Poles and Estonians have, and I found quite a few amusing examples of Turks “being more German than the Germans themselves” when I was working there. Germany has recently gotten very tough about its immigration policies, not only reducing overall Turkish immigration sharply, but effectively shutting out deadbeat Turks period (and also kicking out those Turkish Gastarbeiter who don’t contribute).

So in summary– Central European/Alpine countries, particularly Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, Austria and probably Italy, will be just fine. Despite their own flirtations with addle-headed US/UK-style multiculturalism, they’re historically lucky in having relatively few immigration links with Africa and Asia, focusing more on Eastern Europe, and in general on having a much more nationalistic streak than Western European nations. I do realize that their birth rate is below replacement, but I’m not worried about that– historically, many countries have had periods of sub-replacement fertility, but that only matters if they use the period to demographically replace themselves (as the USA and UK are doing) with a different racial/ethnic group. OTOH, Central Europe and Japan, which all have sub-replacement fertility, will just ride out the period as such nations have in the past– their populations will shrink a bit, but then more pro-Natalist attitudes will kick in, and the population will stabilize. (Meanwhile being filled in somewhat with Eastern European and Balkan stock.)

This, naturally, then leads us to ask: What of the future for Western European nations like France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium and Scandinavia, which is more where you’re focusing on? Here, it’s a mixed story.

As I mentioned, countries like Britain, the Netherlands and France suffer from “post-imperial hangovers” in which, to compensate for their sense of feebleness and lost glory, they pretend that they’re still “world nations” and have opened their borders up to their respective former colonies. This, combined with their dangerous absorption of US-style political correctness (which is truly oppressive in the UK, Canada and Australia) and proposition-nation confusion, has weakened the nationalistic bonds that have enabled them to stay strong as nations for so many centuries. Still, the severity of the problem varies from country to country.

Great Britain, I’m sorry to say, is on the brink of ruin and demographic takeover. It pains me to say it– while I’m galled by the foolish, self-destructive policies of the United Kingdom over the past century, I still love that country and the potential of its people. But I have to call it like it is, and I’ve spent more months working in Britain (in England in particular) than any other European country. And England is facing disaster, demographically speaking.

Predictions, future of West (mainly Alpine/Central Europe) Pt 1

Takuan,

Just wanted to add something to your excellent comments here (which I hope are reprinted across the Web), as I’ve worked not only in the USA and Canada but about 2 dozen other mainly Western countries:

I actually think that at least a big chunk of Europe is in much better shape long-term than the United States, Canada and Australia. This is in part because nationalism in general has more “room to maneuver” in European countries than in North America and Australia. Possibly because Europeans in Europe are genuinely indigenous– while North America and Australia are settler nations (with a different indigenous population) and obviously much less of a European history. (Although there are exceptions, as I’ll talk about below.)

I know this is in some ways contradictory to what Fjordman has said, and certainly as an American it’s very different from what I used to think– but long-term, demographically, Europe (outside of the rapidly self-destructing and deluded UK and possibly Sweden and Russia) will pull through this, while most of the White settler nations will not.

Central Europe in particular, including the so-called “Alpine bloc” nations like Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Denmark, Luxembourg and probably Italy (nations on that longitude, at least), will probably wind up in the best shape. Historically speaking, for the most part they did not have maritime empires in Africa and/or South Asia like France, Belgium, Britain and the Netherlands, so their historical orientation is different to start with.

Whereas in the UK it seems depressingly “natural” to so much of the population, to have millions of Pakistanis, Zimbabweans, Somalis, Yemenis, Bangladeshis and other South Asians– who will very soon be the majority population in north and SE England– and in France, nobody is surprised by having so many Lebanese, Laotians and Vietnamese, it’s very different for the Alpine bloc.

For the Central European nations once in the Austro-Hungarian, Danish, Prussian or other similar empires, their historical orientation was toward Eastern Europe or Scandinavia rather than Africa or Asia, and that’s still where the focus is today. When I work stints in Austrian cities and quite a few places in the still-economically hurting (but fairly cheap) eastern Germany, I’m repeatedly surprised at how many “Austrians and Germans” I run into, who spoke perfect German, to me seem indistinguishable from the native-born– but then tell me they’re actually Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Estonians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians or Finns. This, in fact, is still the vast majority source of immigration to these countries today, and unlike in the UK (where the 2004 “one-off” opening of the borders to Poles has largely reversed, with the vast majority of Poles earning some extra pounds and then heading home as the UK economy has collapsed), among the Alpine bloc countries, those Eastern Europeans stay and basically blend in with the population.

When I looked at a list of instructors at the University of Graz on the one hand, and a list of moving company employees on the other, it was remarkable how the lists basically seemed to have Czech and Slovak names– even though they identified themselves as Austrians. I also noticed this with Denmark, which has a decent-sized Finnish and Baltic population.

The Turkish question inevitably comes up here, but on this too, I was very surprised when I worked and mingled with the locals. The Turks in Germany and Austria were disproportionately Christian– perhaps precisely because they were fleeing Muslim persecution in Turkey– and physically speaking, almost all the Turks were physically indistinguishable from European Mediterraneans like Italians, Greeks and Slovenians. If anything, I found more blond, blue-eyed/green-eyed/hazel-eyed Turks than I did Greeks or Sicilians! Part of this is that again, historically, the Central Asian Turkish invaders under Osman and the other sultans suffered such heavy losses, that they essentially reconstituted much of their armies with janissaries– who were basically Balkan or Germanic Christian children raised to be the tip of the Turkish spear, and admired as their bravest fighters. Plus, the preexisting Greek and Balkan population, dating from Byzantine times, basically stuck around (albeit at a lower economic status) to constitute a very large fraction of the eventual “Turkish” population.

Demographics and the Culture War

The implications of population decline


We moderns have gotten used to the slow, seemingly inexorable dissolution of traditional social forms, the family prominent among them. Yet the ever-decreasing size of the family may soon expose a fundamental contradiction in modernity itself. Fertility rates have been falling throughout the industrialized world for more than 30 years, with implications that are only just now coming into view. Growing population has driven the economy, sustained the welfare state, and shaped modern culture. A declining population could conceivably put the dynamic of modernization into doubt.

The question of the cultural and economic consequences of declining birthrates has been squarely placed on the table by four new books: The Empty Cradle: How Falling Birthrates Threaten World Prosperity and What to Do About It, by Phillip Longman; Fewer: How the New Demography of Depopulation Will Shape Our Future, by Ben Wattenberg; The Coming Generational Storm: What You Need to Know About America’s Economic Future, by Laurence J. Kotlikoff and Scott Burns; and Running On Empty: How the Democratic and Republican Parties Are Bankrupting Our Future and What Americans Can Do About It, by Peter G. Peterson. Longman and Wattenberg concentrate on the across-the-board implications of demographic change. Kotlikoff and Burns, along with Peterson, limn the economic crisis that could come in the absence of swift and sweeping entitlement reform.
Taken together, these four books suggest that we are moving toward a period of substantial social change whose tantalizing ideological implications run the gamut from heightened cultural radicalism to the emergence of a new, more conservative cultural era.

New demographics

Drawing on these books, let us first get a sense of the new demography. The essential facts of demographic decline discussed in all four are not in doubt. Global fertility rates have fallen by half since 1972. For a modern nation to replace its population, experts explain, the average woman needs to have 2.1 children over the course of her lifetime. Not a single industrialized nation today has a fertility rate of 2.1, and most are well below replacement level.

In Ben Franklin’s day, by contrast, America averaged eight births per woman. American birth rates today are the highest in the industrialized world — yet even those are nonetheless just below the replacement level of 2.1. Moreover, that figure is relatively high only because of America’s substantial immigrant population. Fertility rates among native born American women are now far below what they were even in the 1930s, when the Great Depression forced a sharp reduction in family size.
Population decline is by no means restricted to the industrial world. Remarkably, the sharp rise in American fertility rates at the height of the baby boom — 3.8 children per woman — was substantially above Third World fertility rates today. From East Asia to the Middle East to Mexico, countries once fabled for their high fertility rates are now falling swiftly toward or below replacement levels. In 1970, a typical woman in the developing world bore six children. Today, that figure is about 2.7. In scale and rapidity, that sort of fertility decline is historically unprecedented. By 2002, fertility rates in 20 developing countries had fallen below replacement levels. 2002 also witnessed a dramatic reversal by demographic experts at the United Nations, who for the first time said that world population was ultimately headed down, not up. These decreases in human fertility cover nearly every region of the world, crossing all cultures, religions, and forms of government.
Declining birth rates mean that societies everywhere will soon be aging to an unprecedented degree. Increasing life expectancy is also contributing to the aging of the world’s population. In 1900, American life expectancy at birth was 47 years. Today it is 76. By 2050, one out of five Americans will be over age 65, making the U.S. population as a whole markedly older than Florida’s population today. Striking as that demographic graying may be, it pales before projections for countries like Italy and Japan. The United Nations estimates that by 2050, 42 percent of all people in Italy and Japan will be aged 60 or older.
Can societies that old sustain themselves? That is the question inviting speculation. With fertility falling swiftly in the developing nations, immigration will not be able to ameliorate certain implications of a rapidly aging West. Even in the short or medium term, the aging imbalance cannot be rectified except through a level of immigration far above what Western countries would find politically acceptable. Alarmed by the problems of immigration and assimilation, even famously tolerant Holland has begun to turn away immigrants en masse — and this before the recent murder of filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, which has subsequently forced the questions of immigration and demography to the center of the Dutch political stage.
In short, the West is beginning to experience significant demographic changes, with substantial cultural consequences. Historically, the aged have made up only a small portion of society, and the rearing of children has been the chief concern. Now children will become a small minority, and society’s central problem will be caring for the elderly. Yet even this assumes that societies consisting of elderly citizens at levels of 20, 30, even 40 or more percent can sustain themselves at all. That is not obvious.
Population decline is also set to ramify geometrically. As population falls, the pool of potential mothers in each succeeding generation shrinks. So even if, well into the process, there comes a generation of women with a higher fertility rate than their mothers’, the momentum of population decline could still be locked in. Population decline may also be cemented into place by economics. To support the ever-growing numbers of elderly, governments may raise taxes on younger workers. That would make children even less affordable than they are today, decreasing the size of future generations still further.
If worldwide fertility rates reach levels now common in the developing world (and that is where they seem headed), within a few centuries, the world’s population could shrink below the level of America’s today. Of course, it’s unlikely that mankind will simply cease to exist for failure to reproduce. But the critical point is that we cannot reverse that course unless something happens to substantially increase fertility rates. And whatever might raise fertility rates above replacement level will almost certainly require fundamental cultural change.
Why does modern social life translate into the lower birth rates that spark all those wider implications? Urbanization is one major factor. In a traditional agricultural society, children are put to work early. They also inherit family land, using its fruits to care for aging parents. In a modern urban economy, on the other hand, children represent a tremendous expense, and one increasingly unlikely to be returned to parents in the form of wealth or care. With the growth of a consumer economy, potential parents are increasingly presented with a zero-sum choice between children and more consumer goods and services for themselves.
Along with urbanization, the other important factor depressing world fertility is the movement of women into the workforce — and the technological changes that have made that movement possible. By the time many professional women have completed their educations, their prime childbearing years have passed. Thus, a woman’s educational level is the best predictor of how many children she will have. As Wattenberg shows, worldwide, the correlation between falling female illiteracy and falling female fertility is nearly exact. And as work increasingly becomes an option for women, having a child  means not only heavy new expenses, but also the loss of income that a mother might otherwise have gained through work.
Technological change also stands behind the movement of women into the workforce. In a modern, knowledge-based economy, women suffer no physical disadvantage. The ability of women to work in turn depends upon the capacity of modern contraception, along with abortion, to control fertility efficiently. The sheer breadth and rapidity of world fertility decline implies that contraceptive technology has been a necessary condition of the change. Before fertility could be reliably controlled through medical technology, marriage and accompanying strictures against out-of-wedlock births were the key check on a society’s birth rate. Economic decline meant delayed marriage, and thus lower fertility. But contraceptive technology now makes it possible to efficiently control fertility within marriage. This turns motherhood into a choice. And what demographic decline truly shows is that when childbearing has become a matter of sheer choice, it has become less frequent.
The movement of population from tightly knit rural communities into cities, along with contraception, abortion, and the related entry of women into the workforce, explain many of the core cultural changes of the postmodern world. Secularism, individualism, and feminism are tied to a social system that discourages fertility. If a low-fertility world is unsustainable, then these cultural trends may be unsustainable as well. Alternatively, if these cultural trends cannot be modified or counterbalanced, human population appears on course to shrink ever more swiftly.

New economics?

Yet there are signs that the current balance of social forces is not sustainable and may well give way sooner rather than later. That, at any rate, is the view of Longman, Peterson, Kotlikoff and Burns. (Wattenberg is somewhat more sanguine about our ability to weather the coming challenge, although he does not directly address the more dystopic scenarios Peterson, Kotlikoff, and Burns float.) Broadly speaking, both the free market and the welfare state assume continual population growth. “Pay as you go” entitlements require ever-larger new generations to finance the retirement of previous generations. Longman argues that economic growth itself depends upon ever-increasing numbers of consumers and workers.

Population growth, he argues, drove the Industrial Revolution, and there has never been economic growth under conditions of population decline. Thus, for example, he ascribes Japan’s current economic troubles to its declining fertility. And though Longman doesn’t point to Germany, it us interesting to note that this particular low-fertility country is also struggling economically to the point of revisiting the famously shorter European work week — a phenomenon obviously related to the struggle to reduce the pensions promised to an aging population and premissed on more younger workers than actually came to exist.
Both Longman and Wattenberg raise the question of whether markets need population growth in order to thrive. As Wattenberg puts the point, it hardly makes sense to invest in a business whose pool of potential customers is shrinking. That much might be true, even if entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare were fully funded. But Social Security and Medicare are not fully funded. On the contrary, America’s massive unfunded entitlement programs have the potential to spark a serious social and economic crisis in the not too distant future. And the welfare state in the rest of the developed world is on even shakier economic ground.
The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the combined cost of Medicare and Medicaid alone will consume a larger share of the nation’s income in 2050 than the entire federal budget does today. By 2050, the combined cost of Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and interest on the national debt will rise to 47 percent of gross domestic product — more than double the level of expected federal revenues at the time. Without reform, all federal spending would eventually go to seniors. Obviously, the system will correct before we reach that point. But how?
Already, senior citizens vote at very high rates — reacting sharply to any potential cuts in benefits. As the baby boomers retire, the political weight of senior citizens will be vastly greater than it already is. Proposed pension reforms brought down French and Italian governments in the 1990s. Even China has been forced by large-scale protests and riots to back off from attempts to reduce retirement benefits.
In the absence of serious reform, we may be in for an economic “hard landing.” Peterson, Kotlikoff, and Burns warn of a spiraling financial crisis that could even lead to worldwide depression. Former Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul Volcker sees a 75 percent chance of an economic crisis of some sort within the next five years.
What might such a “meltdown” look like? Peterson, Kotlikoff, and Burns spin out essentially the same scenario. The danger is that investors might at some point decide that the United States will never rein in its deficit. Once investors see America’s deficits as out of control, they will assume their dollar-based securities will be eroded by inflation, higher interest rates, and a serious decline in the stock market. Should a loss of confidence cause leading investors to pull their money out of U.S. securities, it could set off a run on the dollar. That would create the very inflation, interest rate increases, and market decline that investors feared in the first place. Such has already happened in Argentina, which Kotlikoff and Burns use as a paradigm in which loss of investor confidence brought down the economy in a kind of self-fulfilling prophesy. The danger is that the United States and the rest of the industrialized world may already have entered the sort of debt trap common among Third World nations. A rapidly aging Japan is even more vulnerable than America, say Kotlikoff and Burns. They add that, should investors looking at teetering modern welfare states and the long-term demographic crisis bring down any of the advanced economies, the contagion could spread to others.
Are we really headed for a worldwide economic meltdown that will leave tens of millions of aging seniors languishing in substandard nursing homes while the rest of us suffer from long years of overtaxation, rising crime, and political instability? Kotlikoff and Burns say the prospect is all too real, and Peterson implies as much.
Yet there are also critics of such disaster scenarios. They argue that growth rates in the new information-based economy will likely be somewhat higher than in the past. Higher rates of economic growth will bring in enough revenue to offset the rising costs of entitlements. Medical advances are keeping older workers healthy and productive. Raise the retirement age by a couple of years, say many, and the expanded workforce would boost government revenues enough to offset shrinkage in the number of younger workers.
Peterson, Kotlikoff, and Burns say these fixes won’t work. Despite increased life expectancy, older workers have generally been retiring earlier. It would be politically difficult to force them in the other direction. And according to Kotlikoff and Burns, delayed retirement produces negligible gains for the economy. When people work longer, they save less because they have fewer years of retirement to finance. The effects cancel out. Overall investment in the economy is reduced, as is the real wage base available for government taxation.
Kotlikoff and Burns also argue that the apparent productivity gains of the late nineties were illusory. Peterson argues that, even if productivity gains prove real, the benefit for the deficit will be canceled out by increases in discretionary spending.
The truth is, no one knows what future productivity will be. There’s a chance rates will turn higher on into the future, yet it seems imprudent to rely on luck with the stakes so high. And as Peterson, Kotlikoff, and Burns point out, so long as Social Security is indexed to wages, revenue gains from higher productivity will be canceled out by increased benefits. Even an ideal growth scenario cannot solve the entitlement crisis unless Social Security is indexed to prices rather than wages. It would seem that politically difficult reform and significant de facto benefit cuts are inevitable even on the most optimistic of reckonings. And the optimistic scenarios themselves seem strained.
What about the pessimistic scenarios? It would be foolish to predict with certainty an economic “hard landing,” much less world-wide depression. Still, the case that these are at least real possibilities seems strong. Even without a “meltdown,” long-term prospects for the economy and the welfare state in rapidly aging societies seem uncertain at best. How exactly will nations like Japan or Italy be able to function when more than 40 percent of their citizens are over 60? Hard landing or not, and the political power of the elderly notwithstanding, there seems a very real chance that America’s entitlement programs will someday be substantially scaled back. But what sort of struggle between the old and the young will emerge in the meantime, and how will a massive and relatively impoverished older generation cope with the change?
The Coming Generational Storm and Running On Empty are important books. Whether or not the reader is ultimately persuaded by these premonitions of economic peril, it’s time the United States had a serious debate over entitlement reform. Nonetheless, there is also something problematic in the way that Peterson, Kotlikoff, and Burns place the lion’s share of blame for our problems on our political leadership. True, both parties deserve to be chastised for running from the entitlement crisis. Yet even if Peterson, Burns, and Kotlikoff are right about that, they put too much blame on politicians for what broader cultural and demographic forces have wrought. Peterson nods to demography as the background condition for the deficit dilemma yet barely explores the link. Kotlikoff and Burns have much more to say about the demographic details yet treat our changed fertility patterns as irreversible and therefore irrelevant to policy.
That is a questionable assumption. The growing expense of child-rearing, for example, plays a key role in holding birth rates down. Peterson, Kotlikoff, and Burns are quick to criticize the push for lower taxes, yet rising taxes arguably helped to deepen the population decline at the root of our economic dilemma. In 1955, at the height of the baby boom, a typical one-earner family paid 17.3 percent of its income in taxes. Today, a median family with one paycheck pays 37.6 percent of its income in taxes — 39 percent if it’s a two-earner couple. So the new demography has put us into an economic trap. High taxes depress birth rates, but low taxes expand demographically driven deficits still further.
Precisely because we are at an unprecedented demographic watershed, politicians have no model for taking these factors into account. Political leaders in an earlier era could take it for granted that ever-growing populations would keep the welfare state solvent and the economy humming. It’s not surprising that neither the public nor politicians have been able to adjust to the immense, unintended, and only gradually emerging social consequences of postmodern family life. With their eyes firmly fixed on the underlying demographic changes, Wattenberg and Longman are less disposed to browbeat politicians than are Peterson, Kotlikoff, and Burns.

A new conservatism?

On the matter of the new demography and its social consequences, the work of Ben Wattenberg holds a place of special honor. In 1987, 17 years before the publication of Fewer, Wattenberg wrote The Birth Dearth. That book was the first prominent public warning of a crisis of population decline. Yet many rejected its message. In an era when a “population explosion” was taken for granted, the message of The Birth Dearth flew squarely in the face of received wisdom. Subsequent events, however, have proved Wattenberg right.

Despite that vindication, Wattenberg’s own views have changed somewhat. Whereas The Birth Dearth advocated aggressive pro-natalist policies, today Wattenberg seems to have all but given up hope that fertility rates can be substantially increased. On the one hand, he thinks it unlikely that worldwide population can maintain a course of shrinkage without end. On the other hand, he sees no viable scenario by which this presumably unsustainable trend might be reversed.
In The Empty Cradle, Philip Longman takes a different view. Longman believes that runaway population decline may be halted, yet he understands that this can be accomplished only by way of fundamental cultural change. The emerging demographic crisis will call a wide range of postmodern ideologies into question. Longman writes as a secular liberal looking for ways to stabilize the population short of the traditionalist, religious renewal he fears the new demography will bring in its wake.
Given the roots of population decline in the core characteristics of postmodern life, Longman understands that the endless downward spiral cannot be reversed without a major social transformation. As he puts it, “If human population does not wither away in the future, it will be because of a mutation in human culture.” Longman draws parallels to the Victorian era and other periods when fears of population decline, cultural decadence, and fraying social safety nets intensified family solidarity and stigmatized abortion and birth control. Longman also notes that movements of the 1960s, such as feminism, environmentalism, and the sexual revolution, were buttressed by fears of a population explosion. Once it becomes evident that our real problem is the failure to reproduce, these movements and attitudes could weaken.
Longman’s greatest fear is a revival of fundamentalism, which he defines broadly as any movement that relies on ancient myth and legend, whether religious or not, “to oppose modern, liberal, and commercial values.” Religious traditionalists tend to have large families (relatively speaking). Secular modernists do not. Longman’s fear is that, over time, Western secular liberals will shrink as a portion of world population while, at home and abroad, traditionalists will flourish. To counter this, and to solve the larger demographic-economic crisis, Longman offers some very thoughtful proposals for encouraging Americans to have more children. Substantial tax relief for parents is the foundation of his plan.
Longman has thought this problem through very deeply. Yet, in some respects, his concerns seem odd and exaggerated. He lumps American evangelicals together with Nazis, racists, and Islamicists in the same supposed opposition to all things modern. This is more interesting as a specimen of liberal prejudice than as a balanced assessment of the relationship between Christianity and modernity. Moreover, the mere fact that religious conservatives have more children than secular liberals is no guarantee that those children will remain untouched by secular culture.
Still, Longman rightly sees that population decline cannot be reversed in the absence of major cultural change, and the prospects of a significant religious revival must not be dismissed. In a future shadowed by vastly disproportionate numbers of poor elderly citizens, and younger workers struggling with impossible tax burdens, the fundamental tenets of postmodern life might be called into question. Some will surely argue from a religious perspective that mankind, having discarded God’s injunctions to be fruitful and multiply, is suffering the consequences.
Yet we needn’t resort to disaster scenarios to see that our current demographic dilemma portends fundamental cultural change. Let us say that in the wake of the coming economic and demographic stresses, a serious secular, pronatalist program of the type proposed by Longman were to take hold and succeed. The result might not be “fundamentalism,” yet it would almost certainly involve greater cultural conservatism. Married parents tend to be more conservative, politically and culturally. Predictions of future dominance for the Democratic Party are based on the increasing demographic prominence of single women. Delayed marriage lowers fertility rates and moves the culture leftward. Reverse that trend by stimulating married parenthood, and the country grows more conservative — whether in a religious mode or not.
But can the cultural engines of postmodernity really be thrown into reverse? After all, people don’t decide to have children because they think it will help society. They act on their personal desires and interests. Will women stop wanting to be professionals? Is it conceivable that birth control might become significantly less available than it is today? It certainly seems unlikely that any free Western society would substantially restrict contraception, no matter how badly its population was dwindling.
Yet it is important to keep in mind that decisions about whether and when to have children may someday take place in a markedly different social environment. As mentioned, children are valued in traditional societies because of the care they provide in old age. In the developed world, by contrast, old age is substantially provisioned by personal savings and the welfare state. But what will happen if the economy and the welfare state shrink significantly? Quite possibly, people will once again begin to look to family for security in old age — and childbearing might commensurately appear more personally necessary.
If a massive cohort of elderly citizens find themselves in a chronic state of crisis, the lesson for the young will be clear. Wattenberg notes that pro-natalist policies have failed wherever they’ve been tried. Yet in conditions of serious economic stress and demographic imbalance, sweeping pro-natalist plans like those offered by Longman may in fact become workable. That would usher in a series of deeper cultural changes, most of them pointing society in a more conservative direction.
Then again, we may finesse the challenge of a rapidly aging society by some combination of increased productivity, entitlement reform, and delayed retirement. In that case, fertility will continue to fall, and world population will shrink at compounding speed. The end result could be crisis or change further down the road, or simply substantial and ongoing reductions in world population, with geostrategic consequences difficult to predict. One way or the other, it would seem that our social order is in motion.

New eugenics?

The emerging population implosion, then, may be taken in part as a challenge to Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis. As Fukuyama himself came to recognize in his 2002 book, Our Posthuman Future, the greatest challenge to the “end of history” idea is the prospect that biotechnology might work a fundamental change in human nature and society. In the form of modern contraception, it may already have done so. And contraception could be only the beginning.

Like others who warn of the dangers of biotechnology, Fukuyama is most concerned about the prospect that genetic engineering could undermine the principles of liberty and equality. If children are genetically engineered for greater health, strength, or intellectual capacity, erstwhile liberal society could be plunged into a brave new world of genetically-based class hierarchy.
That is a grave concern, yet there may still be others. The disruptive effects of biotechnology will play out in a depopulating world — perhaps a world shadowed by economic and cultural crisis. So the immediate challenge of biotechnology to human history is the prospect that the family might be replaced by a bioengineered breeding system. Artificial wombs, not the production of supermen, may soon be the foremost social challenge posed by advancing science. Certainly, there is a danger that genetic engineering may someday lead to class distinctions. But the pressure on the bioengineers of the future will be to generate population. If and when the prospect of building “better” human beings becomes real, it will play out in the context of a world under radical population pressure. That population crunch will likely shape the new genetics at every turn.
With talk of artificial wombs and the end of the family, we are a long way from the idea of a conservative religious revival. The truth is, the possibility of a population crisis simultaneously raises the prospect of conservative revival and eugenic nightmare. In his landmark book on Western family decline, Disturbing the Nest, sociologist David Popenoe traces out contrasting ideal-typical scenarios by which the Western family might be either strengthened or further eroded. Looking at these scenarios, it’s evident that a population crisis could trigger either one.
What could reverse the decline of the Western nuclear family? Anything that might counter the affluence, secularism, and individualism that led to family decline in the first place, says Popenoe. Economic decline could force people to depend on families instead of the state. A religious revival could restore traditional mores. And a revised calculation of rational interest in light of social chaos could call the benefits of extreme individualism into question. We’ve already seen that a demographic-economic crisis could invoke all three of these mechanisms.
But what about the reverse scenario, in which the nuclear family would entirely disappear? According to Popenoe, the end of the nuclear family would come through a further development of our growing tendency to separate pair-bonding from sex and procreation. Especially in Europe, marriage is morphing into parental cohabitation. And in societies where parents commonly cohabit, the practice of “living alone together” is emerging. There unmarried parents remain “together” yet live in separate households, only one of them with a child. And of course, intentional single motherhood by older unmarried women — Murphy Brown-style — is another dramatic repudiation of the nuclear family. The next logical step in all this would be for single mothers to turn their children over to some other individual or group for rearing. That would spell the definitive end of the nuclear family.
A prolonged economic crisis accompanied by widespread concern over depopulation would undoubtedly place feminism under pressure. Yet it’s unlikely that postmodern attitudes toward women, work and family could be swept aside — or even significantly modified — without a major cultural struggle. A eugenic regime would be the logical way to safeguard feminist goals in a depopulating world, and there is ample precedent for an alliance between eugenics and feminism.
After all, birth control pioneers like Margaret Sanger in the United States and Marie Stopes in England blended feminism and eugenics at the outset of the twentieth century. As birth control came into wide use, fertility sharply declined — particularly among the upper classes, which had access to the technology. Alarmed by the relative decline of the elites, Teddy Roosevelt urged upper-class women to have more children. Even progressives began to question their commitment to women’s rights. Margaret Sanger’s response was to promote a eugenic regime of forced sterilization and birth control among the unfit. Instead of urging “the intelligent” to have more children, Sanger advocated the suppression of births among “the insane and the blemished.”
The women’s movement of the 1960s forged still more links between feminism and eugenics. Shulamith Firestone’s 1970 classic, The Dialectic of Sex, argued that women would truly be free only when released from the burden of reproduction. Today, as scientists work to engineer embryos in the laboratory, while others devise technology to save premature babies at ever earlier stages of development, the possibility that a viable artificial womb will someday be created has emerged. While feminists are divided on the issue, many look forward to the prospect.
Thus, if faced with an ultimate choice between feminist hopes of workplace equality with men and society’s simultaneous need for more children, it is not hard to imagine that some on the cultural left would opt for technological outsourcing — surrogacy in various forms — as a way out. To some extent, this phenomenon has already begun: Consider the small but growing numbers of older, usually career women who choose and pay younger women to carry babies for them. As with Sanger and Firestone, eugenics may be seen by some as the “logical” alternative to pressure to restore the traditional family.
Christine Rosen, who has usefully thought through the prospects and implications of “ectogenesis,” suggests that objections to the human exploitation inherent in surrogacy could actually propel a shift toward artificial wombs. Of course, that would only complete the commodification of childbirth itself — weakening if not eliminating the parent-child bond. And if artificial wombs one day become “safer” than human gestation, insurers might begin to insist on our not giving birth the old-fashioned way.
Such dark possibilities demand serious intellectual attention. Neither principled objections to tampering with human nature nor instinctive horror at the thought of it suffice to meet the challenge of the new eugenics. Philosophy and instinct must be welded to a compelling social vision. The course and consequences of world population decline offer just such a vision. In the end, philosophical principles and reflexive horror are guardians of the social order, yet without a lively vision of the social order they are protecting, these guardians cannot properly do their work.

New choices

Even in the celebrated image of the conservative who stands athwart history yelling “Stop!” there is a subtle admission of modernization’s inevitability. Tocqueville saw history’s trend toward ever greater individualism as an irresistible force. The most we could do, he thought, was to balance individualism with modern forms of religious, family, and civic association. Today, even Tocqueville’s cherished counterweights to radical individualism are disappearing — particularly in the sphere of the family.

It is indeed tempting to believe that the fundamental social changes initiated in the 1960s have by now become irreversible. Widespread contraception, abortion, women in the workforce, marital decline, growing secularism and individualism — all seem here to stay. Looked at from a longer view, however, the results are not really in. We haven’t yet seen the passing of even the great demographic wave of the “baby boom.” The latter half of the twentieth century may someday be seen not as ushering in the end of history, but as a transition out of modernity and into a new, prolonged, and culturally novel era of population shrinkage.
The most interesting and unanticipated prospect of all would be a conservatism. Of our authors, only Longman has explored the potential ideological consequences of the new demography. In effect, Longman wrote his book to forestall a religiously-based conservatism precipitated by demographic and economic decline. Yet even Longman may underestimate the potential for conservative resurgence.
It wouldn’t take a full-scale economic meltdown, or even a relative disparity in births between fundamentalists and secularists, to change modernity’s course. Chronic low-level economic stress in a rapidly aging world may be enough. There is good reason to worry about the fate of elderly boomers with fragile families, limited savings, and relatively few children to care for them. A younger generation of workers will soon feel the burden of paying for the care of this massive older generation. The nursing shortage, already acute, will undoubtedly worsen, possibly foreshadowing shortages in many other categories of workers. Real estate values could be threatened by population decline. And all these demographically tinged issues, and more, will likely become the media’s daily fare.
In such an atmosphere, a new set of social values could emerge along with a fundamentally new calculation of personal interest. Modernity itself may come in for criticism even as a new appreciation for the benefits of marriage and parenting might emerge. A successful pronatalist policy (if achieved by means of the conventional family rather than through surrogacy or artificial wombs) would only reinforce the conservative trend. In that case we will surely find that it is cultural radicals standing athwart history’s new trend yelling “Stop!”
Humankind faces three fundamental choices in the years ahead: at least a partial restoration of traditional social values, a radical new eugenics, or endless and compounding population decline. For a long time, this choice may not be an either/or. Divisions will likely emerge both within and between societies on how to proceed. Some regions may grow more traditional, others may experiment with radical new social forms, while still others may continue to shrink. And a great deal will depend upon an economic future that no one can predict with certainty. In any case, the social innovations of the modern world are still being tested, and the outcome is unresolved.

Religion Will Not Save the West:

I do not see religion as the re-uniting glue of the West at all, though it is a thread in the common denominator. I do think there is a lot to be said for Christian culture, provided this is not twisted to leftist ends.


Somehow we forget that a lot of good happened during the Enlightenment, and that the people who carried its torch both in Europe and in America called themselves Christian, were deeply spiritual, and yet dismissed religious dogma. Montesquieu and Goethe come to mind, as do the most important of America’s founding fathers, Washington, Franklin, Jefferson et al. They (the Americans) called themselves deists. Washington for instance was observed to kneel in prayer in the field before a battle, but largely refused to attend church services.


Many traditionalists blame the Enlightenment for all our current woes, i.e. putting man in the center of things, but like much everything else, it’s all a question of balance. The Enlightenment happened because the Church had veered far out into  darkness. Now it’s kind of too light for my taste; it’s time to swing back toward the comforting shadow, but never back into darkness. And I am not keen on the Evangelicals either; it’s an entirely anti-intellectual movement. Refusing to use one’s brain and power of critical analysis cannot be the basis for regeneration, or, as a social-political force we are stillborn before we have been born.


I believe that we should not deny a seat at the table to atheists and agnostics either — provided they are not leftist. The two are NOT inextricably linked, despite a lot of silly propaganda one hears, at least in America, about these “Godless” unworthies.


Some of the most moral, developed, indeed great individuals I have known don’t even have a notion such as God, e.g. Confucians and Daoists, including Zen. Confucianism is a thoroughly secular philosophy, yet if you know enough to skirt its pop, distorted image, it’s quite admirable, if not really adaptable to the West. But Zen is adaptable. One of the great Christian mystics of the 20th century, Thomas Merton, was a Zen adept.


You may not follow these debates in the American media, but some of the best, most incisive conservative writers, e.g. John Derbyshire, Heather MacDonald, are constantly being attacked by “conservatives” for being “Godless atheists.”  This is beyond silly.

9 thoughts on “What will happen if Europeans-Americans lose the Western World?

  1. Would it be too much to ask that this article be properly formatted? The last third of every sentence is cut off. I can’t read it.

    • Its a very old article, site has been changed so much since it was posted not all articles, follow the new format. If you find more articles let us know.

      L-Blog team

  2. well actually from a wealthy white man’s pov we whites are worse cause went to their country and the niggers had nothing but peace and we stole them from their homes and enslaved them and shit. then we really screwed the Indians by giving them smallpox blankets which is also what we are doing in Africa. i mean come on did you notice that AIDS was rare until us whites went to Africa and started fucking their wives an our wives fucked their monster dicks .we whites are the virus duh!and we did get a 400year head start cause we made sure we bought out all of the lands were blacks wanted to live and forced them to work harder 4 it so while they worked we just laid back and enjoyed the shit they made us. i mean earlier 2day i fired this black kid so my best friend could work at my firm it was so funny cause my pal got his raise and benefits. and since in whiter i am gonna race this other black kid 4 cash but gonna sneak some steroids FUCK IT IM RICH AN WHITE SO I AINT SCARED TO SAY DAT WE AINT BETTER DEN THE GERMANS TEACHING OUR KIDS TO 4GET IT

    • @ LILROCK

      If you are posting a serious comment to a serious article, if would benefit your position for you to use better grammar.

  3. “What will Happen if Europeans lost Europe, and Americans of European Ancestry lose America?”

    This question is really a statement. Whoever wrote this is claiming to know the future based on the “facts” as he or she sees them. And the statements about race and the superiority of the white race, implied or otherwise, are completely flawed. First, there is no such thing as a pure race, let alone a white one. I’m not going to do the homework for the person who wrote this but only to suggest that they communicate with a credible scientist(s) in the area of genetics., as well as studies in anthropology, biology, and human migrations 50,000 to 100,000 years ago.

    As a white man permit me to make a few points about the white race; to acknowledge that the US dropped nuclear bombs on two Japanese cities, fire-bombed Tokyo, that Great Britain and the US fire-bombed Dresden and a number of other German cities, expending more destructive force, according to some historians, against the civilian German population than against the German armies, that President Grant and his Civil War war criminals, Generals Sherman and Sheridan, committed genocide against the Plains Indians, that the US today enables Israel’s genocidal policies against the Palestinians, policies that one Israeli official has compared to 19th century US genocidal policies against the American Indians, that the US in the new 21st century invaded Iraq and Afghanistan on contrived pretenses, murdering countless numbers of civilians, and that British prime minister Tony Blair lent the British army to his American masters, as did other NATO countries, all of whom find themselves committing war crimes under the Nuremberg standard in lands in which they have no national interests, but for which they receive an American pay check.

    • The Western peoples, which is the white race, is different from the savage mud races, we will no longer fall for the lies of the ruling elites and their pets, our wrath will cleanse the earth very soon now. These liberal western democracies are on their death beds, and soon, like a phoenix from the ashes we will rise and strike a blow that will be remembered in your mud racial collective for all time, and many of your kind will not survive the onslaught, you poke at a beast my mud friend, and our chains grow weak with every breath.

      • alas if only you could only survive the end then maybe you and your friends can do it but in reality you anglo fuckers are no better than what you call the savage mud races and my god you clearly do not fear anything not even god so tell me how in your final last dying words you glimpse at the truth that you were a terrible evil being who wasted his life with hatred and WHOOOO knows the world will probably end soon if we do not change our ways so have a great time alive and you will see what john lennon meant.

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