Surrender, Genocide… or What? — An Update

Surrender, Genocide… or What? — An Update

by Baron Bodissey

Last spring El Inglés caused a bit of a stir here with his essay “Surrender, Genocide… or What?”. In recent weeks he has been busy researching and writing a follow-up, and the result is posted below.

A prefatory note from El Inglés:

I started writing ‘Surrender, Genocide… or What?’ with a fairly loose set of topics I wished to write a paragraph each on. There was no hint in my mind of how it might take shape when finished, or what threads of argument might bind it together. However, as I started to put metaphorical pen to paper, some paragraph headings were discarded as superfluous, others used at greater length, and the resulting chunks of text reorganized in accordance with an increasingly clear notion of what it was I wanted to say.

Having enjoyed the great privilege of having a number of very different essays read, enjoyed, loathed, praised, and torn down by presumably some thousands if not tens of thousands of readers, I would like to bring an end to my rather strange and short career as an analyst of Islamization and related issues with a long-brewing update to ‘Surrender, Genocide, or What?’ in which I consider again some of the key arguments, some new developments, and some factors which may be of relevance to issues of central importance.
London Explosion
Surrender, Genocide… or What? — An Update
by El Inglés

Prelude

The controversy over ‘Surrender, Genocide… or What?’ (hereafter referred to as SGW) was, by and large, fraudulent. It was simply used as ammunition in an ongoing conflict, by certain parties with limited reading comprehension skills and even more limited integrity. Nor is there any obvious reason why it should have been controversial. Given the prevalence of violent conflict of various sorts in human history, it is surely not unreasonable to suggest that any polity, no matter how peaceful or prosperous, is never more than one or two macrohistorical wrong turns away from reacquainting itself with the unpleasantness such conflict results in. Given further the innumerable examples to be found even just in recent history of the extraordinary violence human beings will use to attack and/or separate themselves from others with whom they do not identify, the likelihood of an outbreak of vicious tribal conflict in Europe as a consequence of mass immigration struck me as obvious. Indeed, it still strikes me as being so obvious as to be slightly embarrassing to suggest at all.

Despite the above, there was a slightly surreal quality to the process of considering, in as much detail as I could manage at the time of writing, the implications of the fairly simple positive feedback arguments that were central to the essay. The conclusions I reached in SGW struck even me, the author, as being slightly fantastic in some regards. But that they did so was, I think, more a consequence of the unprecedented nature of the phenomena I predicted for post-war Western Europe than of any flaw in the arguments themselves. Indeed, nothing that has happened between now and my writing SGW has led me to believe that the reasoning therein was not fundamentally sound and the dynamics I claimed to see in the Islamization of Europe not actually real. On the contrary, subsequent events have convinced me that the point of no return I mentioned in SGW has, in all likelihood, already been crossed by at least some European countries, and others are dangerously close to crossing it. Before explaining why I think this, I would like to briefly review the key line of argument in the original essay.

Boiled down to its essentials, the argument goes as follows. Political elites in most Western European countries are wedded, through genuine ideological conviction, institutional entanglements, or both, to a politics which has taken the influx of large numbers of Muslim immigrants to be both natural and beneficial. This position, facilitated by a belief in the equal worth and validity of all cultures and a consequent desire to allow all cultures consideration and concessions, has permitted Islam to start to display its true colours, as a vicious, expansionist, and totalitarian ideology that will continue to demand ever greater degrees of obeisance.

With both endogenous and exogenous growth of European Muslim communities driving up the Muslim population fractions in afflicted countries, a positive feedback loop emerges. The abovementioned political elites, baffled by and helpless in the face of a tribalism the likes of which they had, one assumes, forgotten ever existed, rush to appease the followers of Allah as, their worldview informs them, all conceivable tensions can be resolved to the satisfaction of all relevant parties through compromise. Such capitulation as then takes place emboldens Muslim fifth columnists whilst allowing their numbers to continue to grow unabated. Before too long, further capitulation is required to soothe the anger of an ever-stronger Muslim community, thereby wearing the groove of a coupled behavioural pattern ever deeper into the minds of demanders and appeasers, predators and prey.

It is my contention that this disastrous positive feedback loop cannot be escaped from through the actions of extant political elites with decades of psychological and intellectual investment in its creation. Accordingly, it will be broken only by the emergence of qualitatively different political actors, who can be categorized in one of two ways: non-mainstream political parties who gain power on the back of opposition to Islamization and mass immigration more generally in electoral discontinuities; and agents acting outside of or after the breakdown of established political mechanisms in non-electoral discontinuities, which imply some significant collapse of law and order. Both of these discontinuities are likely to be extremely unpleasant and feature much violence. Furthermore, there is a very real possibility that even electoral discontinuities will be induced by additional dynamics to collapse into non-electoral discontinuities with all that that implies. Note that none of these claims is offered up as some fundamental law of European societies pertinent to the situations they find themselves in today. Rather, they simply constitute a formalization of a number of easily observable, loosely bundled European dynamics vis-à-vis Islam.
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Continuation

I commenced the discussion in SGW with a review and analysis of the stance of the British police with respect to Islam, in order to demonstrate the rot in modern Britain through focusing on a specific institution. Continuing in this vein, I would like to consider more recent developments in this and related areas to show that things have only worsened in the interim and that the positive feedback dynamic I identified in SGW is alive and well.

In 2004, a documentary called Edge of the City was due to be shown on British TV. The filmmakers had spent a year working with social services in Bradford and produced a 90-film exposing the darker aspects of life in that town in northwest England. Originally due to air in May 2004, the broadcast was withdrawn from the schedule at the last moment due to an apparently unprecedented request by the police. This request, made due to a concern that broadcasting the film could result in an outbreak of race riots, resulted in the eventual broadcast being delayed by several months.

Why the concern? The film examined, among other issues, the rather vexing problem of underage white girls in Bradford being systematically pimped out by Pakistani gangs. Despite a furore of claim and counterclaim, the actual scale and nature of the underlying problem was not clear to me at the time, and I was only dimly aware of the controversy. Pakistani gangs were responsible; the police said they had arrested whites for the same crimes. The police were pressured to try to reduce the possibility of the British National Party gaining support prior to the European Parliament elections; the concerns were about the outbreak of rioting a mere three years after the Bradford riots. It was a racial problem; it wasn’t a racial problem. It was a cultural problem; it was a misogyny problem. And so on and so forth.

The entire episode slipped from my mind until fairly recently, when I happened upon a detailed and well-sourced article in The Times that touched on related subjects. Entitled Mothers of Prevention, the article provided a great deal of clarification of what had been happening over the last few years with respect to the pimping of young white girls in the northwest of England. I belatedly discovered that, to put it bluntly, the claims of a disproportionate ‘Asian’ presence in the exploitation of underage girls appeared to be not only true, but horrifyingly so.

The article was written in response to the convictions obtained against two Blackburn men, Zulfqar Hussain and Qaiser Naveed, for abduction, sexual activity with a child, and the supply of a controlled drug. As was demonstrated in some detail, the backdrop to the case was essentially that which Edge of the City had reported on some years earlier, with a vast swath of the North of England seemingly affected. To quote the article:

‘It seemed a shabby, seedy episode, probably typical of many cases down the years that have involved exploitative men and naïve women. Yet, until these convictions, the police in over a dozen towns and cities, including Leeds, Sheffield, Blackburn and Huddersfield, had appeared reluctant to address what many local people had perceived as a growing problem — the groups of men who had been preying on young, vulnerable girls and ensnaring them into prostitution.

‘It was a very uncomfortable scenario, not least because many of these crimes had an identifiable racial element: the gangs were Asian and the girls were white. The authorities, in the shape of politicians and the police, seemed reluctant to acknowledge this aspect of the crimes; it has been left to the mothers of the victims to speak out.’

Here, I will present certain key claims in the article at length to provide the material for the analysis that follows.

(1) The mother of one young victim ‘[…] was told by one police officer that he did not ‘want to start a race riot’ by arresting Pakistani men for sexual offences.’
(2) The problems discussed in the article are widespread, as ‘Blackburn, in common with many northern towns, is experiencing a huge upsurge in pimping, and it is an unpalatable truth for the authorities — and indeed the police — that many of the newest wave of pimps come from within the Asian [sic] community.’
(3) Blackburn, the most obviously afflicted town, is the constituency of Jack Straw, a key Cabinet member under the Labour government in power since 1997. According to Mr. Straw: ‘I have had two cases at my constituency surgery over the past two years and have discussed this with the police, council, community leaders and the Lancashire Telegraph.
(4) Affected families are ‘meeting lawyers to discuss possible action against the police. This could result in the biggest civil action ever brought against police for failing to protect children from sexual predators.
(5) The mother of one victim said that ‘We parents are doing more to investigate these criminals than the police […] My husband and I have sat for hours outside hot spots, taking down car-registration numbers. I have given the police dozens of names from my daughter’s mobile phone, but they have done nothing.
(6) Predictably, there are efforts to minimize the importance of the ‘evidence from rigorous research by organisations such as Crop [Coalition for the Removal of Pimping] that the gangs are largely made up of men from the Pakistani Muslim communities‘. ‘What we’re dealing with is gross criminality,’ says Aravinda Kosaraju, a researcher at Crop. ‘That should be confronted whatever the race of the perpetrator.’
(7) Mike Cunningham, an assistant chief constable with Lancashire police was quoted as saying that ‘Offenders can and do come from a variety of cultural backgrounds, and we deal with each case on its own individual merit.
(8) During the events leading to the postponing of the broadcast, ‘A spokesman […] said police had found no evidence of the alleged systematic exploitation, and the chief constable of West Yorkshire Police warned Channel 4 that he felt the timing of the programme could contribute to community unrest in Bradford and possibly even provoke public disorder in the city.
(9) Sunny Hundal, a young British Sikh journalist and commentator said that ‘Although it’s obvious that it’s young, lawless Pakistani boys, it’s tricky to make this an issue about race or religion when neither are contributing factors.‘ He also claims that some young ‘Asian’ men ‘hold very disparaging attitudes towards white girls‘.

This assembly of points, depressing and enraging in equal measure, can be pieced together to help reiterate and reinforce the key claims in the central argument of SGW as follows.

Key Claim 1 — Political elites in most Western European countries take the influx of large numbers of Muslim immigrants to be both natural and beneficial.

This claim is not demonstrated explicitly in the article, but is the foundation on which everything in the article stands. Point (3) mentions Jack Straw, who has been Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary, and Leader of the House of Commons since Labour’s ascent to power in 1997. It was in that year, soon after winning the general election, that Labour abolished the Primary Purpose Rule, which made it incumbent on those who would bring spouses into the UK to establish that the marriage in question was not being undertaken for the purpose of enabling the immigration of the non-British spouse. Muslim immigration soared after this change, and has remained ever since at annual levels much higher than those seen under the previous Conservative administration. To all intents and purposes, there seem to be no barriers of note to the influx of ever-greater numbers of Muslims, particularly from the Indian sub-continent. This was, undoubtedly, the purpose of the change, though why it was considered desirable is a question I do not pretend to be able to answer.

Key Claim 2 — Islam has started to display its true colours, as a vicious, expansionist, and totalitarian ideology.

This claim is not demonstrated explicitly in the article either, but will already be crystal clear to most of the people reading this essay, so I will not rehash the evidence for it here. Suffice it to say that the standard wall of denial comes down in point (6), in which a red herring statement of the blindingly obvious is used to deflect attention from gross disproportionalities in the identities of the criminals, point (7), in which we hear the same thing from a police representative with no intention whatsoever of straying from the prevailing taboos of his decaying society, and point (9), in which an occasionally sensible commentator admits the disproportionality but essentially shrugs and admits defeat on the thorny topic of what its significance might be. Neither race nor religion are contributing factors, leaving said disproportionality as one of the great mysteries of modern social science, shuffled awkwardly out of sight with vague references to ‘disparaging’ attitudes towards white girls. Note also the ascribing of the problem to the meaningless construct of the ‘Asian’ population in point (2), an inexcusable slap in the face to the UK’s productive and law-abiding Hindu and Sikh populations from an otherwise reasonably clear-eyed article.

Key Claim 3 — With the Muslim population fractions in afflicted countries increasing, a positive feedback loop emerges.

This is the heart of the argument. Points (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), and (8) all testify to the conflict-avoidance of political elites, the consequent deterioration of the situation, and the subsequent occurrence of similar but even more difficult problems. Points (6) and (7) have already been touched upon, so let us consider points (1), (3), (4), (5), and (8).

In point (1), we have a frank statement on the part of a police officer that the investigation of certain types of crimes by certain groups will not take place if it could lead to race riots. Sadly, it seems improbable that there will come again a time when such investigations have no potential to do so in areas with large Pakistani Muslim populations, forcing us to conclude that the police will avoid such investigations as and when possible in such areas in perpetuity. This is the implication of this simple statement; to wit, that the larger these communities become, the more feebly the long arm of the law must extend into them. Note that this claim is not refuted by the disproportionately large numbers of Pakistanis in our prisons; rather, it suggests that this number would be even larger if the police were so old-fashioned as to actually do their jobs.

Moving onto point (3), we observe the response of the previously mentioned, democratically elected Member of Parliament for Blackburn, Jack Straw. I will repeat it here due to its great comedic value: ‘I have had two cases at my constituency surgery over the past two years and have discussed this with the police, council, community leaders and the Lancashire Telegraph.‘ Mr. Straw is actually admitting, albeit tacitly, that he has accomplished nothing whatsoever to aid those young girls being systematically drugged, raped, and pimped by vicious sexual predators who only exist in Britain in such large numbers in the first place due to the pro-immigration policies of the government in whose Cabinet he has been such a prominent figure. According to the 2001 census, the population of Blackburn was nearly 26% Muslim in that year, and this number can only have risen since. Presumably this has something to do with Mr. Straw’s reluctance to help pursue Pakistani Muslim child rapists.

Points (4) and (5) drive home the evolution of the police from an organization dedicated to bringing criminals to justice and thereby deterring possible future offenders, to a passive riot prevention tool. This astounding law enforcement innovation requires some explanation. Faced with the widespread sexual abuse of young girls by an actively hostile fifth column, the concern of the police is simply to avoid riots (not an unworthy objective in its own right), a goal it achieves largely by not doing anything in response. The churlish might argue that this important goal could be achieved at lesser cost by simply not having a police force in the first place, but, at times, the police also have an active riot prevention function to perform, hence their enduring utility. This is made clear to us by point (8), where we see not only the astounding deceit the police are prepared to resort to in pretending not to see what is in front of their faces, but also their attempts to prevent the broader public from learning about their gross negligence at times considered politically inconvenient due to the proximity of elections for the European Parliament.

Key Claim 4 — This positive feedback loop cannot be escaped from through the actions of mainstream political elites.

This point is a logical extension of the previous one. Once a positive feedback loop has been established as outlined in more detail in SGW, by its very nature it will prove impossible to break in the absence of some influence being extended over the system by an agent external to it. Much could be said to further develop this idea, but I will refrain from saying it to simply observe that no mainstream political party (i.e. a party once a part of the multicultural consensus) has yet come to its senses and unapologetically started to oppose the Islamization of its country, as far as I am aware. Nor does any seem to have come close. This empirical reality speaks far more eloquently on the subject than any theoretical claims could hope to.

Key Claim 5 — Accordingly, the positive feedback loop will be broken only by the emergence of qualitatively different political actors, in an event which will constitute a discontinuity.

This final claim cannot be definitively established in advance for any country, but it is reasonably clear that we can, with some confidence, expect political actors to emerge and gain support from outside the political mainstream across Europe to challenge Islamization, its supporters, and its enablers. These forces, when ascendant, will cause a rupture between the European recent past and the European future, which I have referred to as a discontinuity. These discontinuities will be, as mentioned before, of two different types, electoral and non-electoral, with the former likely to be structurally unstable enough to collapse into the latter.

Colonization

Is there one convenient word for describing what we are witnessing when we look at the sort of phenomena plaguing the north of England? I believe there is, and the word in question is colonization. Until recently, I have always been suspicious of suggestions that this is what is occurring, as they seemed to smack of a genuinely hysterical xenophobia. Upon more careful consideration however, it occurs to me that it is a very simple and accurate description of what is happening.

When we examine unambiguous historical examples of colonization, such as the colonization of North America by Europeans, what precisely are the characteristics of these historical events that lead us to describe them as colonization at all? I submit that there are three conditions, related but distinct, all of which must be satisfied for us to be observing an instance of colonization. Others might produce different lists, but the key principles will be the same.

1) Population — Colonization must involve the colonizing population putting the colonized population under continuous demographic pressure. It can do this by continued settlement/immigration, higher fertility rates, gradually killing off the colonized population, undermining its ability to maintain itself economically, or some combination of these factors. If the colony at Jamestown, Virginia, had remained the only European settlement in North America, we would surely not talk today about the colonization of America, irrespective of the other behaviours of the colonists.
2) Territory — Colonization must also involve the colonizing population putting the colonized population under geographic pressure. If the ‘colonized’ population enjoys permanent control of substantial territories in which it is able to maintain its way of life without major hindrance, then it has not yet been colonized, though it may have been inconvenienced by the influx of newcomers. If the colonization of North America had been limited to a number of large, populous settlements along the Atlantic seaboard, we would not talk about the colonization of the continent, though we could still legitimately talk of the existence of colonies.
3) Zero-Sum Game — Last but not least, colonization must involve the creation of a zero-sum game between colonizers and colonized, a game which the colonized start to lose. Whether competition over resources, markets, and territory, or outright wars of extermination, there must be winners and losers in interactions between the two groups. If the native population of North America had simply been incorporated into an ever-growing yet prosperous, peaceful and productive polity, membership of which they greatly preferred to their previous nomadic ways, using the word colonization to describe the process would feel somehow wrong, despite its obvious applicability in other, technical regards. Colonization is not colonization if it is welcomed.

It seems to me that these three conditions are, taken together, both necessary and sufficient to establish an encroachment of one people on another as being colonization. This said, can it then be observed that Europe is being colonized by a mishmash of various Muslim populations? I would argue that it can. The demographic pressure of Muslim populations on native populations in European countries, spurred on by ongoing immigration and high fertility rates, is too well-established to be discussed again here. The territorial pressure on the native population, brought to bear on both private citizens and organs of the state too, will be similarly familiar to anyone with the briefest acquaintance with the growing Muslim ghettoes in European cities.

More interesting is the last condition, that of the zero-sum game. This implies a transfer of some sort from colonized to colonizers, but the nature of the transferred object can vary. It can be tangible, such as a piece of land, a gold nugget, or a horse, or intangible, such as a trade concession, a social privilege, or a legal privilege. It will not be lost on the observant reader that at the same time as Muslim colonizers extract great tangible wealth from their colonized populations in the form of welfare and other payments, they extract intangible concessions in the form of, for example, ‘hate speech’ laws which reduce the freedom of those populations whilst increasing the political utility they themselves enjoy.

There is more to be said on the subject, but this should suffice. The fact that most of the Muslims in Western European countries arrived there legally is neither here nor there. Legality is beside the point, a thin and pathetic smear of superficial legitimacy slapped onto mass population movements by political elites who long since stopped attempting to implement the will of the electorates they supposedly served. Colonization with the help of collaborators is still colonization.

I am well aware of the fact that many reasonable-minded people will consider the description of Muslim immigration into Western Europe as colonization to be overstating the case. But the fact of the matter is that colonization was not a historical aberration inflicted by white Europeans on unsuspecting indigenous peoples around the world during a now long-gone historical period. Rather, it is an ever-present historical force that will exist as long as human beings do. The Chinese government is quite deliberately colonizing Tibet and Xinjiang by subsidizing influxes of Han Chinese into these provinces and providing greater political freedoms to those who choose to relocate. America is gradually undergoing a colonization by the various peoples of Latin America, many of whom believe that large swathes of the American southwest are rightfully theirs. In Africa, Bantu peoples continue to gradually encroach upon the few remaining lands of the Bushmen, who used to roam a much larger portion of the continent.

Also noteworthy are failed or only partially successful colonizations. The Russian attempt to colonize the Asiatic land mass from the Urals to the Japan Sea seems doomed to eventual failure, as the country undergoes a demographic collapse and the thinly distributed population of the Russian east heads back west. Similarly, the attempts of white settlers in southern Africa to carve a new America out of the tip of that continent foundered and are now, slowly, in the process of being reversed. Encroaching, retreating, swamping, receding; these human tides are not and will never be merely a feature of some bygone age, or a historical curiosity. They will endure as long as human beings do, and there is a pressing need for European peoples to realize that new waves of colonization are already lapping around their feet.

Considerations

The coming discontinuities, be they electoral or non-electoral, will be attempts by the native populations of European countries to reassert the primacy of their historic ways of life over those of alien and hostile colonizing forces. They will not, I hope, be attempts to reject, tout court, all ethnically non-European peoples who have, in one way or another, come to make their homes in European countries and lived law-abiding and productive laws without endangering the stability or integrity of those countries. I suggested in The Danish Civil War that notions of identity which can encompass such people, while rejecting those who need to be rejected, will be important if we are to steer away from the gradually increasing likelihood of the resurgence of a featureless racial tribalism the consequences and aftermath of which would not be difficult to imagine. Given that I am capable neither of formulating nor propagating such notions, I will content myself here with some final thoughts on topics of relevance.

1) Size of Country

I suspect that geographically small countries with high population densities will have an advantage in somehow successfully responding to the threat posed by Islam in the long term. Larger, more sparsely populated countries will provide too many opportunities for their inhabitants to simply move away from the deepening nightmare of Islamization. Of course, these opportunities will always exist in the form of emigration, but given that many people will naturally be reluctant to completely give up on their countries due to the encroachment of hostile invaders, the greater psychological pressure exerted by the growing inescapability of Islam in a country like the Netherlands will give it a major advantage over a country like Sweden, in that the problem is likely to come to a head sooner.

2) Military Capabilities Relative to Population

In the event of any type of discontinuity, the single most obvious salient factor in determining the outcome will be the capabilities and disposition of the country’s military. In Denmark, which has a substantial and serious Muslim-free military establishment for the size of the country, and in which military experience is widespread among those not in the standing military, any sort of civil breakdown could undoubtedly be met effectively if the political will existed. Sweden, on the other hand, is a country which appears to attach much less value to the maintenance of an effective military and, as far as I am aware, is currently downsizing its already fairly underwhelming forces. Should it continue in this vein, it may well find that its ability to maintain even a semblance of order in the event of a discontinuity will be extremely limited. This will shut some doors and open others considerably less likely to lead anywhere pleasant.

3) Private Gun Ownership

It is probably fair to suggest that in the event of a collapse of civil order and the outbreak of hostilities between Muslims and others, the types of violence that the two sides will bring to bear on each other will be very different. We have been given great insight into the Muslim way of war by events in Iraq over the last few years, with the spreading of diffuse webs of terror through entire societies as the various sides try to crush the will of their opponents. In contrast, the key characteristics of the Western way of war are the forcing of decisive shock battle with highly trained and technologically intensive concentrations of force, the occupation of territory, and the forcing of favourable political settlements after favourable results on the battlefield. Insofar as the defence of European countries falls to the common man rather than professional militaries, the application of this latter way of war or a related one will largely depend on the availability of firearms to that common man. European countries in which such availability is high will be well-positioned to play to their own strengths, irrespective of the actions of their opponents.

4) Urban Vs. Rural

It is a peculiar irony that the brunt of Islamization is born by those in urban areas, whereas the will and means to oppose it may well turn out to be concentrated in more conservative and less cosmopolitan rural areas, where gun ownership is more common and the bond felt with nation and soil presumably stronger. The ability to mobilize, in some fashion, the outrage of the countryside against the Islam-induced decay of the city may well play an important part in determining the post-discontinuity course a given country follows. If a city sees its Muslim population reach parity with its non-Muslim population, as many European cities are projected to in the not-too-distant future, then the necessity of such a mobilization in the event of a discontinuity not contained by the military is not difficult to see.

5) Discrete Opportunities for Electoral Discontinuity

It would take a more knowledgeable observer of Dutch politics than such as myself to say for sure, but it may be the case that the Netherlands is teaching us an important lesson about the likelihood of electoral discontinuities: that such opportunities are discrete entities, arriving, remaining available for a limited time, then receding again. First Pim Fortuyn, now Geert Wilders — if Wilders’ efforts fail, in one fashion or another, perhaps the next chance for an electoral discontinuity will not come for several years, by which time it may be too late to avoid a collapse into a non-electoral discontinuity. If such opportunities do indeed possess this discrete nature, then pressure for such a discontinuity will not be something that steadily builds, but that can be periodically batted away by clueless political elites.

6) Whither the Netherlands?

As I implied in the three scenarios I wrote, in which I laid down three possible futures for Britain with respect to Islamization, my personal belief is that the Netherlands is the country most likely to hit a discontinuity first. This belief, largely impressionistic in nature but also supplemented by a consideration of the country’s size and population density (see above), is further heightened by the existence of all the key elements necessary for the drama to proceed: a rapidly-growing Muslim population both criminal and seditious; a charismatic politician identifying the threat without bending a knee to multicultural platitudes; growing public alarm and anger; and a witless government capable of convincing itself that sending squads of policemen to kick in the doors of cartoonists constitutes the optimal response to the problems it faces. It would be foolish to expect all countries afflicted by Islam to read from a single script, but there is no better country than the Netherlands to observe if we wish to glean an insight what lies in our futures.

7) Whither France?

France would seem to enjoy the dubious privilege of being the European country most likely to continue its slide into Islamization without meeting a discontinuity along the way. Anyone who has read SGW will understand that I do not predict post-discontinuity events to be particularly enjoyable for either side, but it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that the only thing worse than experiencing a discontinuity would be not experiencing one. I am indebted to certain colleagues for trying to explain to me exactly how and why France has reached its own distressing position vis-à-vis Islam, and understand and appreciate many of the germane points. However, any genuine understanding of what exactly the French establishment thinks it is doing eludes me. I will only venture to say here that after the disappointment of Sarkozy and the lack of any obvious widespread attempts to reverse the Islamization of the country despite a Muslim population perhaps as high as 10%, we should at least consider the possible that one of the most populous and powerful countries in Europe will not crash into the wall of Islam at all, but somehow intermingle with it to create a type of polity for which no precedent springs to mind. Though an Islamic France would doubtless be a crippled and enfeebled version of its former self, opponents of Islam and Islamization in the vicinity might do well to start asking themselves what such a development might mean for them.

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